



**Dr.M.G.R. GOVERNMENT ARTS AND
SCIENCE COLLEGE FOR WOMEN**

E- CONTENT

HISTORY OF CHINA AND JAPAN FROM A.D.1900 TO

A.D. 2000

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

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UNIT - I

BOXER REBELLION

In 1900, in what became known as the Boxer Rebellion (or the Boxer Uprising), a Chinese secret organization called the Society of the Righteous and Harmonious Fists led an uprising in northern China against the spread of Western and Japanese influence there. The rebels, referred to by Westerners as Boxers because they performed physical exercises they believed would make them able to withstand bullets, killed foreigners and Chinese Christians and destroyed foreign property. From June to August, the Boxers besieged the foreign district of Beijing (then called Peking), China's capital, until an international force that included American troops subdued the uprising. By the terms of the Boxer Protocol, which officially ended the rebellion in 1901, China agreed to pay more than \$330 million in reparations.

Boxer Rebellion: Background

By the end of the 19th century, the Western powers and Japan had forced China's ruling Qing dynasty to accept wide foreign control over the country's economic affairs. In the Opium Wars (1839-42, 1856-60), popular rebellions and the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), China had fought to resist the foreigners, but it lacked a modernized military and suffered millions of casualties.

By the late 1890s, a Chinese secret group, the Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists (“I-ho-ch’uan” or “Yihequan”), had begun carrying out regular attacks on foreigners and Chinese Christians. (The rebels performed calisthenics rituals and martial arts that they believed would give them the ability to withstand bullets and other forms of attack. Westerners referred to these rituals as shadow boxing, leading to the Boxers nickname.) Although the Boxers came from various parts of society, many were peasants, particularly from Shandong province, which had been struck by natural disasters such as famine and flooding. In the 1890s, China had given territorial and commercial concessions in this area to several European nations, and the Boxers blamed their poor standard of living on foreigners who were colonizing their country.

Boxer Rebellion: 1900

In 1900, the Boxer movement spread to the Beijing area, where the Boxers killed Chinese Christians and Christian missionaries and destroyed churches and railroad stations and other property. On June 20, 1900, the Boxers began a siege of Beijing’s foreign legation district (where the official quarters of foreign diplomats were located.) The following day, Qing Empress Dowager Tzu’u Hzi (or Cixi, 1835-1908) declared a war on all foreign nations with diplomatic ties in China.

As the Western powers and Japan organized a multinational force to crush the rebellion, the siege stretched into weeks, and the

diplomats, their families and guards suffered through hunger and degrading conditions as they fought to keep the Boxers at bay. By some estimates, several hundred foreigners and several thousand Chinese Christians were killed during this time. On August 14, after fighting its way through northern China, an international force of approximately 20,000 troops from eight nations (Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) arrived to take Beijing and rescue the foreigners and Chinese Christians.

Boxer Rebellion: Aftermath

The Boxer Rebellion formally ended with the signing of the Boxer Protocol on September 7, 1901. By terms of the agreement, forts protecting Beijing were to be destroyed, Boxer and Chinese government officials involved in the uprising were to be punished, foreign legations were permitted to station troops in Beijing for their defense, China was prohibited from importing arms for two years and it agreed to pay more than \$330 million in reparations to the foreign nations involved.

The Qing dynasty, established in 1644, was weakened by the Boxer Rebellion. Following an uprising in 1911, the dynasty came to an end and China became a republic in 1912.

MANCHU REFORMS

The primary reform of the Manchu were to end the Ming Dynasty. Ming emperors had secluded themselves within the Forbidden City and allowed court Eunuchs to rule in their stead. Corruption and discontent were widespread, but the ruling family remained blissfully ignorant due to a self imposed isolation. When a revolt..

Reformist and revolutionist movements at the end of the dynasty

Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan), a commoner with no background of Confucian orthodoxy who was educated in Western-style schools in Hawaii and Hong Kong, went to Tianjin in 1894 to meet Li Hongzhang and present a reform program, but he was refused an interview. That event supposedly provoked his anti-dynastic attitude. Soon he returned to Hawaii, where he founded an anti-Manchu fraternity called the Revive China Society (Xingzhonghui). Returning to Hong Kong, he and some friends set up a similar society under the leadership of his associate Yang Quyun. Sun participated in an abortive attempt to capture Guangzhou in 1895, after which he sailed for England and then went to Japan in 1897, where he found much support. Tokyo became the revolutionaries' principal base of operation.

After the collapse of the Hundred Days of Reform, Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao had also fled to Japan. An attempt to reconcile the reformists and the revolutionaries became hopeless by 1900: Sun was slighted as a secret-society ruffian, while the reformists were more influential among the Chinese in Japan and the Japanese.

The two camps competed in collecting funds from the overseas Chinese, as well as in attracting secret-society members on the mainland. The reformists strove to unite with the powerful, secret Society of Brothers and Elders (Gelaohui) in the Yangtze River region. In 1899 Kang's followers organized the Independence Army (Zilijun) at Hankou in order to plan an uprising, but the scheme ended unsuccessfully. Early in 1900 the Revive China Society revolutionaries also formed a kind of alliance with the Brothers and Elders, called the Revive Han Association. This new body nominated Sun as its leader, a decision that also gave him, for the first time, the leadership of the Revive China Society. The Revive Han Association started an uprising at Huizhou, in Guangdong, in October 1900, which failed after two weeks' fighting with imperial forces.

After the Boxer disaster, Cixi reluctantly issued a series of reforms, which included abolishing the civil service examination, establishing modern schools, and sending students abroad. But these measures could never repair the damaged imperial prestige; rather, they inspired more anti-Manchu feeling and raised the revolutionary tide. However, other factors also intensified the revolutionary cause: the introduction of social Darwinist ideas by Yen Fu after the Sino-Japanese War countered the reformists' theory of change based on the Chinese Classics; and Western and revolutionary thoughts came to be easily and widely diffused through a growing number of journals and pamphlets published in Tokyo, Shanghai, and Hong Kong.

Nationalists and revolutionists had their most-enthusiastic and most-numerous supporters among the Chinese students in Japan, whose numbers increased rapidly between 1900 and 1906. The Zongli Yamen sent 13 students to Japan for the first time in 1896; within a decade the figure had risen to some 8,000. Many of these students began to organize themselves for propaganda and immediate action for the revolutionary cause. In 1902–04, revolutionary and nationalistic organizations—including the Chinese Educational Association, the Society for Revival of China, and the Restoration Society—appeared in Shanghai. The anti-Manchu tract “Revolutionary Army” was published in 1903, and more than a million copies were issued.

Dealing with the young intellectuals was a new challenge for Sun Yat-sen, who hitherto had concentrated on mobilizing the uncultured secret-society members. He also had to work out some theoretical planks, though he was not a first-class political philosopher. The result of his response was the Three Principles of the People (Sanmin Zhuyi)—nationalism, democracy, and socialism—the prototype of which came to take shape by 1903. He expounded his philosophy in America and Europe during his travels there in 1903–05, returning to Japan in the summer of 1905. The activists in Tokyo joined him to establish a new organization called the United League (Tongmenghui); under Sun’s leadership, the intellectuals increased their importance.

Sun Yat-sen and the United League

Sun’s leadership in the league was far from undisputed. His understanding that the support of foreign powers was indispensable for

Chinese revolution militated against the anti-imperialist trend of the young intellectuals. Only half-heartedly accepted was the principle of people's livelihood, or socialism, one of his Three Principles. Though his socialism has been evaluated in various ways, it seems certain that it did not reflect the hopes and needs of the commoners.

Ideologically, the league soon fell into disharmony: Zhang Binglin (Chang Ping-lin), an influential theorist in the Chinese Classics, came to renounce the Three Principles of the People; others deserted to anarchism, leaving anti-Manchuism as the only common denominator in the league. Organizationally too, the league became divided: the Progressive Society (Gongjinhui), a parallel to the league, was born in Tokyo in 1907; a branch of this new society was soon opened at Wuhan with the ambiguous slogan "Equalization of human right." The next year, Zhang Binglin tried to revive the Restoration Society.

Constitutional movements after 1905

Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05) aroused a cry for constitutionalism in China. Unable to resist the intensifying demand, the Qing court decided in September 1906 to adopt a constitution, and in November it reorganized the traditional six boards into 11 ministries in an attempt to modernize the central government. It promised to open consultative provincial assemblies in October 1907 and proclaimed in August 1908 the outline of a constitution and a nine-year period of tutelage before its full implementation.

Three months later the strangely coinciding deaths of Cixi and the emperor were announced, and a boy who ruled as the Xuantong emperor (1908–1911/12) was enthroned under the regency of his father, the second Prince Chun. These deaths, followed by that of Zhang Zhidong in 1909, almost emptied the Qing court of prestigious members. The consultative provincial assemblies were convened in October 1910 and became the main base of the furious movement for immediate opening of a consultative national assembly, with which the court could not comply.

The gentry and wealthy merchants were the sponsors of constitutionalism; they had been striving to gain the rights held by foreigners. Started first in Hunan, the so-called rights recovery movement spread rapidly and gained noticeable success, reinforced by local officials, students returned from Japan, and the Beijing government. But finally the recovery of the railroad rights ended in a clash between the court and the provincial interests.

The retrieval of the Hankou-Guangzhou line from the American China Development Company in 1905 tapped a nationwide fever for railway recovery and development. However, difficulty in raising capital delayed railway construction by the Chinese year after year. The Beijing court therefore decided to nationalize some important railways in order to accelerate their construction by means of foreign loans, hoping that the expected railway profits would somehow alleviate the court's inveterate financial plight. In May 1911 the court nationalized the Hankou-Guangzhou and Sichuan-Hankou lines and signed a loan contract with the four-power banking consortium. This incensed the

Sichuan gentry, merchants, and landlords who had invested in the latter line, and their anti-Beijing remonstrance grew into a province-wide uprising. The court moved some troops into Sichuan from Hubei; some other troops in Hubei mutinied and suddenly occupied the capital city, Wuchang, on October 10. That date became the memorial day of the Chinese Revolution.

The commoners' standard of living, which had not continued to grow in the 19th century and may have begun to deteriorate, was further dislocated by the mid-century civil wars and foreign commercial and military penetration. Paying for the wars and their indemnities certainly increased the tax burden of the peasantry, but how serious a problem this was has remained an open question among scholars. The Manchu reforms and preparations for constitutionalism added a further fiscal exaction for the populace, which hardly benefited from these urban-oriented developments. Rural distress, resulting from these policies and from natural disasters, was among the causes of local peasant uprisings in the Yangtze River region in 1910 and 1911 and of a major rice riot at Changsha, the capital of Hunan, in 1910. However, popular discontent was limited and not a major factor contributing to the revolution that ended the Qing dynasty and inaugurated the republican era in China.

SUN – YAT – SEN AND 1911 REVOLUTION

Sun Yat-sen, Chinese (Pinyin) **Sun Yixian** or (Wade-Giles romanization) **Sun I-hsien**, original name **Sun Wen**, courtesy name (zi) **Deming**, literary name (*hao*) **Rixin**, later **Yixian**, also called **Sun Zhongshan**, (born November 12, 1866, Xiangshan [now Zhongshan], Guangdong province, China—died March 12, 1925, Beijing), leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang [Pinyin: Guomindang]), known as the father of modern China. Influential in overthrowing the Qing (Manchu) dynasty (1911/12), he served as the first provisional president of the Republic of China (1911–12) and later as de facto ruler (1923–25).

Early life and influences

Sun was born to a family of poor farmers in Xiangshan, in the South China province of Guangdong. In 1879 his brother Sun Mei, who had earlier emigrated to Hawaii as a labourer, brought him to Honolulu, where, as a student at a British missionary school for three years and at an American school, Oahu College, for another year, he first came into contact with Western influences. Because his brother objected to his penchant for Christianity, Sun returned to his native village in 1883 and went to study at the Diocesan Home in Hong Kong in the fall; late that year, he was baptized by an American missionary.

In 1884 he transferred to the Government Central School (later known as Queen's College) and married Lu Muzhen (1867–1952), who was chosen for him by his parents. Out of this marriage a son and two daughters were born.

After another trip to Hawaii, he enrolled in the Guangzhou (Canton) Hospital Medical School in 1886. He transferred later to the College of Medicine for Chinese in Hong Kong and graduated in 1892.

Although not trained for a political career in the traditional style, Sun was nevertheless ambitious and was troubled by the way China, which had clung to its traditional ways under the conservative Qing dynasty, suffered humiliation at the hands of more technologically advanced nations. Forsaking his medical practice in Guangzhou, he went north in 1894 to seek political fortunes. In a long letter to Li Hongzhang, governor-general of Zhili (Chihli, now Hebei) province, he set forth his ideas of how China could gain strength, but all he received from Li was a perfunctory endorsement of his scheme for an agricultural-sericultural association. With this scant reference, Sun went to Hawaii in October 1894 and founded an organization called the Revive China Society (Xingzhonghui), which became the forerunner of the secret revolutionary groups Sun later headed. As far as it can be determined, the membership was drawn entirely from natives of Guangdong and from lower social classes, such as clerks, peasants, and artisans.

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Years in exile

Taking advantage of China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–95) and the ensuing crisis, Sun went to Hong Kong in 1895 and plotted for an

uprising in Guangzhou (Canton), the capital of his native province. When the scheme failed, he began a 16-year exile abroad.

In 1896, under circumstances not entirely clear, Sun was caught and detained for 13 days by the Chinese legation in London. It appears likely that Sun ran into a fellow Cantonese who worked for the legation and was found out and seized while visiting him under an alias. The legation planned to ship Sun back to China, but, before this could be done, Sun had converted a British employee at the legation to his side and got word through to James Cantlie, former dean of Hong Kong College of Medicine. The British Foreign Office intervened, and Sun was released from his captivity. The incident engendered great publicity and gave Sun's career a powerful boost.

After spending much of the ensuing eight months reading in the British Museum, Sun traveled to Japan by way of Canada. Arriving in August 1897, he was met by Miyazaki Torazō, an adventurer who had heard of the London incident and who was willing to help Sun in his political activities. Miyazaki introduced Sun to many influential Japanese, including the elder statesmen Ōkuma Shigenobu, Soejima Taneomi, and Inukai Tsuyoshi, from some of whom Sun was to receive both political and financial assistance.

During the turmoil of 1900, Sun participated in secret maneuvers involving Sir Henry Blake, the British governor of Hong Kong, and He Kai, an influential Chinese in that colony. Their aim was to persuade Li Hongzhang to declare independence from the Qing. Responding to an invitation by Li's staff, Sun journeyed to Hong Kong, but, fearing a trap, he did not go ashore. Instead,

he was represented by Miyazaki and two other Japanese at the meeting, which proved fruitless.

Previously, Sun had made contact with bandits and secret societies in Guangdong. These forces began a revolt in Huizhou (present-day Huiyang in Guangdong) in October 1900. The campaign, the second of 10 claimed by Sun between 1895 and 1911, lasted 12 days.

Founding of the United League

The year 1903 marked a significant turning point in Sun's career; from then on, his following came increasingly from the educated class, the most prestigious and influential group in China. For this decisive change Sun owed much to two factors: the steady decline of the Qing dynasty and the powerful propaganda of Liang Qichao, a reformist who fled to Japan in 1898, founded a Chinese press, and turned it into an instant success. Liang did not actually oppose the Qing regime, but his attacks on Cixi, the empress dowager, who effectively ruled the country, served to undermine the regime and make revolution the only logical choice. As a consequence, Sun's stock rose steadily among the Chinese students abroad. In 1904 he was able to establish several revolutionary cells in Europe, and in 1905 he became head of a revolutionary coalition, the United League (Tongmenghui), in Tokyo. For the next three years the society propagandized effectively through its mouthpiece, "People's Journal" (*Minbao*).

The rise in Sun's fortune increased many of his difficulties. The United League was very loosely organized, and Sun had no control over the individual

members. Worse still, all the revolts Sun and the others organized ended in failure. The members fell into despair, and outside financial contributions declined. Furthermore, as a result of pressures exercised by the Qing, foreign governments increasingly shunned Sun. In 1907 the Japanese government gave him a sum of money and asked him to leave the country. A year later French Indochina, where Sun had hatched several plots, banned him completely. Hong Kong and several other territories were similarly out of his reach.

In the circumstances, Sun spent a year in 1909–10 touring Europe and the United States. Returning to Asia in June 1910, he left for the West again in December after a meeting with other revolutionaries, in which they decided to make a massive effort to capture Guangzhou. This time Sun raised more money in Canada and the United States, but the uprising of April 27 in Guangzhou (known as the March 29 Revolution, because of its date in the Chinese calendar) fared no better than the earlier plots. The possibility of revolutionary success seemed more remote than ever.

But help was to come from the Qing. If only for self-preservation, the court had sponsored reform since 1901. In the next few years it reorganized the army, instituted a school system, abolished the civil-service examinations based on traditional Chinese scholarship, reconstructed many government organs, and convened provincial and national assemblies. The educated class nevertheless remained unsatisfied with the tempo of change, and the regime was rapidly losing its grip over the situation.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1911

In 1911 the Qing decided to nationalize all the trunk railways, thus incurring the wrath of local vested interests. Armed rebellion broke out in the province of Sichuan, and the court exposed itself to further attacks by failing to suppress it. In October of the same year a local revolutionary group in Wuhan, one of many in China by this time, began another rebellion, which, in spite of its lack of coordination, unexpectedly managed to overthrow the provincial government. Its success inspired other provincial secessions.

Sun Yat-sen learned of the Wuhan revolution from the newspapers while he was in Denver, Colo. He returned to Shanghai in December and was elected provisional president by delegates meeting in Nanjing. Knowing that his regime was weak, Sun made a deal with Yuan Shikai (Yüan Shih-k'ai), an imperial minister who had been entrusted with full power by the court. On Feb. 12, 1912, the emperor abdicated; the next day Sun resigned, and on the 14th Yuan was elected his successor.

Later struggles

In September, Yuan appointed Sun director-general of railway development. Their entente might have lasted if Song Jiaoren, who had reorganized the Alliance Society into the Nationalist Party and was serving as its head, had not been assassinated in March 1913, reportedly at Yuan's instigation. This precipitated a second revolution, in which Sun opposed Yuan. When the campaign failed, Sun fled once again to Japan. While there, he unavailingly sought Japanese aid by promising vast concessions in China, and

he also alienated many revolutionaries by requiring them to take an oath of personal allegiance to him. He was also criticized for marrying his secretary, Song Qingling (Soong Ch'ing-ling), in October 1915, without divorcing his first wife.

A combination of internal opposition and external pressures defeated Yuan in 1916. The next year Sun went from Shanghai to Guangdong to launch a movement against the premier, Duan Qirui (Tuan Ch'i-jui). Elected generalissimo of a separatist regime in July, Sun had to resign and leave for Shanghai toward the middle of 1918, when he lost the support of Lu Rongting, the military overlord of Guangdong.

Earlier, Lu had agreed to Sun's gaining control over 20 battalions of armed guards if the forces would remain outside Guangdong. Accepting this condition, Sun appointed Chen Jiongming (Ch'ien Chiung-ming) as the commander and dispatched his men to Fujian. By persuading Chen to fight Lu, Sun found his way back to office for another 16 months, at the end of which Chen turned against him, and Sun had to leave for Shanghai again. From that sanctuary, he wooed the troops from Guangxi and Yunnan, and with their help he again returned to Guangzhou. In February 1923 he installed himself as generalissimo of a new regime.

Meanwhile, a new factor had risen in Sun's political life. Unsuccessful at obtaining aid from the West and Japan, he looked increasingly to the Soviet government, which had come to power in Russia in 1917. A Soviet diplomat, Adolf Joffe, visited Sun in Shanghai in both 1922 and 1923. On the

latter occasion the two issued the Sun-Joffe Manifesto declaring that the communist system was not suitable for China, that Russia intended to give up its privileges there, and that Russia had no intention of extending its influence over Outer Mongolia. At Soviet prodding, the Chinese Communist Party resolved to cooperate with the Nationalists.

In October 1923, Mikhail Borodin, a representative of the Comintern (Communist International), arrived at Guangzhou and soon gained Sun's confidence. Early in 1924 Sun reorganized the Nationalist Party as a tightly disciplined body with authority descending from the top to the lower levels on the model of the Soviet Communist Party. Under his directive a party congress elected three communists to its central executive committee and approved the establishment of a military academy (of which Sun appointed Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi] president). Part of his party-building efforts were a series of lectures Sun delivered on his own doctrine, the Three Principles of the People.

Although these actions strengthened the Nationalists, there was still considerable opposition to Sun's authority when he died of cancer in Beijing in March 1925. His coffin remained uninterred in a temple in Xishan until 1929, when it was moved to a mausoleum in Nanjing.

Legacy

Sun's political doctrines are summarized in his Three Principles of the People (nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood—the last involving the regulation of private capital and “equalizing land rights”) and his Plan for

National Reconstruction, which explained basic parliamentary procedures, attacked the traditional Chinese saying that to know is easier than to do, and set forth a grandiose plan for China's industrialization, concocted by Sun without much help from engineers or economists.

Although sanctified by his followers, Sun's doctrine was not his major strength. All contemporary sources attribute to him a magnetic personality, a great capacity for tolerating others' weaknesses, a singular dedication to the pursuit of power, and a knowledge of the West unequaled by that of any of his political rivals. Perhaps the last factor is the most important, for it is this that set Sun apart and made him the symbol of Chinese modernization. Quite fittingly, the Chinese communists call him "a pioneer of the revolution."

DECLINE OF MANCHUS

On February 12, 1912 China's boy emperor, Hsuan T'ung, was forced to abdicate, ending the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty. The last dynasty of China — Qing dynasty or Manchu dynasty, ruled the country from 1644 to 1912. Aisin Gioro is the name of the imperial clan of Manchu emperors of the Qing dynasty. The House of Aisin Gioro ruled China from 1644 until the Xinhai Revolution of 1911-12. By 1790, the kingdom extended till Central Asia. However, over the years, imperial control gradually declined. The Opium Wars (1839 - 1842), the Taiping rebellion (1850 and 1864) followed by the Dungan Revolt (1862 and 1877) further weakened the dynasty.

In 1860, there was an attempt to restore the traditional order, to arrest the dynastic decline of the Qing dynasty. Empress Dowager Cixi, was a regent and the Emperor's death in she ousted a group of regents appointed by the late emperor and assumed regency. She controlled the government for 47 years from 1861. There was an immediate need to strengthen China. However, this only delayed the inevitable occurrence of the collapse of the empire.

The Boxer Rebellion (1899 and 1901) or the Yihetuan Movement saw violent anti-foreign and anti-Christian uprisings, killing many foreign diplomats and civilians. Foreign powers formed an alliance to counter the killings. Japan, Russia, the British Empire, France, the

U.S., Germany, Italy and Austria-Hungary came together and the Qing dynasty lost. The imperial court fled to Xi'an, the capital of Shaanxi Province in central China and the Boxer Protocol was signed.

The early 20 century saw a mass civil disorder. The Empress issued an imperial edict in 1901 which was known as the late Qing Reform. These reforms died an early death with the sudden passing away of the empress in 1908. Puyi, the oldest son of Zaifeng, Prince Chun (a Manchu prince and regent of the Qing dynasty) was appointed successor at the age of two.

General Yuan Shikai was removed from his positions of power as he was suspected to have killed the empress. A Royal Cabinet was formed.

With provinces separating from Qing control, Yuan Shikai was brought back to power by the dynasty. But with so much power and control it was only a matter of time before the empire crashed and the Republic of China was formed under his leadership.

Puyi, the last emperor, had no choice but to abdicate and Yuan Shikai became President of the Republic of China.

YUAN-SHI-KAI

Yuan Shikai (1859-1916) was an important **politician** and **militarist** in China's modern history. He had a major influence during the last years of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912).

As a relatively young man, Yuan was sent to Korea as supreme adviser on Korean government policies, and after his return he was in charge of training new troops. He played an important role in promoting modernization and in **forcing Emperor Pu Yi's abdication**.

Yuan Shikai was elected the **first official president of the Republic of China** (1911-1949), and was active in establishing modern industrial, judicial and educational systems as well as unifying the currency. He even **tried to restore the monarchy** in China, and **proclaimed himself the Hongxian Emperor**; though in this he failed.

Early Life

On September 16th, **1859, Yuan Shikai was born** into an aristocratic family in Yuanzhai village of Henan Province. He started to learn the Confucian classics at six years of age. In his youth, however, he was more interested in military strategy, fencing and boxing.

In 1876, Yuan married a girl from the Yu family, and in 1878 she bore him a son named Yuan Keding. Shikai took the imperial examination twice (in 1876 and 1879 respectively) to pursue a civil-service career, but he failed both times, so instead **made up his mind to enter politics through joining the army**.

Under the influence of the Westernization Movement (a movement aiming to learn from Western countries), Yuan Shikai gave his allegiance to Wu Changqing, the commander of the Huai Army, and **in May 1881 became an assistant to Wu.**

Years in Korea

In 1882, during the Joseon Dynasty in Korea, **Heungseon Dawongun**, father of the Gaozong Emperor of Korea, **tried to seize power through a military coup.** This led to a struggle between him and Empress Myeongseong.

The empress asked the Qing government to send troops to quell the coup. **Yuan Shikai was sent to Korea** by Li Hongzhang, viceroy of Zhili (presently Hebei Province), **to suppress the rebels, and he succeeded.**

As a result, Heungseon Dawongun was escorted as a prisoner to Baoding (of Hebei Province), and the **23-year-old Yuan Shikai was appointed supreme adviser on Korean government policies** by Li Hongzhang and stationed in Korea. He helped to train Korea's new army and to control Korean taxes, and he earned unanimous approval from Korean nobles during his stay in Korea.

In 1884, Japanese troops stationed in Korea attempted to kidnap the Korean Emperor Li Xi (the Gaozong Emperor) during a military coup. Li Xi asked the Qing government for help, and **Yuan Shikai commanded the Huai Army and helped the Koreans defeat the Japanese**, protecting Korea and the Qing government's interests in Korea; for which he gained favor in the eyes of Li Hongzhang.

When the Dongxuedang uprising broke out in Korea **in 1894**, Yuan Shikai advised the Korean Emperor to ask for assistance from the Qing government. Later, the Japanese army sent more troops to Korea and attempted to start a war. Before the First Sino-Japanese War, Yuan Shikai returned to China via Inchon, masquerading as a peasant. Due to his outstanding record in Korea, Yuan was recommended by Li Hongzhang **to be in charge of training the new army.**

Establishing the New Army

Yuan Shikai started to train the new army in Tianjin in 1895. Later, he was in charge of training and expanding the Dingwu Army under the command of Li Hongzhang, and the Dingwu Army evolved into the Beiyang Army, the main land force in the late Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). Most warlords during the Republic of China (1911-1949) had been trained in the Beiyang Army; including Xu Shichang, Duan Qirui, Feng Guozhang, Wang Shizhen, Caokun and Zhang Xun.

In 1897 Yuan Shikai was promoted to chief prosecutor of the Zhili (presently Hebei Province) high court, and he was still in charge of drilling troops. **In June 1898, the 39-year-old Yuan Shikai was promoted to President of the Board of Industry.**

The pro-emperor party pinned their hopes on Yuan's new army, and Tan Sitong (a leader of the Wu Hsu Reform of 1898) once advised Yuan Shikai to send troops to besiege the Empress Dowager in the Summer Palace. Yuan, however, didn't take Tan's advice and instead **reported Tan's plot to Rong Lu,**

a pro-empress figure, **resulting in the failure of the Wu Hsu Reform of 1898** and the arrest of the Guangxu Emperor.

In 1899 Yuan was appointed governor of Shandong Province and he led his new army into Jinan to suppress the Boxers (the Righteous and Harmonious Fists fighting the foreign invaders). Owing to Yuan's tough policies, the Boxers couldn't find a foothold in Shandong, so they fled to Tianjin and Beijing. In 1900, the Eight Power Allied Forces (Britain, France, Russia, the US, Germany, Italy, Japan and Austria) ransacked Beijing, but Shandong remained stable under Yuan's governance. When Li Hongzhang was promoted to Chancellor of the Beiyang Army in November 1901, Yuan Shikai was also promoted, and **became a notable figure in the history of China.**

New Policy Period of the Late Qing Dynasty

After the Boxer Protocol was signed in 1901, due to internal and external pressures, the Guangxu Emperor implemented many new policies, which were strongly supported by Yuan Shikai. **Shandong University was established in 1901 under Yuan's advocacy.**

The Army Drilling Ground was set up in Beijing in 1903, and then Yuan was in charge of drilling the Beiyang Army. Later, Yuan was also involved in **setting up industrial and mining establishments, railways, a police force and new-style universities**, and he eventually **abolished the time-honored imperial examination.**

The Guangxu Emperor and Empress Dowager passed away on successive days in November 1908, and the young prince Pu Yi (later the last

emperor of the Qing Dynasty) ascended the throne, with his father Zai Feng as regent. Zai Feng hated Yuan Shikai with a vengeance, because of Yuan's new policies and his behavior at the time of the Wu Hsu Reform. Zai Feng suspected that Yuan had betrayed the reforming party, which had led directly to the Guangxu Emperor's imprisonment. So as soon as Zai became regent, **Yuan was dismissed from his government position** and had to make himself scarce in Anyang, of Henan Province.

Becoming President of the Republic of China

When the Wuchang Uprising broke out on October 10 th, 1911, led by Li Yuanhong, neither the warlords from the northern provinces nor the Beiyang Army had a clear stance for or against the uprising. **On November 1st, 1911, the Guangxu Emperor appointed Yuan Shikai as Chancellor (Prime Minister)**, because Yuan had gained support from various parties. Yuan arrived in Beijing on November 13th and formed his new cabinet three days later.

Yuan understood clearly that full-scale suppression of the Wuchang Uprising would lead to his redundancy in the eyes of the Qing rulers, so he **began to negotiate with the revolutionaries**, rather than suppressing them. Yuan negotiated with Li Yuanhong and reached an agreement to convene a national assembly to vote for the presidency on December 18th, 1911.

On December 29th, 1911, representatives from 17 provinces of southern China elected **Sun Yat-sen as the first provisional president of the Republic of China**, and Sun was sworn in at Nanjing on January 1st, 1912,

proclaiming the establishment of the Republic of China. Angry about this outcome, Yuan ordered his army to attack Wuhan and Nanjing, and the revolutionaries retreated again and again.

Owing to their weak military position, the United League led by Sun Yat-sen had to negotiate with Yuan Shikai, and Sun promised Yuan that he would surrender the position of President of the Republic of China to Yuan if Emperor Pu Yi abdicated.

Yuan forced Pu Yi to abdicate on February 12 th, 1912, though Empress Yulong was reluctant to accept this. In the end, she ordered Yuan to form a cabinet for the Republic of China and this represented the formal fall of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912).

On February 15th, 1912, the house of councilors in Nanjing officially **elected Yuan Shikai as the provisional President of the Republic of China**. Under the provisional constitution of the Republic of China, however, Yuan's power was greatly weakened by the system of parliamentary government. **In May 1914**, Yuan modified the provisional constitution, and he **changed the system of government from a parliamentary to a presidential one**.

The Twenty-One Demands Treaty with Japan

The First World War broke out in 1914. Japan sent troops to take over the German occupied territory in Jiaozhou Bay and the Jiao-Jinan Railway in Shandong Province, and the government of the Republic of China was powerless to prevent this. While European countries were at war in

Europe, **Japan proposed the so-called Twenty-One Demands to Yuan Shikai**, including expanding Japan's rights and benefits in Manchuria and Mongolia and hiring Japanese people as councilors to the Republic of China.

Negotiations between the Republic of China and Japan, based on Japan's Twenty-One Demands, lasted from February 2nd to May 7th, 1915. Finally, on May 8th, **1915, Yuan Shikai accepted Japan's Twenty-One Demands.**

Revival of the Monarchy

On November 20th, 1915, Yuan convened a special representative assembly, at which he **was voted unanimously to be the next Emperor of China.** In December, with the support of congressmen, university students and mass petitioning groups, **Yuan** established a constitutional monarchy and the Empire of China. He **was sworn in as Emperor on December 12th, 1915.**

As a new constitutional monarchy was to be implemented in the Empire of China, Yuan renamed the Presidential Palace as Xinhua (New China) Palace. New norms for royalty were promulgated, including demolishing the system of eunuchs, the system of selecting maids-in-waiting and the system of presenting tribute. This new constitutional monarchy, however, was opposed by various warlords from southern China, who rose up one after another in revolt.

Death

On December 25th, 1915, General Cai E and General Tang Jiyao announced their opposition to Yuan Shikai, followed by generals from Guizhou

Province and Guangxi Province. In March the following year, Yuan Shikai was forced to disestablish the new empire, and he appointed Duan Qirui, the Secretary of State, to suppress the insurrectionary army from southern China.

Yuan was disheartened and fell sick in May 1916, **dying of uremia at the age of 57 on June 6th, 1916**. He was buried on August 24th, 1916, in Anyang of Henan Province.

Historical Accomplishments

Retrospectively, there are **more negative assessments of Yuan Shikai than there are positive** ones. He is **strongly criticized for having signed the humiliating Twenty-One Demands Treaty with Japan**, which greatly weakened China's prestige in the world.

Some scholars, however, **view Yuan as a great reformer**, owing to his contributions to China in many aspects of its modern history. **He made great contributions to China's military, economy, education and politics, and he forced** Emperor Pu Yi to abdicate the throne peacefully, bringing **an end to 2,000 years of feudalism** (from the Zhou Dynasty right up to the early Republican period).

Military Legacy

Yuan Shikai was a wise and sharp man, well-versed in military strategy. He **took action immediately to defeat the Japanese army during Korea's abortive coup attempt in 1884**, successfully shattering Japan's efforts to overthrow the Korean regime and greatly expanding China's influence on Korea. He was highly praised for this by Li Hongzhang.

After taking over the Beiyang Army, Yuan **built up new armies, reformed the old armies and restructured police units**, completely separating the police force and the army.

Yuan was in charge of establishing regular armies and policies from 1903 onwards and formed China's first modern army in Hebei Province. He also hired German drillmasters to drill his troops and set up modern military schools, training a number of military talents; five of whom were elected as presidents or prime ministers of the Republic of China (1911-1949).

Economic Legacy

Yuan Shikai raised money for and in 1905 supervised the construction of China's first railway (Beijing–Zhangjiakou). During the early years of the Republic of China (1911-1949), much attention was paid by Yuan to industry, agriculture, and commerce; especially to industry. Over 4,000 new factories were built between 1912 and 1914, and great progress was made in paper-making, the metallurgical industry and the mining industry.

During his reign, Yuan issued a series of decrees and regulations which **promoted the development of China's national industries**, including raising import duty and lowering export duty, encouraging native products and supporting domestic industrial and commercial enterprises.

As for agriculture, **Yuan established agricultural education bases and promoted new agricultural technology**, which greatly promoted the development of agriculture in the early years of the Republic.

As for finance, **Yuan issued government bonds, reformed currencies and taxes, and established banks**, which not only greatly eased the financial crisis of the government, but promoted China's modernization financially.

Educational Legacy

Yuan Shikai supported literacy and education, established new schools, abolished the old-fashioned imperial examination and encouraged students to learn from Western countries and from Japan. He established Shandong University, raised funds from multiple sources to train teachers, introduced the modern Western educational system to Chinese people, and also ordered the implementation of 4 years of free compulsory education in China.

Political Legacy

Yuan Shikai's greatest achievements in politics are reflected in his **far-reaching reform of government structure, bureaucratic establishments, law and local autonomy**.

Yuan **played an active role in China's democratization process**. He was the first to hold high the banner of constitutionalism, and established the first republic in Asia – the Republic of China (1911-1949). Yuan played a crucial role in reforming China's bureaucratic establishments, and he also made laws concerning officials' grades, appointments and dismissals, rewards and punishments, and salaries. On Yuan's initiative, anti-corruption institutes were established for bringing corrupt officials to trial.

Yuan promoted and recommended appropriate legal personnel to higher positions, which **greatly improved China's modern judicial system. He also** actively **participated in China's system of local autonomy**, making Tianjin in Hebei Province the first autonomous city in the Republic of China (1911-1949).

UNIT –II

CHINA AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Japanese gains

Following the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Japan joined the side of the Allies and seized the German leasehold around Jiaozhou Bay together with German-owned railways in Shandong. China was not permitted to interfere. Then, on Jan. 18, 1915, the Japanese government secretly presented to Yuan the Twenty-one Demands, which sought in effect to make China a Japanese dependency. Yuan skillfully directed the negotiations by which China tried to limit its concessions, which centred on greater access to Chinese ports and railroads and even a voice in Chinese political and police affairs. At the same time, Yuan searched for foreign support. The European powers, locked in war, were in no position to restrain Japan, and the United States was unwilling to intervene. The Chinese public, however, was aroused. Most of Yuan's political opponents supported his resistance to Japan's demands. Nevertheless, on May 7 Japan gave Yuan a 48-hour ultimatum, forcing him to accept the terms as they stood at that point in the negotiations.

Japan gained extensive special privileges and concessions in Manchuria (Northeast China) and confirmed its gains in Shandong from Germany. The Hanyeping mining and metallurgical enterprise in the middle Yangtze valley was to become a joint Sino-Japanese company. China promised not to alienate to any other power any harbour, bay, or island on the coast of China nor to permit any nation to construct a dockyard, coaling

station, or naval base on the coast of Fujian, the province nearest to Japan's colony of Taiwan.

Yuan's attempts to become emperor

In the wake of the humiliation of these forced concessions, Yuan launched a movement to revive the monarchy, with some modernized features, and to place himself on the throne. The Japanese government began to "advise" against this move in October and induced its allies to join in opposing Yuan's plan. Additional opposition came from the leaders of the Nationalist and Progressive parties. In December, Chen Qimei (Ch'en Ch'i-mei) and Hu Hanmin (Hu Han-min), two followers of Sun Yat-sen (who was actively scheming against Yuan from his exile in Japan), began a movement against the monarchy. More significant was a military revolt in Yunnan, led by Gen. Cai E (Ts'ai O; a disciple of Liang Qichao) and by the governor of Yunnan, Tang Jiyao (T'ang Chi-yao). Joined by Li Liejun (Li Lieh-chün) and other revolutionary generals, they established the National Protection Army (Huguojun) and demanded that Yuan cancel his plan. When he would not, the Yunnan army in early January 1916 invaded Sichuan and subsequently Hunan and Guangdong, hoping to bring the southwestern and southern provinces into rebellion and to then induce the lower Yangtze provinces to join them. The Japanese government covertly provided funds and munitions to Sun and the Yunnan leaders. One by one, military leaders in Guizhou, Guangxi, and parts of Guangdong declared the independence of

their provinces or districts. By March the rebellion had assumed serious dimensions, and public opinion was running strongly against Yuan.

A third source of opposition came from Yuan's direct subordinates, Generals Duan Qirui (Tuan Ch'i-jui) and Feng Guozhang (Feng Kuo-chang), whose powers Yuan had attempted to curtail. When he called on them for help, they both withheld support. On March 22—with the tide of battle running against his forces in the southwest, Japanese hostility increasingly open, public opposition in full cry, and his closest subordinates advising peace—Yuan announced the abolition of the new empire. His opponents, however, demanded that he give up the presidency as well. The revolt continued to spread, with more military leaders declaring the independence of their provinces. The issue became that of succession should Yuan retire. The president, however, became gravely ill and died on June 6.

Yuan's four years in power had serious consequences for China. The country's foreign debt was much enlarged, and a precedent had been established of borrowing for political purposes. Yuan's defiance of constitutional procedures and his dissolution of parliament also set precedents that were later repeated. Many were disillusioned with the republican experiment; China was a republic in name, but arbitrary rule based on military power was the political reality. The country was becoming fractured into competing military satrapies—the beginning of warlordism.

Gen. Li Yuanhong (Li Yüan-hung), the vice president, succeeded to the presidency, and Duan Qirui continued as premier, a position he had accepted

in April. A man of great ability and ambition, Duan was supported by many generals of the former Beiyang Army, a powerful force based in northern China that developed originally under Yuan's leadership. Duan quickly began to gather power into his own hands. Parliament reconvened on August 1; it confirmed Duan as premier but elected Gen. Feng Guozhang, the leader of another emerging faction of the Beiyang Army, as vice president. The presidential transition and restoration of parliament had by no means answered the underlying question of where the governing power lay.

Conflict over entry into the war

In February 1917 the U.S. government severed diplomatic relations with Germany and invited the neutral powers, including China, to do the same. This brought on a crisis in the Chinese government. Li opposed the step, but Duan favoured moving toward entry into the war. Parliamentary factions and public opinion were bitterly divided. Sun Yat-sen, now in Shanghai, argued that entering the war could not benefit China and would create additional perils from Japan. Under heavy pressure, parliament voted to sever diplomatic relations with Germany, and Li was compelled by his premier to acquiesce. When the United States entered the war in April, Duan wished China to do the same but was again opposed by the president.

Duan and his supporters demanded that China enter the war and that Li dissolve parliament. On May 23, Li dismissed Duan and called on Gen. Zhang Xun (Chang Hsün), a power in the Beiyang clique and also a monarchist, to mediate. As a price for mediation, Zhang demanded that Li

dissolve parliament, which he did reluctantly on June 13. The next day Zhang entered Beijing with an army and set about to restore the Qing dynasty. Telegrams immediately poured in from military governors and generals denouncing Zhang and the coup; Li refused to sign the restoration order and called on Duan to bring an army to the capital to restore the republic. Li requested that Vice President Feng assume the duties of president during the crisis and then took refuge in the Japanese legation. Duan captured Beijing on July 14; Zhang fled to asylum in the Legation Quarter, and this ended a second attempt to restore the imperial system.

Duan resumed the premiership, and Feng came to Beijing as acting president, bringing a division as his personal guard. The two powerful rivals, each supported by an army in the capital, formed two powerful factions: the Zhili (Chihli) clique under Feng and the Anhui clique under Duan. Opposed neither by Li nor by the dissolved parliament, Duan pushed through China's declaration of war on Germany, announced on Aug. 14, 1917.

Formation of a rival southern government

Meanwhile, in July Sun Yat-sen, supported by part of the Chinese navy and followed by some 100 members of parliament, attempted to organize a rival government in Guangzhou (Canton). The initial costs of this undertaking, termed the Movement to Protect the Constitution, probably were supplied by the German consulate in Shanghai. On September 1 the rump parliament in Guangzhou established a military government and elected Sun commander in chief. Real power, however, lay with military men, who only nominally

supported Sun. The southern government declared war on Germany on September 26 and unsuccessfully sought recognition from the Allies as the legitimate government. The Constitution-Protecting Army (Hufajun), made up of southern troops, launched a punitive campaign against the government in Beijing and succeeded in pushing northward through Hunan. Sichuan was also drawn into the fight. Duan tried to quell the southern opposition by force, while Feng advocated a peaceful solution. Duan resigned and mustered his strength to force Feng to order military action; Gen. Cao Kun was put in charge of the campaign and drove the southerners out of Hunan by the end of April 1918. In May the southern government was reorganized under a directorate of seven, in which military men dominated. Sun therefore left Guangzhou and returned to Shanghai. Although his first effort to establish a government in the south had been unsuccessful, it led to a protracted split between south and north.

Wartime changes

Although its wartime participation was limited, China made some gains from its entry into the war, taking over the German and Austrian concessions and canceling the unpaid portions of the Boxer indemnities due its enemies. It was also assured a seat at the peace conference. Japan, however, extended its gains in China. The Beijing government, dominated by Duan after Feng's retirement, granted concessions to Japan for railway building in Shandong, Manchuria, and Mongolia. These were in exchange for the Nishihara loans, amounting to nearly \$90 million,

which went mainly to strengthen the Anhui clique with arms and cash. Japan also made secret agreements with its allies to support its claims to the former German rights in Shandong and also induced the Beijing government to consent to these. In November 1917 the United States, to adjust difficulties with Japan, entered into the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, which recognized that because of “territorial propinquity...Japan has special interests in China.” This treaty seemed to underwrite Japan’s wartime gains.

Important economic and social changes occurred during the first years of the republic. With the outbreak of the war, foreign economic competition with native industry abated, and native-owned light industries developed markedly. By 1918 the industrial labour force numbered some 1,750,000. Modern-style Chinese banks increased in number and expanded their capital.

Intellectual movements

A new intelligentsia had also emerged. The educational reforms and the ending of the governmental examination system during the final Qing years enabled thousands of young people to study sciences, engineering, medicine, law, economics, education, and military skills in Japan. Others went to Europe and the United States. Upon their return they took important positions and were a modernizing force in society. Their writing and teaching became a powerful influence on upcoming generations of students. In 1915–16 there were said to be nearly 130,000 new-style schools in China with more than four million students. This was mainly an urban phenomenon, however; rural life was barely affected except for what may have been gradually increasing

tenancy and a slow impoverishment that sent rural unemployed into cities and armies or into banditry.

An intellectual revolution

An intellectual revolution took place during the first decade of the republic, sometimes referred to as the New Culture Movement. It was led by many of the new intellectuals, who held up for critical scrutiny nearly all aspects of Chinese culture and traditional ethics. Guided by concepts of individual liberty and equality, a scientific spirit of inquiry, and a pragmatic approach to the nation's problems, they sought a much more profound reform of China's institutions than had resulted from self-strengthening or the republican revolution. They directed their efforts particularly to China's educated youth.

In September 1915 Chen Duxiu (Ch'en Tu-hsiu), who had studied in Japan and France, founded *Xinqingnian* ("New Youth") magazine to oppose Yuan's imperial ambitions and to regenerate the country's youth. This quickly became the most popular reform journal, and in 1917 it began to express the iconoclasm of new faculty members at Peking University (Beida), which Chen had joined as dean of the College of Letters. Peking University, China's most prestigious institution of higher education, was being transformed by its new chancellor, Cai Yuanpei (Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei), who had spent many years in advanced study in Germany. Cai made the university a centre of scholarly research and inspired teaching. The students were quickly swept into the New Culture Movement. A proposal by Hu Shih (Hu Shi), a

former student of the American philosopher John Dewey, that literature be written in the vernacular language (*baihua*) rather than the classical style won quick acceptance. By 1918 most of the contributors to *Xinqingnian* were writing in *baihua*, and other journals and newspapers soon followed suit. Students at Peking University began their own reform journal, *Xinchao* ("New Tide"). A new experimental literature inspired by Western forms became highly popular, and scores of new literary journals were founded.

Riots and protests

On May 4, 1919, patriotic students in Beijing protested the decision at the Paris Peace Conference that Japan should retain defeated Germany's rights and possessions in Shandong. Many students were arrested in the rioting that followed. Waves of protest spread throughout the major cities of China. Merchants closed their shops, banks suspended business, and workers went on strike to pressure the government. Finally, the government was forced to release the arrested students, to dismiss some officials charged with being tools of Japan, and to refuse to sign the Treaty of Versailles. This outburst helped spread the iconoclastic and reformist ideas of the intellectual movement, which became known as the May Fourth Movement. By the early 1920s, China was launched on a new revolutionary path.

MAY FOURTH MOVEMENT

May Fourth Movement, intellectual revolution and sociopolitical reform movement that occurred in China in 1917–21. The movement was directed toward national independence, emancipation of the individual, and rebuilding society and culture.

In 1915, in the face of Japanese encroachment on China, young intellectuals, inspired by “New Youth” (*Xinqingnian*), a monthly magazine edited by the iconoclastic intellectual revolutionary Chen Duxiu, began agitating for the reform and strengthening of Chinese society. As part of this New Culture Movement, they attacked traditional Confucian ideas and exalted Western ideas, particularly science and democracy. Their inquiry into liberalism, pragmatism, nationalism, anarchism, and socialism provided a basis from which to criticize traditional Chinese ethics, philosophy, religion, and social and political institutions. Moreover, led by Chen and the American-educated scholar Hu Shi, they proposed a new naturalistic vernacular writing style (*baihua*), replacing the difficult 2,000-year-old classical style (*wenyan*).

These patriotic feelings and the zeal for reform culminated in an incident on May 4, 1919, from which the movement took its name. On that day, more than 3,000 students from 13 colleges in Beijing held a mass demonstration against the decision of the Versailles Peace Conference, which drew up the treaty officially ending World War I, to transfer the former German concessions in Shandong province to Japan. The Chinese government’s acquiescence to the decision so enraged the students that they

burned the house of the minister of communications and assaulted China's minister to Japan, both pro-Japanese officials. Over the following weeks, demonstrations occurred throughout the country; several students died or were wounded in these incidents, and more than 1,000 were arrested. In the big cities, strikes and boycotts against Japanese goods were begun by the students and lasted more than two months. For one week, beginning June 5, merchants and workers in Shanghai and other cities went on strike in support of the students. Faced with this growing tide of unfavourable public opinion, the government acquiesced; three pro-Japanese officials were dismissed, the cabinet resigned, and China refused to sign the peace treaty with Germany.

As a part of this movement, a campaign had been undertaken to reach the common people; mass meetings were held throughout the country, and more than 400 new publications were begun to spread the new thought. As a result, the decline of traditional ethics and the family system was accelerated, the emancipation of women gathered momentum, a vernacular literature emerged, and the modernized intelligentsia became a major factor in China's subsequent political developments. The movement also spurred the successful reorganization of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), later ruled by Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), and stimulated the birth of the Chinese Communist Party as well.

WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

Washington Conference, also called **Washington Naval Conference**, byname of **International Conference on Naval Limitation**, (1921–22), international conference called by the United States to limit the naval arms race and to work out security agreements in the Pacific area. Held in Washington, D.C., the conference resulted in the drafting and signing of several major and minor treaty agreements.

The Four-Power Pact, signed by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, and France on December 13, 1921, stipulated that all the signatories would be consulted in the event of a controversy between any two of them over “any Pacific question.” An accompanying agreement stated they would respect one another’s rights regarding the various Pacific islands and mandates that they possessed. These agreements ensured that a consultative framework existed between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan—i.e., the three great powers whose interests in the Pacific were most likely to lead to a clash between them. But the agreements were too vaguely worded to have any binding effect, and their chief importance was that they abrogated the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902; renewed 1911), which had previously been one of the principal means of maintaining a balance of power in East Asia. Another supplementary document defined the “insular possessions and dominions” of Japan.

The Five-Power Naval Limitation Treaty, which was signed by the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy on February 6, 1922, grew out

of the opening proposal at the conference by U.S. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes to scrap almost 1.9 million tons of warships belonging to the great powers. This bold disarmament proposal astonished the assembled delegates, but it was indeed enacted in a modified form. A detailed agreement was reached that fixed the respective numbers and tonnages of capital ships to be possessed by the navies of each of the contracting nations. (Capital ships, defined as warships of more than 10,000 tons displacement or carrying guns with a calibre exceeding 8 inches, basically denoted battleships and aircraft carriers.) The respective ratios of capital ships to be held by each of the signatories was fixed at 5 each for the United States and Great Britain, 3 for Japan, and 1.67 each for France and Italy. The Five-Power Naval Limitation Treaty halted the post-World War I race in building warships and even reversed the trend; it necessitated the scrapping of 26 American, 24 British, and 16 Japanese warships that were either already built or under construction. The contracting nations also agreed to abandon their existing capital-ship building programs for a period of 10 years, subject to certain specified exceptions. Under another article in the treaty, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan agreed to maintain the status quo with regard to their fortifications and naval bases in the eastern Pacific.

The Naval Limitation Treaty remained in force until the mid-1930s. At that time Japan demanded equality with the United States and Great Britain in regard to the size and number of its capital ships. When this demand was

rejected by the other contracting nations, Japan gave advance notice of its intention to terminate the treaty, which thus expired at the end of 1936.

The same five powers signed another treaty regulating the use of submarines and outlawing the use of poison gas (*see* chemical weapon) in warfare. A Nine-Power Pact signed by the above five powers plus the Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium, and China affirmed China's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and gave all nations the right to do business with it on equal terms. In a related treaty the nine powers established an international commission to study Chinese tariff policies.

RISE OF KUOMING

The **History of the Kuomintang** is an overview on the inception of the Kuomintang (KMT), a Chinese political party that ruled mainland China from 1927 to 1949 prior to its relocation to Taiwan as a result of the Chinese Civil War. The name of the party translates as "China's National People's Party" and was historically referred to as the Chinese Nationalists. The Party was initially founded on 23 August 1912, by Sun Yat-sen but dissolved in November 1913. It reformed on October 10th 1919, again led by Sun Yat-sen, and became the ruling party in China. After Sun's death, the party was dominated from 1927 to 1975 by Chiang Kai-shek. Though the KMT lost the civil war with the Communist Party of China in 1949, the party took control of Taiwan and remains a major political party of the Republic of China based in Taiwan.

Founded in 1912 by Sun Yat-sen, the KMT helped topple the Qing Emperor and promoted modernization along Western lines. The party played a significant part in the first Chinese first National Assembly where it was the majority party. However the KMT failed to achieve complete control. The post of president was given to Yuan Shikai (1859–1916) as reward for his part in the revolution. Yuan Shikai abused his powers, overriding the constitution and creating strong tensions between himself and the other parties. In July 1913, the KMT staged a 'Second Revolution' to depose Yuan. This failed and the following crack down by Yuan led to the dissolution of the KMT and the exile of

its leadership, mostly to Japan. Subsequently, Yuan Shikai had himself made Emperor of China.

In exile, Sun Yat-sen and other former KMT members founded several revolutionary parties under various names but with little success. These parties were united by Sun in 1919 under the title "The Kuomintang of China". The new party returned to Guangzhou in China in 1920 where it set up a government but failed to achieve control of all of China. After the death of Yuan Shikai in 1916, China fractured into many regions controlled by warlords. To strengthen the party's position, it accepted aid and support from the Soviet Union and its Comintern. The fledgling Communist Party of China was encouraged to join the KMT and thus formed the First United Front. The KMT gradually increased its sphere of influence from its Guangzhou base. Sun Yat-sen died in 1925 and Chiang Kai-shek (1887–1975) became the KMT strong man. In 1926 Chiang led a military operation known as the Northern Expedition against the warlords that controlled much of the country. In 1927, Chiang instigated the April 12 Incident in Shanghai in which the Communist Party of China and Communist elements of the KMT were purged.^[1] The Northern Expedition proved successful and the KMT party came to power throughout China (except Manchuria) in 1927 under the leadership of Chiang. The capital of China was moved to Nanjing in order to be closer to the party's strong base in southern China.

The party was always concerned with strengthening Chinese identity at the same time it was discarding old traditions in the name of modernity. In

1929, the KMT government suppressed the textbook *Modern Chinese History*, widely used in secondary education. The Nationalists were concerned that, by not admitting the existence of the earliest emperors in ancient Chinese history, the book would weaken the foundation of the state. The case of the *Modern Chinese History* textbook reflects the symptoms of the period: banning the textbook strengthened the Nationalists' ideological control but also revealed their fear of the New Culture Movement and its more liberal ideological implications. The KMT tried to destroy the Communist party of Mao Zedong, but was unable to stop the invasion by Japan, which controlled most of the coastline and major cities, 1937–1945. Chiang Kai-shek secured massive military and economic aid from the United States, and in 1945 became one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, with a veto. The KMT governed most of China until it was defeated in the civil war by the Communists in 1949.

The leadership, the remaining army, and hundreds of thousands of businessmen and other supporters, two million in all, fled to Taiwan. They continued to operate there as the "Republic of China" and dreamed of invading and reconquering what they called "Mainland China". The United States, however, set up a naval cordon after 1950 that has since prevented an invasion in either direction. The KMT regime kept the island under martial law for 38 years, killing up to 30,000 opponents during its dictatorial rule by Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo (1910–1988). As the original leadership died off, it had to hold elections, allowed democracy, with full election of

parliament in the early 1990s and first direct presidential election in 1996. After a defeat by the Democratic Progressive Party in 2000, the KMT returned to power in the elections of 2008 and 2012.

TANG PARTY

Chinese Communist Party (CCP), also called **Communist Party of China (CPC)**, Chinese (Pinyin) **Zhongguo Gongchan Dang** or (Wade-Giles romanization) **Chung-kuo Kung-ch'an Tang**, political party of China. Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the CCP has been in sole control of that country's government.

History

The CCP was founded as both a political party and a revolutionary movement in 1921 by revolutionaries such as Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu. Those two men and others had come out of the May Fourth Movement (1919) and had turned to Marxism after the Bolshevik victory in the Russian Revolution of 1917. In the turmoil of 1920s China, CCP members such as Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and Li Lisan began organizing labour unions in the cities. The CCP joined with the Nationalist Party in 1924, and the alliance proved enormously successful at first. However, in 1927, after the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) turned violently against the communists and ousted them from Shanghai, the CCP was driven underground.

Many of the CCP cadres, such as Mao, then abandoned their revolutionary activities among China's urban proletariat and went to the countryside, where they were so successful in winning peasant support that in 1931 the Chinese Soviet Republic, with a population of some 10 million, was set up in southern China. That entity was soon destroyed by the military campaigns of the Nationalists, however, and Mao and the remnants of his

forces escaped in the Long March (1934–35) to Yan'an in northern China. It was during the march that Mao achieved the leadership position in the CCP that he held until his death in 1976. Other important leaders who supported him in that period were Zhou Enlai and Zhu De.

In 1936 in the Xi'an (Sian) Incident, Chiang Kai-shek was forced to call off his military campaigns against the CCP and instead enter into a United Front with it against increasing Japanese military aggression in China. While Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces basically sat out the war in Chongqing, the CCP tremendously expanded its strength by fighting the Japanese invaders. By the end of the war (1945), the party controlled base areas of some 100 million people and had an experienced army and a workable political program of alliance between peasants, workers, the middle class, and small capitalists.

The civil war recommenced in 1946, and the CCP's land-reform program increased its peasant support. Meanwhile, the Nationalists' ineptitude and demoralization cost them what little support they had. In 1949, after the Nationalists had been decisively defeated and retreated to Taiwan, the CCP and its allies founded the People's Republic of China.

In the next several years the life of the CCP was taken up with serious disagreements over the course of the country's development. At first the CCP adopted the Soviet model for development and closely allied itself with the Soviet Union. However, the CCP and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) soon found themselves increasingly at odds over foreign

policy and ideology, and, as the 1950s ended, the CCP and CPSU broke their close ties with each other. Internally, the CCP attempted to hasten China's industrial development with bold but sometimes harmful programs, most disastrously with the Great Leap Forward (1958–60).

In 1966 Mao, who remained in serious disagreement with several other CCP leaders over the course of China's future economic and social development, launched the Cultural Revolution, and there followed a period of turbulent struggles between the CCP's radical wing under Mao and the more pragmatic wing led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. Liu, Deng, and several other pragmatist leaders fell from power during the Cultural Revolution. An uneasy truce between radicals and pragmatists held from 1971 until 1976, when Zhou Enlai and Mao himself died. Almost immediately the radical group known as the Gang of Four, including Mao's widow, were arrested, and soon afterward the frequently purged and frequently rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping reappeared and assumed paramount power. The Cultural Revolution was formally ended, and the program of the "Four Modernizations" (of industry, agriculture, science/technology, and defense) was adopted. Restrictions on art and education were relaxed, and revolutionary ideology was de-emphasized. After Mao's death Hua Guofeng was party chairman until 1981, when Deng's protegee Hu Yaobang took over the post. Hu was replaced as the party general secretary (the post of chairman was abolished in 1982) by another Deng protégé, Zhao Ziyang, in 1987. Zhao was succeeded by Jiang Zemin in 1989,

and Hu Jintao was elected general secretary in 2002. Hu was then followed as general secretary by Xi Jinping, who was elected to the post in 2012.

Party structure

With more than 85 million members, the CCP is one of the largest political parties in the world. It is a monolithic, monopolistic party that dominates the political life of China. It is the major policy-making body in China, and it sees that the central, provincial, and local organs of government carry out those policies.

The CCP's structure is as follows. Once every five years or so, a National Party Congress of some 2,000 delegates (the number varies) meets in plenary session to elect a Central Committee of about 200 full members, which in turn meets at least once annually. The Central Committee elects a Political Bureau (Politburo) of about 20–25 full members; that body is the ruling leadership of the CCP. The Political Bureau's Standing Committee of about six to nine of its most-authoritative members is the highest echelon of leadership in the CCP and in the country as a whole. In practice, power flows from the top down in the CCP.

The CCP's Secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day administrative affairs of the CCP. The general secretary of the Secretariat is formally the highest-ranking official of the party. The CCP has a commission for detecting and punishing abuses of office by party members, and it also has a commission by which it retains control over China's armed forces. The CCP has basic-level party organizations in cities, towns, villages, neighbourhoods, major

workplaces, schools, and so on. The main publications of the CCP are the daily newspaper *Renmin Ribao* (English-language version: *People's Daily*) and the biweekly theoretical journal *Qiushi* ("Seeking Truth"), which replaced the former monthly journal *Hongqi* ("Red Flag") in 1988.

CHIANG KAI SHEK

Chinese military and political leader Chiang Kai-shek joined the Chinese Nationalist Party (known as the Kuomintang, or KMT) in 1918. Succeeding party founder Sun Yat-sen as KMT leader in 1925, he expelled Chinese communists from the party and led a successful unification of China. Despite a professed focus on reform, Chiang's government concentrated on battling Communism within China as well as confronting Japanese aggression. When the Allies declared war on Japan in 1941, China took its place among the Big Four. Civil war broke out in 1946, ending in a victory by Mao Zedong's Communist forces and the creation of the People's Republic of China. From 1949 until his death, Chiang led the KMT government in exile in Taiwan, which many countries continued to recognize as China's legitimate government.

Chiang Kai-shek's Early Life and Career

Born in the coastal province of Chekiang on October 31, 1887, Chiang ran away from home after his father died and joined the provincial army. He received formal military training at the Paoting Military Academy in northern China, and later in Japan. When uprisings against the ruling Qing (Manchu) dynasty broke out in China in 1911, Chiang returned home and joined the struggle, which ended in the overthrow of the Manchus and the formation of a Chinese republic.

In 1918, he joined the Nationalist Party (known as the Kuomintang, or KMT), founded by Sun Yat-sen.

Did you know? Chiang Kai-shek's second wife, Soong Mei-ling, became a significant political figure in her own right. In addition to her address of Congress in 1943, the Wellesley-educated "Madame Chiang" wrote many articles on China for the American press.

Communism's Rise and Decline

With Sun's support, Chiang founded a military academy at Whampoa, near Canton, in 1924. He began to build up the Nationalist army, based on methods Chiang observed during a visit to the Soviet Union. During this same time, Chinese Communists were admitted into the KMT; after Sun's death in 1925, they began to clash with more conservative party elements. As Sun's successor, Chiang led a successful military campaign against local warlords in northern China and consolidated control within his own party by expelling the Communists in a brutal coup in 1927. In 1928, he formed a new central government out of Nanking, with himself as head of state.

Chiang Kai-Shek: Internal and External Conflict in China

Chiang sought to institute a modest program of reforms, including financial and educational reforms, infrastructure improvements and a revival of Confucianism, supported by the "New Life Movement" campaign. The bulk of his government's energies and

resources, however, were focused on threats to its own stability from within and outside of China. The Communists were operating their own opposition government from rural strongholds, while war with Japan—which seized Manchuria in 1931—seemed imminent. Chiang initially focused on the communist threat rather than confront Japan directly, a choice that angered many of his supporters. In the Sian (Xian) Incident of December 1936, one of his generals seized Chiang and held him captive for two weeks until he agreed to ally with Mao Zedong's Communist forces against Japan.

Japan invaded China the following year, sparking the Sino-Japanese War. China fought Japan on its own for more than four years, until the Allies (with the exception of the Soviet Union) declared war on Japan in 1941. For its efforts, China earned inclusion among the Big Four powers, and Chiang's international reputation skyrocketed. In 1943, his Western-educated wife, Soong Mei-ling, became the first Chinese and only the second woman to address a joint session of the U.S. Congress, when she asked for increased U.S. aid for China in the Sino-Japanese War. At the same time, however, Chiang's government was losing a good deal of support within the country itself, thanks to his relative passivity toward Japan and increasingly conservative policies that favored landowners and mercantile interests and alienated peasants (who made up nearly 90 percent of the Chinese population).

Chiang Kai-Shek: Civil War and Government in Exile

In 1946, a year after Japan's surrender, civil war broke out in China between KMT and Communist forces. With the Communist victory in mainland China in 1949, Mao declared the establishment of the People's Republic of China. Upon his defeat, Chiang fled with the remnants of his Nationalist government to Taiwan, which had been turned over to the Nationalist government after the defeat of Japan according to terms agreed upon in Cairo in 1943. Backed by American aid, Chiang launched Taiwan on the path of economic modernization, and in 1955 the United States signed an agreement guaranteeing Taiwan's defense. Many countries continued to recognize Chiang's government in exile as the legitimate Chinese government, and it would control China's seat in the United Nations until Chiang's death.

From 1972 onward, however, Taiwan's preferred status (especially in relation to the United States) was threatened by improving U.S.-China relations. In 1979, four years after Chiang died, the United States broke off diplomatic relations with Taiwan and established full relations with the People's Republic of China.

Birth of Civil war in China

Chinese Civil War, (1945–49), military struggle for control of China waged between the Nationalists (Kuomintang) under Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists under Mao Zedong.

The end of World War II and the collapse of the United Front

During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), China was effectively divided into three regions—Nationalist China under control of the government, Communist China, and the areas occupied by Japan. Each was essentially pitted against the other two, although Chinese military forces were ostensibly allied under the banner of the United Front. By the time Japan accepted the surrender terms of the Potsdam Declaration on August 14, 1945, China had endured decades of Japanese occupation and eight years of brutal warfare. Millions had perished in combat, and many millions more had died as a result of starvation or disease. The end of World War II did not mark the end of conflict in China, however.

Japan's defeat set off a race between the Nationalists and Communists to control vital resources and population centres in northern China and Manchuria. Nationalist troops, using transportation facilities of the U.S. military, were able to take over key cities and most railway lines in East and North China. Communist troops occupied much of the hinterland in the north and in Manchuria. The United Front had always been precarious, and it had been tacitly understood by both the Nationalists and Communists that they would cooperate only until Japan had been defeated; until then, neither side

could afford to seem to pursue internal aims at the cost of the national struggle. The growing wartime ineffectiveness and corruption of the Nationalists—who seemed, especially to the North Chinese, practically a government-in-exile in far-off Chongqing—left the Communists on a rising tide in 1945.

The Marshall Mission and early Nationalist successes (1945–46)

The stage was set for renewal of the civil war, but it initially appeared that a negotiated settlement between the Nationalists and the Communists might be possible. Even before the Japanese surrender had been finalized, Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek had issued a series of invitations to Communist leader Mao Zedong to meet with him in Chongqing to discuss reuniting and rebuilding the country. On August 28, 1945, Mao, accompanied by American ambassador Patrick Hurley, arrived in Chongqing. On October 10, 1945, the two parties announced that they had reached an agreement in principle to work for a united and democratic China. A pair of committees were to be convened to address the military and political issues that had not been resolved by the initial framework agreement, but serious fighting between government and Communist troops erupted before those bodies could meet.

U.S. Pres. Harry S. Truman responded to the outbreak of violence by dispatching George C. Marshall to China in December 1945. The Marshall Mission succeeded in bringing both sides back to the negotiating table, and on January 10, 1946, an armistice was concluded between the government and the Communists. On January 31 the Political Consultative Conference, a body

composed of representatives from across the Chinese political spectrum, reached agreements on the following points: reorganization of the government and broadening its representation; convocation of a national assembly on May 5, 1946, to adopt a constitution; principles for political, economic, and social reform; and unification of military command. In late February Marshall brokered an agreement on military force integration and reduction—the Chinese army would consist of 108 divisions (90 government and 18 Communist) under the overall command of a national ministry of defense. Before any of these agreements could be put into practice, renewed fighting broke out in Manchuria. The withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops in March–April 1946 triggered a scramble; Nationalist troops occupied Mukden (Shenyang) on March 12, while the Communists consolidated their hold throughout northern Manchuria. After government troops took Changchun on May 23, a 15-day truce was declared in Manchuria from June 6 to June 22. Fighting intensified elsewhere, however, as government and Communist troops clashed in Jehol (Chengde), northern Kiangsu (Jiangsu), northeastern Hopeh (Hebei), and southeastern Shantung (Shandong).

Marshall and John Leighton Stuart, the newly appointed U.S. ambassador, tried to bring the two sides together in late August to discuss a coalition government, but the effort was fruitless, as neither side wished to give up its military gains. In late September 1946 Nationalist troops laid siege to Kalgan, a major Communist base, and lead Communist negotiator Zhou Enlai responded by withdrawing from peace talks. Kalgan fell to the

Nationalists on October 11, and on October 21, Zhou was persuaded to return to the restored Nationalist capital at Nanking (Nanjing) for further negotiations. To induce the Communists and other parties to join the new National Assembly, Chiang issued a qualified cease-fire order on November 11 and postponed the opening of the assembly from November 12 to November 15. On November 20, Zhou flew from Nanking to the Communist stronghold at Yan'an. On December 4 Zhou wired Marshall that "if the Kuomintang would immediately dissolve the illegal National Assembly now in session, and restore the troop positions of January 13 [1946] the negotiations between the two parties may still make a fresh start."

On December 25, 1946, the National Assembly, without the Communists or the left wing of the centrist Democratic League, adopted a new constitution. Combining features of both presidential and parliamentary systems with Sun Yat-sen's Five-Power Constitutional democracy, it was to be put into effect on December 25, 1947. Until the new constitution was enacted and a new president elected, the Nationalists would continue to be the ruling party.

The tide turns (1947-48)

On January 8, 1947, Marshall left China, one day after he issued a scathing condemnation of the extremists among the Nationalists and Communists for the continuance of the civil war. Peng Hsueh-pei, the government's minister of information, proclaimed the Nationalists' willingness to continue peace negotiations with the Communists. Gen. Zhang Zhizhong

was selected to go to Yan'an in an attempt to renew talks, and a proposal was submitted to the Communists through Stuart. The Communists restated their demands for a return to the military positions of January 13, 1946, and for nullification of the new constitution, terms which previously had been rejected by the government. On January 21 the government offered four points as the basis for a resumption of peace talks: cessation of hostilities, with troops retaining their existing positions; army reorganization; reopening of communications; and a just and equitable solution of the problem of regional administration.

In the meantime, the Communists resumed their offensive in Manchuria while government troops launched major drives on Communist positions in Shantung and Shensi (Shaanxi). Early in March the government ordered all Communist personnel to leave government territory, and on March 15 Chiang Kai-shek charged the Communists with armed rebellion. The break between warring factions was final and complete. The capture of Yan'an by government troops on March 19 elated the Nationalists, but Communist spokesmen expressed confidence that they would achieve final victory. Indeed, Maoist strategy emphasized the importance of securing a base among the peasantry in the countryside at the expense of holding cities. By the end of the year, government military forces had made no further important gains, with the exception of the capture of Weihaiwei (Weihai) and Chefoo (Yantai) on the coast of Shantung in early October, which cut the Communist sea lane to the southern ports in Manchuria. Communist forces, however, made critical

inroads into central China in September and caused the closing of the defensive gates at Nanking on September 18. In Manchuria the Communists succeeded in reducing the government's control to Changchun and Mukden, an isolated pocket in Kirin (Jilin), and the rail line leading from Mukden into China proper. In a report to the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee in December 1947, an optimistic Mao observed, "The Chinese people's revolutionary war has now reached a turning point....The main forces of the People's Liberation Army have carried the fight into the Kuomintang Area....This is a turning point in history."

China's internal strife was closely linked with its diplomatic relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. After more than a year of continuous effort to bring the national government and Communists together, the United States abandoned its task as a mediator. U.S. policy had become unpopular in China, and, to avoid further complication in China's affairs, the U.S. government informed the Soviet Union that its forces in China would be reduced to 6,180 men by June 1, 1947. However, the deterioration of the economic and military situation in China and the spread of communism in East Asia led to the appointment of a U.S. fact-finding mission to China and Korea headed by Lieut. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer arrived in Nanking on July 22, and his mission was welcomed by the Chinese government but attacked by the Communists as imperialistic. Upon his departure from China on August 24, Wedemeyer stated that "if the Chinese Communists are truly patriotic...they will halt voluntary employment of force" and that "to

regain and maintain the confidence of the people, the Central Government will have to effect immediately drastic, far-reaching political and economic reforms.” The latter statement displeased the Chinese government, and Nationalist Premier Chang Chun (Zhang Qun) declared on September 2 that China would not alter either its domestic or its foreign policy as a result of Wedemeyer’s mission. Wedemeyer’s full report warned of an imminent Communist victory unless the U.S. dramatically increased its support for the Nationalist government, and the U.S. Department of State, deeming the report too sensitive, withheld its publication for two years. On November 11, Marshall, now secretary of state, submitted a program to Congress calling for \$300 million in new aid for China.

At the end of 1947, official government figures put Nationalist military strength at some 5 million men, roughly half of whom were combat ready. The U.S. military estimated that Communist troop strength was around 1.1 million, but the Communists clearly held the momentum. By early 1948 the Nationalists’ military position had degraded to the point that it had lost the initiative on all major fronts; worse, it was gradually but inexorably losing its superiority in numbers, equipment, and training. As the Nationalist war effort shifted to the defensive, the government’s strategy was to stabilize the situation in Manchuria by holding the four isolated areas of Changchun, Kirin, Mukden, and Chin Hsien, largely through airborne resupply; to maintain the Nationalist position in the important cities in the north; and to prevent Communist expansion in northwestern, central, and eastern China.

Having destroyed or blocked the overland supply routes of the government to its Manchurian posts and major centres in North China, the Communists under Gen. Lin Biao struck at weak points along the Nationalist lines. As 1948 progressed, they steadily pushed the Nationalist army out of Manchuria and North China, and in several instances Communist victory was hastened by defections among government forces. In Manchuria, the Communists took Kirin on March 12, Chin Hsien on October 15, Changchun on October 20, and Mukden on October 30. With the capture of Mukden and the surrender of the city's 140,000-man garrison, Manchurian operations virtually came to a close. In North China, the Communists took Lo-yang (Luoyang) on April 7 and recaptured their former capital of Yan'an on April 22. Other major urban centres of the north fell before year's end: Tsinan (Jinan) was taken on September 25, Cheng-chou (Zhengzhou) on October 24, and Kalgan on December 26. All the seaports of Shantung, with the exception of Tsingtao (Qingdao), were occupied by the Communists.

Communist-held territory had increased from about one-tenth of China in early 1946 to one-third in late 1948—an area of some 1 million square miles (2.6 million square km) containing more than 200 million inhabitants. The Communists had gained complete control of Manchuria, about half of Inner Mongolia, and large portions of the provinces of Hopeh (Hebei), Honan (Henan), Shantung (Shandong), Shansi (Shanxi), Shensi (Shaanxi), Kiangsu (Jiangsu), and Anhwei (Anhui). The Yangtze River was essentially the Nationalists' last remaining line of defense against a Communist attack on the cities of Nanking

(Nanjing) and Shanghai. Communist troop strength now exceeded that of the Nationalists, and the Communists had captured such huge stocks of small arms, artillery, and armour that they were better equipped than the Nationalists. On September 1, 1948, the Communists proclaimed the North China People's Government as a forerunner to a people's republic that would encompass all of China.

The continuous Communist offensive cut off the Nationalists from natural resources, paralyzed communication and commerce in the war zones, and intensified the financial crises in government-held areas. Public morale was further lowered as the Nationalist government failed to check galloping inflation and soaring living costs. The Nationalists had financed much of the war effort by simply printing more money and had, in the process, destroyed the purchasing power of their currency, the yuan. Some 9 trillion yuan were in circulation in late 1946, but by August 1948 that number had increased to 700 trillion. Professionals and middle-class workers in the Nationalist heartland saw their savings wiped out as the government seemed unwilling or unable to help. Strikes, student demonstrations, and labour unrest became commonplace, and black market traffic dramatically increased. In desperation, the government introduced rigid price and wage controls and began enforcing harsh criminal penalties for economic crimes such as hoarding. These measures, along with the creation of a new currency called the gold yuan, temporarily halted the economic meltdown. The Chinese public, however, noted that those with close ties to the Nationalist government avoided

prosecution for even the most glaring violations of the new laws, and morale was further eroded by the return of inflation. Nearly 300 billion gold yuan were introduced into circulation in August 1948; within eight months, more than 5 quadrillion gold yuan had been printed. Chiang concluded the year by indicating his willingness to negotiate a peace that would be acceptable to all parties. The Communists marked the end of 1948 by publishing a list of 25 “war criminals” that was topped with Chiang’s name.

Nationalist collapse and the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (1949)

The two-decade struggle for China between the Nationalists and the Communists reached its conclusion in 1949. The year began with a Nationalist appeal to the “Big Four” (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union) to mediate a settlement with the Communists. The United States, which had for so long supported the Nationalist cause, immediately replied that such an effort would not serve any useful purpose. On January 14 Mao declared his willingness to negotiate on the following terms: (1) punishment of “war criminals,” (2) abrogation of the 1946 constitution, (3) abolition of the existing form of government, (4) reorganization of Nationalist armies, (5) confiscation of “bureaucratic” capital from Nationalist Party elites and functionaries, (6) land reform, (7) abrogation of “treasonous” treaties, and (8) establishment of a democratic coalition government without the participation of “reactionary” (Nationalist) elements. Meanwhile, the Communist advance continued, and Tientsin (Tianjin) fell on January 15,

1949. Chiang announced his resignation as president of China on January 21, and Nationalist leadership passed to Gen. Li Tsung-jen (Li Zongren). On January 22, Li accepted Mao's eight conditions as a basis for peace negotiations, and Nationalist forces began their withdrawal from Peking (Beijing). With the fall of Peking, the Communist drive on the Nationalist capital of Nanking could begin in earnest.

Following a meeting with a preliminary peace delegation from Nanking, Mao, now in Peking, agreed on February 9 to call an official peace conference within a month. On February 20 Li flew to Canton (Guangzhou), the newly designated Nationalist capital, in an effort to rally the various Nationalist contingents behind his peace efforts. Premier Ho Ying-chin (He Yingqin) designated Gen. Chang Chih-Chung (Zhang Zhizhong) as head of the Nationalist peace delegation, while the Communists selected Zhou Enlai to head their mission. Talks were scheduled to begin on April 1 in Peking, a timetable that gave the Communists sufficient time to regroup their forces along the Yangtze and near Nanking. From April 2 to April 12 the delegates exchanged views informally over three fundamental Communist demands: (1) Communist armies must be allowed to cross the Yangtze to help reorganize Nationalist troops; (2) an interim government with Mao as chairman and Li as one of the vice-chairmen must be established; (3) the Chiang, Soong, Kung, and Chen families must be punished. Formal negotiations opened on April 13, and within three days Mao's peace program had expanded to 24 items, with the crossing of the Yangtze by Communist armies and the elimination of the

national government as the key issues. On April 17 the Communists gave the Nationalists three days to respond. Li's government formally rejected Mao's peace draft on April 19, and within hours the Communists had launched an all-out offensive. The fall of Nanking on April 24 marked the beginning of the disintegration of the Nationalist government.

In rapid succession, the Communists captured Hankow (Hankou) on May 17, Tsingtao (Qingdao) on May 25, and Shanghai on June 2. To consolidate Nationalist forces, a supreme council was created at Canton with Chiang Kai-shek as chairman, Li Tsung-jen as deputy, and Yen Hsi-shan (Yan Xishan) as premier. In July the Communists launched offensives into South China and the northwest. The vital commercial centre of Changsha fell on August 5, the port of Foochow (Fuzhou) on August 17, and the northwestern fortress city of Lanchow (Lanzhou) on August 28.

It was clear that the end was rapidly approaching for the Nationalist cause on the mainland. From his capital at Peking, Mao proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949. Within days the Soviet Union and the communist bloc recognized it as the legitimate government of China, and by year's end several other countries had followed suit. On October 10 the Nationalist government officially informed foreign diplomats that it was relocating its capital again, this time to Chungking (Chongqing). The Communists took Canton on October 15 and Amoy (Xiamen) on October 17. By this time, the Communists had penetrated

the southwest, and the Nationalists abandoned Kweiyang (Guiyang), about 200 miles (320 km) south of Chungking, on November 13.

On November 20 Li flew to Hong Kong, and on December 5 he traveled to the United States for medical treatment. On November 24 the Nationalists designated Chengtu (Chengdu) as the seat of a much-reduced national government. Chungking fell on November 30, and on December 8 the national capital was moved to Taipei, Formosa (Taiwan). After the Communists took Nanning in far southern China on December 6, one of the last remaining Nationalist armies in the field, under Gen. Pai Chung-hsi, disintegrated and fled to Hainan and French Indochina. By December 10, when Chiang left the mainland for Formosa, the exodus of people, goods, and institutions was largely complete. Assets of the Nationalist air force had begun relocating to the island as early as August 1948, and they were soon followed by the navy and the government's gold reserves. The remaining pockets of Nationalist control eroded as generals and provincial governors in Sinkiang (Xinjiang), Yunnan, and Sikang (Xikang) switched their allegiances to the Communists in early December 1949. By the end of 1949, virtually all of mainland China was under Communist control.

The cost of the war was enormous. Official Communist figures counted some 1.5 million dead and wounded among the People's Liberation Army. Some 600,000 Nationalists troops were killed in combat, while roughly three times that many defected to the Communists. Nearly 7 million Nationalist troops

were captured during four years of combat. Approximately 5 million civilians died as a result of combat, famine, and disease.

MANCHURIAN CRISIS

In 1931, the Japanese Empire controlled the South Manchuria Railway. In the September the Japanese claimed that the Chinese had sabotaged the railway. Using this pretense the Japanese army invaded and over ran Manchuria with Japanese forces. They removed the Chinese defensive forces and renamed the area Manchukuo. In Manchukuo they created a puppet government which would do as Japan commanded.

China appealed directly to the League of Nations for support in the matter, as part of their territory had been invaded by Japan. The League sent officials to Manchuria, but the journey was long, it took a significant amount of time for the officials to arrive. It was therefore, an entire year before the League was able to publish the report in to the situation in Manchuria. The report itself was detailed and declared that Japan was in the wrong.

Japan should have then withdrawn from Manchuria, but instead decided it was going to continue the invasion of China. Japan's argument was still one of self defence, and argued that it was necessary to protect itself from China. After the League voted to approve the report against Japan, Japan left the League, withdrawing its support.

This removal of Japan was a major blow to the League. What remained attempted to enforce economic sanctions against Japan, but were hampered by the fact that the biggest trading partner was the United States, who were not in

the League. Britain also undermined the efforts of the League in punishing Japan as it wanted to keep good relations with the Japanese. Everytime the League came close to decision it would be averted as the members did not want a war to happen.

The only countries who could do something about Japan were the Soviet Union or America, as as neither of those were in the League, it was unlikely to happen. The Manchurian Crisis proved to international observers such as Italy and Germany that the League was powerless to stop international aggression.

SECOND SINO- JAPANESE WAR

The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) had a significant impact on the course of the Chinese Revolution. Known in China as the 'War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression', it was a catastrophic conflict for the Chinese people, causing up to 20 million casualties. It also had serious political repercussions for both the nationalist Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Tensions with Japan

Japan's invasion of China in the early 1930s and the Sino-Japanese War that followed capped off decades of antagonism between the two nations.

The political and economic development of Japan stood in stark contrast to that of China. The Meiji Restoration of the late 19th century propelled Japan into the modern world. The Japanese had tapped into Western knowledge to develop an industrialised economy.

Japan's military, once a barefoot army of *samurai*, was now a well trained Westernised armed force, equipped with modern weapons. Its government was dominated by militarists and expansionists who hoped to make Japan an Asian imperial power.

The First Sino-Japanese War erupted in August 1894 over control of the Korean peninsula. This war ended with a Japanese victory in a little over eight months, despite Japanese forces being greatly outnumbered by the Qing armies.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed in April 1895, saw China surrender control of the Liaodong peninsula, west of Korea, and the island of Taiwan. Six years later, following the disastrous Boxer Rebellion, Japan won the right to station troops in eastern Manchuria, giving them a military stronghold on the Chinese mainland.

Japanese imperialism

The collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911 weakened China and allowed Japan to further expand its sphere of influence there.

In 1915, the Japanese government issued Chinese president Yuan Shikai with a set of 21 territorial and concessional demands, which Shikai had no choice but to accept.

An incident in Mukden, Manchuria in September 1931 provided the Japanese with the pretext for a full military invasion of Manchuria. Once established there, the Japanese set up the puppet state of Manchukuo and installed the last Qing emperor, Puyi, as its ineffectual head of state.

In May 1933, the Nationalist president Jiang Jieshi, who was more concerned with fighting the communists than resisting Japanese imperialism, signed the Tanggu Truce, effectively recognising the legitimacy of the Manchukuo puppet state.

War breaks out

Full-scale war between China and Japan began in July 1937, following an incident near the Marco Polo Bridge in Wanping, near Beijing. After

Japanese troops opened fire on local soldiers a brief ceasefire was negotiated but both sides increased military numbers in the region.

When the Japanese launched a full-scale invasion of China in late July, the Nationalists and CCP were seven months into a shaky alliance dubbed the Second United Front.

The Nationalist armies attempted to resist the invasion but were quickly overcome by the technological supremacy and preparedness of the Japanese. China's underdeveloped industries were incapable of supplying munitions or engineering quickly or in sufficient quantities. Unlike the Japanese, the Chinese military had no tanks and only a few aircraft.

Rapid Japanese advances

The first phase of the war was a blitzkrieg of Japanese victories as their forces moved swiftly along China's east coast.

Almost half a million Japanese troops moved against Shanghai, Nanjing and other locations in mainland China, while Japanese military planes bombarded regions where their foot soldiers could not penetrate.

In late 1937 the Nationalist government was forced to retreat from its capital, Nanjing, to Chongqing in western China.

Japanese brutalities

Japanese troops in China were notorious for their brutal treatment of civilians and military prisoners.

The Japanese occupation of Nanjing from December 1937, often referred to as the 'Rape of Nanjing', is the most infamous example of Japanese

brutality. Estimates suggest that the Japanese massacred 300,000 people in and around the city, many of them civilians.

Historian Jonathan Fenby describes the Rape of Nanjing as a uniquely “urban atrocity” because of “the way the Japanese went about their killing, the wanton individual cruelty, the reduction of the city’s inhabitants to the status of sub-humans who could be murdered, tortured and raped at will”.

According to contemporary accounts, thousands of civilians were buried alive, machine-gunned or used for bayonet practice. Females were taken and forced into labour as “comfort women” (sex slaves for Japanese officers and soldiers).

The Japanese also conducted human experimentation in secret bases in China. Unit 731 in the country’s northeast was the largest biological and chemical warfare testing facility. Prisoners there were injected with diseases like anthrax, smallpox, cholera, dysentery and typhoid. Other experiments studied the effects of food deprivation and extreme cold; amputation without anaesthesia; and the effects of chemical weapons and flamethrowers.

The Japanese also air-bombed cities like Ningbo and Changde with fleas carrying bubonic plague. Vast swathes of China were decimated by Japan’s ‘scorched earth’ warfare, epitomised by the slogan “kill all, loot all, destroy all”.

Little foreign support

While Jiang Jieshi had some early assistance from Soviet Russian leader Joseph Stalin, the Nationalists had little support from foreign powers.

In June 1938, Jiang ordered the dykes of the Yellow River dam to be blown, a desperate attempt to slow the advance of the Japanese invasion. While this ploy worked, it also caused a devastating flood that killed between 500,000 to one million Chinese civilians, rendered up to ten million homeless and ruined millions of acres of important farmland.

The resulting food shortages, famine and human suffering only contributed to rising peasant hatred of Jiang Jieshi and the Nationalist regime. Other problems confronting Jiang and the Guomindang government were widespread corruption, rising inflation and high desertion rates caused by poor treatment of Nationalist soldiers, most of whom were unwilling conscripts.

Stalemate and World War II

Beyond 1938, the Sino-Japanese war reached a virtual stalemate. China's geographical size, her lack of infrastructure and scattered pockets of resistance all helped to slow the Japanese advance.

By 1940, the Japanese controlled the entire north-eastern coast and areas up to 400 miles inland. They installed a puppet government in Nanjing under Wang Jingwei, a former Guomindang leader and political rival to Jiang Jieshi.

Foreign assistance for the Chinese finally came after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour in December 1941. As the United States was drawn into World War II, China became an important theatre in the war against the Japanese.

In 1942, US general Joseph Stillwell was sent to China to assist with training, reorganisation and equipment. Jiang's authoritarianism, however, hampered their collaboration. Jiang's wife Soong Meiling, dubbed "Madame Chiang" by the Western press, proved a more skilled diplomat than her husband; she was instrumental in securing some foreign assistance.

A historian's view:

"The Nationalist government, which bore the major brunt of the fighting, was so depleted physically and spiritually that it was manifestly incapable of coping with the new challenges of the postwar era."

Immanuel Hsu

The CCP consolidates

During its war with the Japanese, the CCP continued to consolidate its base in Yan'an, while the Red Army – later reorganised into the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army – defended the inland areas of the northwest. The Japanese had no desire to occupy rural areas in the interior, which created a misleading perception that the communists were successful defenders.

Favourable reports from foreign visitors also came out of the Yan'an Soviet during the war period, such as praise from the American Dixie Mission of 1944 and from US president Franklin Roosevelt's special emissary, Patrick Hurley. Zhou Enlai also became well respected among diplomats and foreign journalists.

These factors were exploited by CCP propaganda, which helped generate support for the party and allowed it to present as an alternative national

government to the Guomindang. By 1942, CCP membership had grown to 800,000, a twentyfold growth from the beginning of the war five years earlier. Scholars like David Goodman suggest the CCP's tactics during this period were an essential element of the party's eventual rise to power.

Conclusion

The Second Sino-Japanese War came to an end in August 1945 after the United States detonated nuclear weapons over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Russian troops invaded from the north and suppressed Japanese forces in Manchuria, while Japanese forces in China were ordered to surrender to Jiang Jieshi and the Nationalists.

In assessing the impact of the war, historian Jonathan Fenby describes it as “an extended body blow for a regime already shot through with weaknesses. The length, scale and nature of the conflict had debilitated China and the Nationalists”.

China emerged from the war politically unsettled, economically exhausted and scarred by an enormous amount of human suffering. With the CCP growing in size, popularity and prestige, and the Guomindang government grossly unpopular, the Chinese stage was now cleared for a civil war between the Nationalists and the communists.

UNIT – III

MAO'S ERA

I. The First Years of the People's Chinese Republic (PRC): 1949-1957.

a. Domestic Policy.

Mao's three proclaimed tasks were: 1. national unity; 2. social and economic change; 3. freedom from foreign interference. The CCP set out to revolutionize the countryside south of the Yangtze river. This meant land reform and educating the peasants to support the revolution. At this time, peasants were given land. In some cases, they also killed their landlords, but this was a more general occurrence in the second, more radical wave of land reform that took place after 1949. (It is estimated that one million were killed). In the first phase, the rich peasants were allowed to keep their land, or most of it, in order to help restore food production and avoid alienating them from the new regime. (Compare Soviet Russia under NEP, 1921-29, and Eastern Europe, 1944-48). At the same time, party committees were established in every village to help the peasants carry out the reform and maintain party control over the process.

In the cities, which were new territory for the CCP, Mao followed a policy of "alliance" with the intellectuals and middle class, including the merchants. Again, the goal was to restore production and avoid alienation. The state took possession of heavy industry, banking and transport but private enterprise was allowed both in the towns and in the countryside. In general, the PRC economic

policies and political toleration of the first two or three years resembled the NEP period in Soviet Russia, as well as the first postwar years in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe. The goal was the same, i.e., conciliation of most sectors of society in order to rebuild the economy. As in the USSR and E. Europe, this did not mean that the communists gave up their goal of creating a "socialist" society.

One radical reform introduced in 1950 was the *new marriage law*, giving women freedom of choice. As mentioned earlier (ch.9), the liberation of women had been advocated by reformist thinkers from the late 19th century onward. It was embraced by *the May 4th movement of 1919* and then taken up by the CCP. The marriage law was a break with the past; it was also the first step in the CCP policy of undermining the traditional power of the family in China.

b. PRC - U.S. Relations.

Before the Korean War, Mao showed great interest in establishing friendly relations with the United States, provided it recognized the territorial integrity of China, including Taiwan, and thus gave up its support of Chiang Kai-shek, who had established his government as the Republic of China (Free China) in Taiwan. However, the U.S. government viewed the PRC as a satellite of Moscow and advised its allies not recognize it, but to form a common front against it. Thus, when Mao invited J. Leighton Stuart, U.S. ambassador to Chiang since July 1946, to visit Beijing, he was not allowed to go. Furthermore,

the U.S. imposed a trade embargo on the PRC and advised its allies not to trade with it, or at least not to export "strategic goods" for its use.

From the perspective of time, this policy seems unwise. We must, however, bear in mind that it was formulated in the atmosphere of the *Cold War*. American opinion was deeply affected by the expansion of Soviet power in Eastern Europe and its threat to Western Europe (the Berlin Blockade, 1948-49). As we know, NATO was the response there. The communist victory in China created the fear of communist expansion in Asia, which was heightened by the French Indochina War, and then the Korean War. Therefore, the U.S. footed the bill for great quantities of military equipment used by the French in their war against the North Vietnamese communists (see ch. 12) and supplied arms to Chiang-Kai-shek in Taiwan. This political climate prevented the establishment of good U.S.- CPR relations for a long time to come.(1) At the same time, in acknowledging Mao Zedong's overtures and their rejection by the United States we should keep in mind that as a communist Chinese leader he was bent on eliminating western influence from China. Furthermore, Stalin made it clear to Mao, that he did not want him to risk a war with the United States. For all these reasons, Mao's moderate stance toward the United States in the years of the Civil War and immediately after it was a matter of tactics, and not of desire for a real understanding with Washington.

c. PRC-Soviet Relations.

Mao paid a long visit to Moscow in late 1949 and early 1950. Finally, in February 1950, he signed a Treaty of Friendship and Assistance with the Soviet Union. In this treaty, the USSR promised assistance against Japan, if this was necessary. It also gave the CPR credits amounting to \$300 million repayable at 1% interest, but Mao had to recognize the Soviet occupation of Dalian (Darien) and Lushun (Port Arthur) until 1952 (it was to last longer). Finally, he had to recognize the existence of Soviet Mongolia. These were bitter pills for the Chinese, but they needed Soviet economic aid so they accepted them.

Recently published Chinese documents as well as recently declassified Russian documents allow a comparison of the two records of the Mao-Stalin conversations in Moscow in December 1949-January 1950. While the Russian record shows a business-like approach to the talks by Stalin and does not indicate any bullying on his part or objections by Mao, the latter's account, paints a different picture. It also suggests that Stalin deliberately left Mao to cool his heels in a "dacha" (country house) near Moscow between the first conversation of December 16, 1949 and the second on January 22, 1950, when Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai was also present. Perhaps Stalin wanted to teach Mao a lesson? Whatever the case may be, Mao resented this treatment deeply. He gave his version of the conversations and expressed his feelings on March 31, 1956, in a talk with Soviet ambassador Pavel Yudin, in which he also vented his resentment against Stalin's support of Chiang in the civil war. It is worth noting that according to the Soviet record, Mao did not object to

Stalin's demands for keeping some Chinese territory under Soviet control, but in Mao's version, the latter did not agree to them. Perhaps the second version is nearer to the truth; if so, it would explain why Stalin kept Mao waiting 5 weeks between the two conversations. (2)

d. The Impact of the Korean War.

We know a great deal more about the origins of this war since the opening of Russian documents on this subject in summer 1994. It is not longer a secret why the outbreak of the war in June 1950 caught Mao by surprise, for it is clear that Stalin did not keep him informed on his agreement to Kim il Sung's plan to attack South Korea. (See ch. 11). It is also clear why Mao at first followed a cautious policy - he did not want to risk a war with United States. Finally, under pressure from Stalin - who also wanted to avoid a war with the U.S - fearing that U.N. troops would cross the Yalu river into China; and after securing Stalin's promise of Soviet air cover, the CCP leadership decided to move. Therefore, in early November 1950, Chinese troops launched some attacks on U.N. troops in North Korea when they approached the Yalu river, the border between China and Korea, but then melted away into the hills. This was meant as a warning to the United States that the PRC would not tolerate U.S. troops on its border with Korea. This warning was also conveyed to the U.S. government through Asian diplomats.

The Chinese troops had massed in the difficult mountainous terrain on their side of the Yalu river. But they were so well camouflaged that they were not be detected by U.S. aerial reconnaissance. When Gen. Douglas MacArthur (1880-1964, Supreme Commander U.N. Forces, Korea, 1950-51), after landing troops at Inchon, approached the bridges on the Yalu, the Chinese attacked on November 26th and drove back the American and ROK troops. MacArthur had the agreement of President Harry S. Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take over the whole of North Korea. However, they did not agree to his suggestions of bombing China, including use of the atomic bomb. President Truman dismissed him in April 1951.

U.N. troops, in which the U.S. predominated, finally drove the Chinese and North Koreans out of South Korea. The result was the existence of two Koreas: communist North Korea and anti-communist South Korea (see ch. 11). It is worth noting that during the war the Soviets sent the PRC a great deal of military equipment, such as artillery and MIG fighter planes - but the Chinese had to pay for the Soviet arms they obtained. The USSR also provided advisers and military hardware, especially T-34 tanks and some tank units to the North Koreans. Furthermore, Soviet pilots flew MiGs against U.S. planes. However, it is clear that Stalin was just as unwilling to become involved with the United States in a war over Korea as Truman was to become involved there in a war with the USSR. In fact, Truman not only opposed using the atomic bomb against China, but also opposed sending U.S. troops into China.

The Korean War led to more radical reforms in China. Terror and coercion were used to eradicate all opposition. In the first campaign against "counter-revolutionaries," which began in February 1951, an estimated 1 to 3 million people were killed.

The next campaign was a *purge of the party bureaucracy*. It targeted the *3 antis: corruption, waste, and bureaucracy*. The aim was to rid the party of many allegedly unreliable members who had jumped on the bandwagon in 1949 and after.

Next came a *campaign against the former ally of the PRC, the Chinese middle class*. The slogan was now the *5 antis: bribery, tax evasion, fraud, theft of government property, and theft of government secrets*. Since there was no definition of what constituted a government secret, it was easy to accuse anyone viewed as an enemy, or potential enemy of the regime. In fact, the campaign was designed to break the middle class, make them give up their property, and agree to become salaried managers in state enterprises. They were forced to "confess" their misdeeds in front of their former employees. This was designed to humiliate them and make them pliant tools of the regime. Those who refused were often given long terms of imprisonment, which many did not survive.

e. The First Five Year Plan (FYP).

The first FYP was launched in 1953, with the aim of developing the Chinese economy on the Soviet model. This was quite logical, for the USSR was the only existing communist economic system and was the only source of technical aid for the PRC. Thus,.

The first FYP gave priority to heavy industry. Indeed, China was far more backward economically in 1953 than the USSR had been in 1928-29, when Stalin launched his industrialization and collectivization drive. As in the USSR, so in China, all industry and larger commercial enterprises were nationalized. Soon, all private property was abolished as well.

In the countryside, Mao avoided the shock tactics of Stalin's collectivization and its resulting massive peasant resistance by proceeding more gradually, at least until 1955. Thus, he began with the establishment of semi-socialist peasant cooperatives whose members were paid according to the amount of land and capital they brought in, as well as according to their work. *This reform progressed slowly; by July 1955 only 15% of peasant families had entered the cooperatives. At this time, Mao made a speech calling for a sharp increase in collectivization and rapid acceleration followed.* However, this drive *slowed down in 1956*, partly because of peasant resistance, and partly because of a poor harvest.

II. 1956-1965: The Sino-Soviet Split and the Evolution of an Independent Foreign Policy; the Great Leap Forward and Inner Party Struggles.

a. The Background to the Sino-Soviet Split.

Under Mao's leadership, Chinese communism had conquered China, mainly by focusing on the peasants and implementing moderate land reform up to 1949. At the same time, its military strategy was guerrilla warfare called "people's resistance." Victory had been achieved without Soviet aid. No wonder that as early as 1946, one of Mao's closest collaborators, Liu Shaoqi (Shao-ch'i, 1898-1969), claimed that Mao had created "a Chinese or Asiatic form of communism" and that China's example would influence all Asian countries. In 1949, Liu again said that Mao's way was the way for all Asia - a statement that was criticized in Moscow.

Khrushchev's famous anti-Stalin speech, delivered at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, is generally seen as the start of the Sino-Soviet split. It is clear, however, that it was not the beginning, but rather an important contribution to Mao's growing distrust of the USSR. Shortly after the speech,. Mao complained to Soviet ambassador Yudin that Stalin had treated him as a "Chinese Tito." As mentioned earlier, he also expressed his resentment at Stalin's support of Chiang Kai -shek during the civil war. Indeed, this support went further than historians suspected. A recently discovered document in the Japanese Foreign Ministry archives shows that *on October 3, 1940, Soviet and Japanese diplomats reached an agreement that stipulated:*

"The USSR will abandon its support of Chiang [Kai-shek; Jaing Jieshi] and will repress the Chinese Communist Party's anti-Japanese activities; in exchange, Japan recognizes and accepts that the Chinese Communist Party will retain as a base the three (Chinese) Northwest provinces (Shanxi, Gansu, Ningxia)." One may well wonder how Stalin could "repress" CCP activities, since he did not control Mao. Still, the agreement seemed to preserve some space for the CCP in provinces close to the border of Soviet Mongolia - even though the Japanese did not control these areas either! Thus, Stalin's "concession" to the Japanese and their counter-concession to him constituted bargaining counters that concerned their interests in other disputed matters elsewhere. (2a) Nevertheless, the agreement is a good illustration of Stalin's policy toward Mao at this time.

As far as Khrushchev was concerned, he sometimes supported the PRC and at other times considered it an obstacle to his policy of coexistence with the United States. Already in 1954, he told Western statesmen that China was a liability to the Soviet Union because of the danger of a conflict between the PRC and the U.S. over Taiwan. Moreover, it was also at this time that the PRC began to compete with the Soviets for the leadership of the Third World. This competition was evidenced by the Sino-Indian Treaty of 1954 and by China's role in the Bandung Conference of Third World Countries in 1955. When Khrushchev and Tito effected a reconciliation in that same year, Albania feared renewed Yugoslav domination (as in 1945-48), and turned to the PRC for help; it became China's East European satellite for many years to come.

Finally, *Mao's 4 concepts of unity, equality, comparison, and learning* were quite unacceptable to Soviet leaders as a basis for mutual relations. They often treated the Chinese communists as somewhat backward and wayward younger brethren, who had to be kept in their place and follow the Soviet lead.

It is true, of course, that Mao resented Khrushchev's attack on Stalin in February 1956, for the Soviet leader had not bothered to consult his Chinese colleague. Worse still, Khrushchev not only set out to destroy the Stalin myth, but also attacked the "personality cult" as alien to communist practice -- and there was, after all, a growing Mao cult in China. Thus, it is not surprising that Mao called Khrushchev's attack on Stalin "a gunshot (character) assassination."

Above all, however, Mao deeply resented Khrushchev's policy of coexistence with the United States, which threatened the PRC with isolation. At the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties in November 1957, Mao contradicted Khrushchev's line that no one could win a nuclear war. He said that such a war would not be the end of the world, because half its population would survive. From other statements by Mao, it is clear he thought that a large part of the huge Chinese population would survive an atomic war. However, both leaders tried to keep up an appearance of good relations. Thus, Mao used Albania for attacking the USSR, and Khrushchev attacked Albania as a proxy for the CPR.

The first open Sino-Soviet clash over foreign policy came in 1958. In July of that year, Khrushchev proposed a summit meeting between the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, the USSR, and India to settle a Middle East crisis (U.S. troops had landed in Lebanon, on the request of President Camille Chamoun, who was trying to put down a revolt). However, three days later, when Khrushchev was on a visit to Beijing, he withdrew the conference proposal, probably to conciliate Mao.

In August-September 1958, there was a crisis over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Straits between the PRC, on the one hand, and Chiang Kai-shek, supported by the United States, on the other. It is clear from recently published Chinese documents that Mao launched the attack on purpose to show his independence of the USSR. Khrushchev wrote a letter to President Eisenhower supporting China and even brandishing the nuclear threat. It is equally clear, however, that Khrushchev's "nuclear threat" was to serve as a demonstration of his support for China - not of readiness to fight the United States. In fact, he did what he could to defuse the crisis. In any case, the show of U.S. naval power in the area forced Mao to retreat. (2 b).

In September 1959, there were border clashes between the PRC and India, and the Soviets called on both sides to desist, which Mao saw as a betrayal. Even worse from Mao's point of view, was Khrushchev's behavior when he visited Beijing on September 30 that year after his visit to the United States. During a formal banquet in his honor, Khrushchev attacked those who wanted to test the stability of the capitalist system - meaning a war with the

United States. Thus, he criticized Mao's risk-taking in the Taiwan Straits' crisis. Also, Khrushchev now supported the seating of both Chinas in the United Nations: i.e., Mao's PRC and Chiang's Republic of China. As it turned out, this policy was unacceptable both to the PRC and to the United States.

To add insult to injury, at the Romanian Party Congress in Bucharest in June 1960, Khrushchev openly attacked the PRC leaders as "madmen" who wanted to unleash nuclear war. In July, he decided to withdraw all Soviet experts from China. As we know, this included the experts who were helping the PRC develop its own nuclear bomb. Shortly thereafter, Khrushchev reneged on the promise of giving the Chinese a sample bomb, thus delaying its production by China for several years.

Mao reacted by sending Premier Zhou Enlai to the Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow in November 1960 to protest the Khrushchev policy. Zhou not only insisted that all Communist Parties were equal -- thus implicitly denying the Soviet claim to leadership of the world communist movement -- but also expressed the PRC's independent position by laying a wreath at Stalin's grave by the Kremlin wall. (Khrushchev had removed Stalin's body from the mausoleum, where it had lain alongside of Lenin's since 1953).

The final straw for the PRC was Khrushchev's behavior during the Sino-Indian War of 1962. This war broke out over disputed territories, but was characterized by considerable Chinese restraint. Khrushchev, however, used the opportunity to establish closer relations with India by sending aid, including MIG fighters for the Indian Air Force. (3)

In October of that year came the Cuban missile crisis, after which Mao criticized Khrushchev first for "adventurism," and then for capitulating to the U.S. "paper tiger." (see ch. 13).

In January 1963, the Chinese and Soviet press began a public exchange of recriminations. In July, the Soviets signed the First Test Ban Treaty with the United States. The PRC's reaction to Soviet policy came in the Nine Comments, written at least in part by Mao and published in 1963-64. Among other things, they included the statement that "The present-day Soviet Union is a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, a dictatorship of the big bourgeoisie, a dictatorship like German fascism, a Hitler-type of dictatorship; they are a pack of ruffians, even worse than De Gaulle." (General Charles De Gaulle was the leader of the Free French in World War II; he was head of state in 1945-46, returned to power in June 1958, and was President from 1959-67. In the early 1960s, he was seeking a special relationship with the USSR, which made him an enemy of Red China).

The Nine Comments also claimed that in 1954 (when the Soviets had returned Dalian Lushun to China) Mao had asked Khrushchev and Bulganin whether Outer Mongolia would also be returned to China. He reminded them that over the last hundred years, Russia had seized the area east of Lake Baikal from China and that the Chinese had still not "billed" Russia for it. Thus, by 1963, Sino-Soviet relations were very bad indeed. (4)

b. "Let 100 Flowers Bloom" and "The Great Leap Forward," 1958-59.

In February 1957, Mao suddenly launched a campaign for freedom of speech, though "within the bounds of discipline." He encouraged open criticism. Interpretations differ as to what he expected from this; did he really expect to find out what people were thinking, or was his encouragement of criticism directed at abuses with the goal of using this criticism as a weapon against the party leaders he wished to remove? Or was he perhaps concerned that Chinese intellectuals might follow the path of the Hungarians? (Revolution of October-November 1956).

Mao's long-time doctor, Li Zhisui claims in his memoirs that Mao used the campaign to "rectify" or purge the party. He did not trust it; therefore, he turned outside for criticism. Li writes that Mao also distrusted intellectuals, but thought that few would be critical of him so most would play along with his game. When the intellectuals remained quiet, Mao repeated his message in March 1957. What happened next was a revelation. Once the press was allowed to publish criticism of the party, that latter was even attacked as an institution and its right to rule was questioned. Indeed, even Mao himself was criticised. Li writes that "Mao was shocked." He was furious and retired to bed. (Li writes that Mao often retired to bed at times of crisis to think out his response). He told Li: "I handle opponents by letting them strike first. I have three rules: First, I follow the ancient philosopher Laozi. I, the father, do not initiate action. When under attack, I retreat, doing nothing, remaining silent.

We let the enemy feel he has scored a few points. " Mao said the Confucian way to do things was to wait until enemies exposed themselves, and then retaliate.

Thus, Mao decided to launch a campaign against the "rightists." In May he told Li: "I want to coax the snakes out of their holes. Then we will strike." On 8 June, the People's Daily printed Mao's article: "What is this for?" He accused a small number of people of trying to overthrow the "socialist" government and called on the masses to launch a "counterattack." (4a) Thousands of intellectuals, as well as some party leaders, were sent to labor camps and to the villages to be "re-educated" through heavy manual labor. This experience disillusioned many communist intellectuals, including a famous future dissident, the physicist Fang Lizhi. It is also significant that one of the leaders of this attack on the "rightists" was Deng Xiaoping (b.1904), who would later be a victim himself. (He survived to succeed Mao, began a great economic reform in 1978, and was to crush the Chinese democratic movement in June 1989).

In 1958, Mao launched a new economic policy: the "Great Leap Forward" (GLF). This meant the reorganization of state and collective farms into huge communes. Furthermore, the peasants in these communes were ordered not only to work the land, but also to make their own tools out of the iron that they were to smelt into steel.. What were Mao's goals? He said he wanted to establish a "free supply system," i.e. that everyone would have enough to eat in both town and country. He also said that China must catch up with Gt. Britain

in fifteen years. Finally, he wanted to free China from its economic dependence on the USSR.

Some historians speculate that the creation of large militia forces in the communes was to provide Mao with a weapon he could use against moderate CPR leaders. The latter, after all, controlled the army, favored slower reforms, and wished for improved relations with the USSR. Whatever the case may be, by January 1959, the militia numbered about 220 million, or one-third of the entire population. It seems, however, that the militia was a by-product of the GLF.

The Great Leap Forward turned out to be a great disaster. The peasants could not smelt iron into steel for tools in their backyard furnaces. At the same time, this work took away the time needed to work the land, so that crops rotted in the fields. After a wave of initial enthusiasm, they reacted badly to the loss of all individual incentives as well as personal and familial freedoms. Furthermore, the extreme decentralization of economic control not only led to chaotic distribution, but also helped mask huge shortfalls in production that local units were too afraid to report. All these factors were aggravated by bad weather, which led to crop failure in several provinces. *The combined result of political and natural factors was widespread famine, resulting in millions of deaths.* (Some estimates go as high as 30 million out of a population of some 500 million, i.e., 6%). Strict rationing had to be imposed in 1959-61, and this helped to reduce the loss of life.

Li Zhisui wrote later about the beginnings of this catastrophe: "Psychologists of mass behavior might have an explanation for what went wrong with China in late summer 1958. China was struck with a mass hysteria fed by Mao, who then fell victim himself. ..Mao began believing the slogans, casting caution to the winds. Mini-steel mills were being set up even in Zhongnanhai (the former "Forbidden City," or imperial palace grounds in Beijing where Mao lived and key offices were located, A.C), and at night the whole compound was a sea of red light. The idea had originated with the Central Bureau of Guards, but Mao did not oppose them, and soon everyone was stoking the fires - cadres, clerks, secretaries, doctors, nurses, and me. The rare voices of caution were being stilled. Everyone was hurrying to jump on the utopian bandwagon. Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Zhou-Enlai, and Chen Yi, men who might once have reined the Chairman in, were speaking with a single voice, and that voice was Mao's. What those men really thought, we never will know. Everyone was caught in the grip of this utopian hysteria."

Li Zhisui also wrote that the crop displays at the communes visited by Mao were staged. In one region the First Party Secretary had ordered rice to be transplanted to that Mao would see it on his route. In another, a brand new furnace had been brought in to the Commune from a factory. Likewise, the high production figures given out by the communes' "good news reporting stations" were faked. Every provincial party leader wanted to please Mao and avert accusations of slacking.. When disasters struck, "no one, not even the closest to him, dared to speak." (4b)

As Li Zhisui tells it, Mao visited his home village, Shaoshan in Hunan province, where he heard many complaints about the GLF. Nevertheless, he still thought the GLF line was right and did not want to dampen the enthusiasm of the people. However, by fall 1959, there was criticism of the GLF by some members of the the party leadership. Marshal Peng Dehuai (P'eng Tehuai, 1898-1974), then Minister of Defense - who had visited Eastern Europe and met with Khrushchev - attacked the GLF at the Politburo meeting held in Lushan (Port Arthur) in late July and early August 1959. Some historians have theorized that Khrushchev might have encouraged Peng to attack Mao and then establish a new leadership more friendly to the USSR. Others, however, stress Peng's genuine alarm after visiting his own part of the country, and seeing the catastrophic famine there.

According to Li Zhisui, Mao allowed free discussion of the GLF at the Lushan meeting. He did not take part in this, but waited. Peng Dehuai sent him a personal letter stressing the disastrous situation in China. Indeed, Li Zhisui writes that by the end of 1958, a large part of the huge harvest lay rotting in the fields because the peasants, busy with their "backyard furnaces" - producing useless iron ingots from their pots and pans - did not have the strength to harvest the crops. Also, the provinces which had declared exaggerated crop figures had to give a much larger percent of their real produce as taxes to the state. In 1959, food shortages were on the rise in towns and there was famine in some parts of China. Mao heard of this state of affairs not only from Peng Dehuai, but also from personal emissaries he had sent out to

investigate the situation and who reported honestly what they saw. Nevertheless, while Mao acknowledged errors in the execution of the GLF at Lushan, he still insisted that the "general line" was correct and that criticism of it was "bourgeois.". This fitted in with his criticism of Khrushchev's policy in the USSR as "bourgeois" - and we should note that Khrushchev had strongly criticized the GLF, especially the huge communes. Furthermore, according to Li Zhisui, on July 21, the Soviet-educated deputy Foreign Minister, Zhang Wentian had made "a stunning, lengthy attack on Mao's leadership and the Great Leap." He concluded "by arguing in favor of democracy and free speech." When others rebuked him, he declared that "he would rather die telling the truth than live in misery." (4c) If Li Zhisui's account is correct, Mao could have suspected a Khrushchev-backed "conspiracy" to overthrow him.

Whatever the case may be, it is clear that Mao identified the GLF "general line" with his own prestige and authority. Although he had resigned the chairmanship of the CPP to Liu Shaoqi, this was a move agreed on earlier. Mao remained chairman of the PRC, and had no intention of giving up power. Therefore, after allowing free discussion, he attacked Peng Dehuai and his supporters as "bourgeois democrats.". Mao also said that if the party split in two, he would found a new one among the peasants, and if the army split apart, he would raise a new one. (4d) Peng Dehuai, was condemned as a "right opportunist." He was replaced as Minister of Defense by Lin Biao (Lin Piao, 1907-1971), who was a stalwart supporter of Mao and made the army a power base for him. (Peng was arrested in 1966, and died in prison in 1974).

III. 1961 - 1968: The Coming of "The Great Cultural Revolution".(GCR).

Various dates are used to date the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Some historians date it from the failure of GLF, i.e., 1959, while the post-Mao leadership in China uses the dates 1966-76. In fact, although the greatest turmoil took place in the years 1966-68, the GCR had its roots in the failure of the GLF and the subsequent criticism of Mao at the Lushan party summit, while Mao took the more steps toward it in 1962-64.

a. Background to the Cultural Revolution.

While foreign policy played a part, it is clear that internal CCP disputes were more important than external questions in spurring Mao's attack on his rivals. We know that after the failure of the GLF, economic policy was mostly in the hands of moderate leaders, the most prominent of whom were the Chief of State Liu Shaoqi, Premier Zhou Enlai, and the CCP Secretary General, Deng Xiaoping. Like most party bureaucrats, all three wished to follow moderate economic policies, avoiding a repetition of such disasters as Mao's GLF. In fact, there was much discussion of the economy in early 1962. In January of that year, Mao again acknowledged that he bore the primary responsibility for the mistakes of Central Committee, i.e., the GLF. Furthermore, a party committee of investigation confirmed the criticisms made by Peng Dehuai in 1959.

At an enlarged Politburo meeting in February 1962, even the veteran bureaucrat Chen Yun (b.1905), who had been the leading expert on the planned economy, emphasized the magnitude of the economic crisis. He even

suggested that land be redistributed to peasant households, though he agreed with Deng Xiaoping that this would mean the restoration of private farming. In July, Deng made the famous statement that "[W]hether cats are white or black, so long as they catch mice, they are all good cats." This statement marked him out as a pragmatist, and he was to repeat it when he came to power after the death of Mao.

Thus, as in Poland, Hungary, and to a limited extent in the USSR, so also in China, Deng and other like-minded party leaders realized as early as 1962, that the old Stalinist economic model - particularly as it had been adapted by Mao - was unsatisfactory and needed reform. However, by September 1962, Mao began to oppose the suggested reforms. He justified his opposition by stressing the permanence of "class struggle." (We should note that Stalin had used this theory to justify purges in the USSR). Mao also warned against Soviet-style "revisionism," by which he meant Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin and Stalinism. Finally, he said that the real successors of revolution would come from among China's youth. In his words, they "come forward in mass struggles and are tempered in the great storms of revolution." (5) In fact, it was Mao himself who was to release such a storm over China.

Meanwhile, a new problem arose for the CPR with the beginning of active U.S. involvement in Vietnam.. The question for the CCP now was: what policy should the CPR adopt toward this war, fought in an area that had traditionally belonged to the Chinese sphere of influence in Asia? Clearly, the

CPR could not support the United States, but neither did it want to see the growth of Soviet influence in the region. In spring 1962, there was an important debate on this issue within CCP leadership over the possibility of another world war, or of peaceful coexistence with capitalist states, and of the extent of Chinese support of national liberation movements, particularly in Vietnam. Foreign policy specialists advocated peaceful coexistence, but Mao chose confrontation. *This "turn to the left" in foreign policy also accorded with Mao's stress on class struggle and radical policies in Chinese domestic affairs.* According to some China experts, this decision also meant a lost opportunity to prevent later Sino-American hostility in Indochina. (5a)

In spring 1965, Luo Ruiqing (Lo Jui-ch'ing, 1906-1978), who had been Minister of Public Security between 1949 and 1958 and had been one of the critics of the Great Leap Forward, proposed that the CPR side with the Soviets against the United States. However, he was opposed by Lin Biao who spoke for Mao. (Lin Biao had commanded the Fourth Army in the civil war, and now controlled the whole People's Army). While Luo Ruiqing advocated a reconciliation with the USSR as the best way to aid North Vietnam, Lin Biao said China must follow an independent line. (September 1965).

In fact, although the CPR allowed Soviet railway transit to North Vietnam, this transit was often impeded by slowing the trains. Furthermore, in the years 1965-67, the English-language CPR weekly, The Peking Review, often attacked the Soviet Union more rabidly than the United States. Therefore, the Soviets were compelled to send most of their military supplies to North Vietnam

by sea from Vladivostok to Haiphong. The CPR sent aid also, but it was in the form of small arms, machine guns, bicycles, and railway construction crews, who helped rebuild the track destroyed by U.S. bombing. (On the Vietnam War, see ch. 12).

Thus, we should see both the internal debate on economic development, and the debate on the Vietnam war, as factors leading to the Great Cultural Revolution.

b. The Great Cultural Revolution (GCR).

This term is totally inadequate to describe the turmoil that engulfed China in 1966-68, a turmoil that sometimes verged on civil war. In the course of the GCR, the party apparatus was almost destroyed; defense capabilities were severely weakened, and higher education was set back by about 10 years. According to official CCP figures given at the (posthumous) public trials of Lin Biao and The Gang of Four (Mao's widow, Jiang Qing & Co.), in November 1980 - January 1981, 729,511 people were "framed" and persecuted, of whom 34,800 died - though the real figures for both categories must have been much higher. In any case, the GCR had a profoundly traumatic effect on the people of China, especially party members and intellectuals, just as the Stalin purges had in the USSR in the period 1930-38. As in the USSR, so too Chinese literature was later to portray the turmoil and suffering involved, though much of it was to be published outside of China.

There are different interpretations of how and why this terrible upheaval came about. Was it caused, as Mao claimed, by his desire to rid the party of its bureaucratization, oligarchic structure, and its economic "revisionism," in order to restore communist egalitarianism? Or was it Mao's weapon of choice in a struggle to regain power over the party - but a weapon that went out of control?

The GCR was probably a combination of these two factors, but it seems that Mao's primary goal was to regain total power, have China pursue radical policies, and thus "save the revolution." as he saw it. Here we should note that Stalin's purges and terror of 1935-38 were triggered by criticism within the party leadership of his brutal collectivization policy. Once he had eliminated all real and potential rivals as well as all their relatives and friends, he had absolute power and could implement his policies. It is true that after the failure of the GLF, Mao had seemed to go into semi-retirement. However, he soon indicated his opposition both to moderate economic policies and closer relations with the USSR.

Mao launched the offensive against his opponents within the party by attacking first on the fringes, i.e., by encouraging attacks on the intellectuals, particularly writers and academics. He had always distrusted intellectuals, and now the moderate party leaders defended them and worked for the rehabilitation of those persecuted after the the "100 Flowers" campaign of 1957. Therefore, Mao decided to fight his party opponents by attacking the intellectuals. To do this, he set out to build up a new force of his own outside of

the party, in the cities. As his weapon he chose young, particularly frustrated high school students. These students had been raised as loyal supporters of Mao, so they were considered trustworthy. At the same time, they were dissatisfied with the existing elitist educational system, which favored the children of party bureaucrats and high military officers. They studied in the best high schools and had automatic access to university studies, while others had very little chance to pass entrance exams. This interpretation of the origins of the GCR was presented in the Resolution on CCP History (1948-81), adopted under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping by the 6th Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP on June 27, 1981.

The Great Cultural Revolution acquired its name from the fact that it began with an attack on a play dealing with the dismissal of a loyal bureaucrat. Hai Rui under the Ming dynasty in China. He was an honest man who told his ruler the truth and was punished for it. This play, titled; "Hai Rui Dismissed from Office," was written in 1961 by the deputy mayor of Beijing, Wu Han , who was also a distinguished historian of the Ming period. He also supported moderate economic policy . It was an old Chinese tradition -- which had always included censorship -- to criticize present policies by writing about similar policies followed in the past. Chinese intellectuals read the play as an allegory to Wu Han's old ally, the former Minister of Defense, Marshal Peng Dehuai, who had been punished for his criticism of the Great Leap Forward. Furthermore, Wu Han not only favored moderate policies and defended intellectuals, but also had far more influence in Beijing than Mao

himself.

The attack on Wu Han soon turned into an attack on "bourgeois influence" in art and literature, and then on intellectuals in general, but academics in particular. *The attack was first led by party cadres, headed by Mao's wife Jiang Qing, who was now dictator of Culture in China* . Certainly, it was not of her own volition that a young female professor of philosophy at Beijing University put up a poster calling for the Cultural Revolution to become a mass movement. In fact, we know that Mao had her poster reprinted and put up everywhere. He also supported -- and more likely inspired -- the formation by the students of a *Red Guard*, and allowed them to attack their professors, whom Mao rightly viewed as supporters of moderate party leaders. Furthermore, in their fervor to destroy all vestiges of the "old" -- a favorite target of Mao's -- the Red Guards (predominantly high school students) went on to attack and destroy treasures of Chinese culture, i.e., temples, books, art, etc.

They also went on to attack anything representing both Soviet and Western capitalist influence; by the same token, they supported Mao's criticism of the moderate party leaders who favored improved relations with the USSR. They also savaged people wearing Western clothes and mistreated, or even killed Chinese who had been employed by Western firms before they left China. We should note that the police and the military had orders not to interfere with these "Red Guards." At one point, the Red Guards laid siege to the Soviet embassy and also sacked the British embassy in Beijing. Indeed, at the height

of the GCR, China withdrew its ambassadors and diplomats from all countries except Egypt, thus virtually isolating itself from other world governments.

In August 1966, Mao finally turned the movement against his real objective: the moderate CCP leaders, whom he charged with "bourgeois" policies. The major targets were the exponents of moderate economic policies, the Chief of State, Liu Shaoqi, and the General Secretary of the CCP, Deng Xiaoping. The attack was led by Lin Biao., who headed the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Many former party leaders were either killed, or died from beatings, or were sent into the villages to be worked nearly to death. Some, like Liu Shaoqi, died in prison for lack of necessary medical care. (Indeed, as Li Zhisui points out, Mao had taken care beforehand to abolish the privileged medical care that had always been given to party leaders - though he preserved it for himself and his supporters). Above all, thousands of China's university teachers were first humiliated, by being paraded in dunce caps, then beaten and either killed or sent out to the countryside as forced labor in the communes. The universities were closed down during the fighting, after which workers and peasants were admitted without having to pass entrance exams. This, of course, helped to bring down the level of education even further. Party leaders were also sent down to the villages, including Deng Xiaoping and his family. Deng's son was so mistreated that he became an invalid.

The Red Guards were told to travel around China and continue their attacks on intellectuals and party leaders. Central control broke down as

various factions fought each other for power in the cities. China was in chaos. The prisons were full of prisoners, many of whom died either from beatings or from lack of proper medical care.

Was Mao really intent on restoring the purity of the revolution and the power of the masses? Perhaps this is what he made himself believe, but he used these slogans to justify the reimposition of his own total power over the party, for in his view only he knew which way China should go. However, he clearly miscalculated his ability to check the movement when it had carried out his wishes. At any rate, he was unable to check it before it threatened to disintegrate the country. In the end, he had to use the army to restore order.

At the height of the GCR, a *Cultural Revolutionary Group of Five* emerged, headed by Mao's ambitious second wife, the former actress Jiang Qing. She became the dictator of Chinese culture, subordinating all artistic and literary productions to serve the cause of "revolution." All Western culture was banned. She persecuted not only so-called bourgeois artists, i.e., all those who did not hew to Mao's view of the party line, but also those who had known her as a young and promiscuous actress in the 1930s. (6)

IV. From the End of the Cultural Revolution to Mao's Death.

1. The CPR's Relations with Moscow and Washington.

The Cultural Revolution began to peter out in 1969, after Mao had used the army to restore order in the provincial cities. It was high time. In March 1969, there were violent clashes between Soviet and CPR troops over Damansky Island on the Ussuri River in Manchuria. Even before this

event, Mao perceived that the balance of power had shifted in favor of the USSR. Therefore, this confrontation made both the CPR and the USSR seek closer relations with the United States.

As it happened, President Richard M. Nixon (1913-1994) had long advocated improving relations with China. He was particularly interested in securing Soviet aid in ending the Vietnam War, while his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, believed the United States should play China off against the USSR and vice versa. In April 1971, a U.S. pingpong team visited China; in July, Kissinger went secretly to Beijing to prepare a summit meeting, and Nixon himself came in February 1972. The visit seemed to be a success. The American delegation did not realize that Mao had been rescued from death due to heart failure just a few weeks earlier. He had been resuscitated and had received special medical care to make him fit for his meeting with Nixon. (6a)

The U.S. paid the price for normalizing relations with Beijing by abolishing its trade embargo on the PRC, supporting its admission to the U.N. and agreeing in principle to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Taiwan. Nixon considered these concessions well-worth the advantage of using good relations with the PRC to pressure the USSR into better relations with the United States, and, hopefully, of obtaining both PRC and Soviet help to end the Vietnam War on conditions acceptable to Washington. As for Mao, he was only too pleased to tweak Moscow's nose by improving relations with the United States, thus greatly strengthening China's security. (7)

2. The Lin Biao Affair.

Lin Biao had developed the cult of Mao in China. He had produced **The Little Red Book** of Mao's sayings and distributed it all over the country. He was the head of the army. However, in August 1970, Mao began to suspect him. According to Li Zhisui, Lin Biao made the same mistake as Liu Shaoqi before him - he wanted the post of chairman of the party. After Liu's fall, the post had been abolished - now Lin Biao wanted to restore it. He proposed that Mao resume it, but expected Mao to refuse - Mao was 77 years old - so that it would fall to him (Biao). Mao now suspected that Lin Biao was plotting to overthrow him. He thought Lin would use the army. He said he did not think the army would go against him, but if it did, he would go back to Jinggangshan and start another guerrilla war. (This is where Mao had launched his war against Chiang-Kai shek in 1927).

In mid-August 1971, Mao set out south by train to rally all party, government and military leaders. The message was that at the Lushan party conference the previous August: someone had been in a big hurry to take over as chairman of the republic. That person was trying to split the party and grab power for himself. The problem had not yet been solved. Li Zhisui cites Mao as saying: "There is someone who says he wants to support me, elevate me, but what he really has in mind is supporting himself, elevating himself." Clearly, this someone was Lin Biao. At the same time, he also said "we should try to

save Lin Biao." It is hard to determine what Mao had in mind - he said he was concerned with party unity. He returned to Beijing on September 12, 1971 and immediately met with municipal and military leaders.

At midnight that day, Li Zhisui, who was at Mao's residence in Zhongnanhai received a phone call from the deputy commander of the Central Garrison Corps who said: Lin Biao's daughter had called to say her mother and Lin Ligu (Lin's son) had kidnapped Lin Biao and were forcing him to flee. This was interpreted as the daughter's attempt to exculpate Lin Biao. Mao and his staff moved for safety to the Great Hall of the People and an extra battalion was sent to guard him there. Soldiers went off in pursuit of Lin Biao's limousine which was headed for the airport, but could not stop him. However, news soon came that the plane carrying Lin Biao, his wife, son, and a few others, had taken off with inadequate fuel and had lost its right landing gear after striking a fuel truck. Also, there was no co-pilot or navigator on board. A few hours later, the Chinese ambassador to Outer Mongolia reported that a Chinese plane with 9 persons on board had crashed in Undur Khan area. Three days later, he reported that dental records had identified Lin Biao as one of the dead. (7a) The official Chinese reaction at this time was to accuse Lin of having plotted to make China a "colony" of the Soviet Union and of planning to overthrow socialism in China (!). It was not until 1988 that the Chinese press printed the ambassador's report. According to him -- and he had visited the site -- the plane had made a crash landing; one wing must have touched the ground, and the plane burned. Most of the bodies were also burned beyond recognition.

There was no mention of bullets. Thus, it seems most likely that the pilot had to land, and that the plane was destroyed in the attempt

Did Lin Biao really plot to overthrow Mao? This seems rather unlikely. He seems to have hoped to succeed Mao as party chairman, but with Mao's consent. It is possible that when he realized his life was in danger, he fled. Perhaps we may never know the truth of the matter.

Whatever the case may be, Deng Xiaopeng led the action to put Lin on trial posthumously in 1980-81 on the charge of plotting to assassinate Mao. (8) Since Deng had opposed Mao's extreme policies - which Lin Biao had supported - and had suffered for this, we may assume that the trial was staged to discredit the remaining radicals.

3. The Death of Zhou Enlai and the Reappearance and Fall of Deng Xiaoping. Zhou died of cancer in January 1976. In March, during an annual festival to remember the dead, thousands of people came to honor Zhou.. As Deng Xiaopeng admitted later, these demonstrations - which he helped organize - were directed against the radicals, i.e., Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, and her supporters. Indeed, Deng was a staunch follower of the moderate Zhou Enlai, who had brought him back from exile in 1973. Furthermore, Deng had given a eulogy of Zhou at the funeral, on January 15, 1976. The government's attempt to remove the flowers from his memorial in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, led to further mass demonstrations there, which were suppressed by the police. This event is known by the Chinese as the "1st Tiananmen Incident."

In featuring the violent suppression of a political movement instigated by the death of a popular leader, it has uncanny parallels with the Tiananmen massacre of June 1989.

Mao, leery of moderates, appointed Hua Guo-feng (Hua Kuo-feng, b. 1921) as Premier. Hua had risen rapidly due to Mao's patronage and embraced many of Mao's radical policies. On April 1, 1976, the Central Committee of the Party voted to strip Deng of the posts of Deputy Premier and Chief of Staff. He was vilified in wall posters and newspapers as "China's new Khrushchev," while Jiang Qing called him "an international capitalist agent." This was clearly an attack on Deng's moderate policies. Hua was confirmed as Premier and Deputy Chairman of the Party; this meant he was the designated successor of Mao. Deng was demoted again - but not for long.

V. The Death of Mao Tse-tung; Jiang Qing and "The Gang of Four"; The Return of Deng Xiaoping and His Policies.

Mao died on September 9, 1976. Within a month, Hua Guo-feng moved to arrest Jiang Qing and her supporters. However, Deng had more support among the bureaucrats and army commanders than Hua, particularly because of Hua's continued favorable assessment of the Great Cultural Revolution. Thus, in July 1977, Deng was reinstated in all his positions plus a new one: *Chairman of the Central Military Commission*. He quickly emerged as the most powerful leader in China.

Deng reaffirmed Zhou Enlai's program of the "Four Modernizations," i.e., of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. He proclaimed that China must begin to catch up with the West in technology and must reform her inefficient, antiquated, Stalinist economic system. He also showed himself willing to use incentives and to create a less repressive environment. However, almost from the outset, he also showed that he would not tolerate any political liberalization which he did not control himself. This was made quite clear by the fate of those who dared to demand democracy.

1. The Democracy Wall and Its Fate.

Deng clearly wanted a show of popular support for his policies and thus to undercut his radical opponents. Therefore, he relaxed media controls and encouraged the free expression of opinion. This led to the criticism of Hua Guofeng that Deng wanted - but also to criticism of the party itself. Such opinion were expressed in articles and "large character posters" which were pasted on the *Democracy Wall in Beijing in December 1978 - January 1979*. Like Mao in 1956, so Deng in 1979 put a stop to the posters and articles when they began attacking the communist party and system. Wei Jinsheng, who demanded democracy as the "fifth modernization," attacking the existing political system and even Deng himself, was severely punished, as were others who had dared criticize the system.

Here we should note that Wei Jingsheng expressed the views of many young, educated, Chinese who had become disillusioned with communism as it existed in China. He had been raised as a loyal Maoist by his father, who was a revolutionary. He was a *Red Guard* during the Great Cultural Revolution, but was jailed when his group clashed with rival gangs loyal to *Jiang Qing*. He then read a great deal on international affairs, worked as an electrician, and served four years in the army. He also fell in love with a young Tibetan woman, whose father had been persecuted for his politics. (China had forcibly imposed its rule on Tibet in 1959, and the Dalai Lama had fled, taking up residence in India).

Wei demanded free elections of representatives by the people, and said that socialism was flawed because it left no room for the independent individual. Wei's demands coincided with a *demonstration by 28 young people in Tiananmen Square on Dec. 17, 1978, to protest the living and working conditions in south China of some 50,000 young people who had been "sent down" and had been striking there.* (Thousands of young people had been sent into the countryside for "re-education.") On January 8, 1979, several thousand of these people demonstrated with signs that read "We don't want hunger," and "We want human rights and democracy." Later in January, some 30,000 workers and their families, who had also been sent down, came to Beijing to petition the leaders for help. There were similar demonstrations in other cities.

At this point, Deng ordered a crackdown. Many underground writers were arrested and accused of weakening the state with the aid of foreigners. In March 1979, Wei Jingsheng was tried and convicted. The specific charge was

that he had leaked information on the war between China and Vietnam to a foreign journalist. He appealed the verdict on the grounds that he had no access to such information, but his appeal was rejected. (9) As we will see later, Wei and other writers who were repressed in 1979, were the heralds of later protest movements, up to and including that of spring 1989. Wei was sentenced to 15 years; he was released just 6 months before his sentence ended, in September 1993, as part of Red China's bid to host the Olympic Games in the year 2,000. (But it was decided that they will be held in Sydney, Australia, see "The Games China Plays," Newsweek, September 27, 1993, pp. 62-63).

We should note that during the "Democracy Period," the Party was sending out mixed signals. This resulted from the existence of three different groups in the leadership. One group, led by Hu Yaobang (1913-89), who became General Secretary of the Party on January 3, 1979, believed that economic reform had to go hand in hand with democratization, by which he seems to have meant liberalization under party control. Hu also took the line that all that was proved to be wrong should be corrected. A second group stood for combining the party's autocratic rule with a free economy; they were led by Zhao Ziyang (Chao Tzu-yang, b. 1919), formerly the First Secretary of Guangdong Province, who became a member of the Politburo in February 1980. A third group wanted to retain party autocracy, plus some cautious, economic, adjustments falling short of creating a market economy; this group was led by

the former economic planner, Chen Yun (b. 1905). Deng Xiaoping seemed to be playing these groups off against each other.

Deng also developed closer relations with the United States and Japan. He sent Chinese students to study abroad and welcomed foreign, especially American, students to China. Several U.S. universities, including K.U., established exchange programs with Chinese universities. Even Western music was allowed back on a restricted basis. However, Deng's chief goal was to educate thousands of Chinese in modern Western science and technology, and so catch up with the West.

Here we should note that despite the crackdown on Wei Jingsheng and other critics, Deng allowed the release of thousands of academics, writers and artists who had been imprisoned or sent down to the farms. It is likely, however, that his primary aim in this action and in rehabilitating all those unjustly condemned since 1957, was to bring back into service bureaucrats who shared his ideas. This was also the goal of the trial of *Jiang Qing and the "Gang of Four*.

2. Some Condemnation of the Past.

Jiang Qing and her supporters were publicly tried in 1980-81. Jiang firmly denied any wrongdoing and insisted she had always carried out Mao's will. All members of the group were condemned to death, but their sentences were commuted to long prison terms. (When Jiang became sick with cancer,

she was released from prison, but lived under house arrest; she died in summer 1991). As mentioned above, Jiang had lorded over the cultural scene for years, and had been responsible for the death and exile of many artists whom she disliked, or whom her supporters happened to dislike. But what was most important, she stood for the fanatical radicalism which had flowered so disastrously in the Great Cultural Revolution, and which Deng wanted to condemn in Chinese eyes.

Meanwhile, Hua Guo-feng gradually faded from the political scene. In July 1981, he was replaced as Party Chairman by Deng's man, Hu Yaobang. The Party Central Committee, which also met in early July, approved a resolution condemning most of Mao's policies since 1950, particularly the Great Cultural Revolution. According to the Central Committee resolution, the Great Cultural Revolution had been responsible for "the heaviest losses suffered since the founding of the People's Republic." It was charged with purposely decimating the Party, ruining the careers of many loyal party workers, and of undermining the economy of China. Deng spoke for himself and for many thousands of party members in the words of the resolution that "It was us and not the enemy who were thrown into disorder by the Cultural Revolution." Finally, the resolution also criticized Mao for dismissing Deng from high party office and appointing Hua as his successor. Hua was made a junior deputy chairman of the Party. (11)

Thus the CCP Central Committee resolution of July 1981 can be seen as the Chinese equivalent of Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speeches of February 1956 and 1961. Just as Khrushchev had praised Stalin for his policies of industrialization and collectivization, so the Dengist leadership praised Mao not only as the great leader of the CCP in the period 1927-49 but also for his economic and social policies in the early 1950s. The Great Leap Forward was strongly criticized, and the Great Cultural Revolution was condemned - although it was presented as an aberration of Mao's thought.

Indeed, while it was admitted that Mao knew what was going on, the purge of the CCP and the repression of academic and cultural life of China were blamed on Jiang Qing and her "gang," who were publicly tried. It is most likely that Deng avoided a wholesale condemnation of Mao because he did not want to alienate the old guard who were loyal to Mao's memory, and whose support he would need, or whom he would at least have to neutralize in order to rule China.

Finally, we must bear in mind that for the Chinese, Mao was Lenin and Stalin rolled into one; he was both the great revolutionary leader and the builder of the Chinese People's Republic. Neither the people nor the Party were ready to accept a total condemnation of Mao's policies, nor could any Chinese leader attempt to formulate such a drastic judgment at the time. For these reasons, Deng did not go as far in repudiating Mao as Gorbachev was to go in the USSR in repudiating Stalin after 1987.

Instead, Deng set about reforming the Chinese economy. At the same time, he purged the party of Maoists in order to carry out these reforms. (About 5,500 members were purged in 1983). He also ordered about 700,000 party members to undergo "ideological training," which focused on the need for moderate change. (At this time, the CCP numbered about 40 million). Deng also purged the army, though he was very careful not to remove the veterans of the Long March. Instead, he tried to persuade them to retire.

3. Economic Reforms and Problems.

The first, and one of the most important of Deng's economic reforms took place in agriculture. In order to increase food production, Deng implemented the "contract responsibility system," i.e., support for private farmers. First, private plots were restored and enlarged; next, the great farm communes were dissolved, and the government leased the "subsoil" to farmers. They, in turn, could rent it out to others if they wished to leave the farms and work in village industries.

After fulfilling the government quotas, the farmers could sell the rest of the produce for their own profit. This led to a swift and significant increase in food production. In fact, between 1979 and 1984, agricultural output grew by at least double that of the preceding 20 years. Also, cotton output jumped threefold in six years, making China the largest textile producer in the world.

Although food production increased, new problems arose. Many farmers preferred to raise cash crops i.e., vegetables and fruit -- especially watermelons, beloved by the Chinese -- rather than the labor-intensive and low priced staples, rice and grain. Also, in some years there was an overproduction of grain, so that prices fell steeply and led to reduced production. The government decided to manipulate prices upward to encourage farmers to grow grain.

Another constant problem is the continuing loss of scarce agricultural land to village industry and housing. Freed by new policies that allowed them to engage in sideline occupations, many farmers abandoned farming for work in small local industries, producing tools and other goods for the villagers. While beneficial in itself, this trend has removed land from food production. This is very dangerous, since China's total cultivated land is usually given as 110 mln hectares (1 hectare = 2.47 acres), and the total loss in 1981-85 amounted to 2.23 mln. hectares.

Furthermore, the rise in food prices, i.e., inflation, hurt the city workers, so the government decided to manipulate prices. Urban discontent was aggravated by the import of manufactured goods from Japan, Taiwan, Hongkong, and elsewhere. These goods were bought by the rich farmers and city entrepreneurs, but were initially beyond the reach of industrial workers. On top of this, the imports led to highly visible corruption, for many party members grew rich from buying imported goods at low prices and reselling them at enormous markups. This violated the egalitarian ethos of socialism

and was greatly resented by all Chinese people: workers, academics and students.

Agricultural reform was, of course, only the first of the "four modernizations," the others being the modernization of industry, science-technology, and national defense. Deng also allowed a certain amount of private enterprise in the cities, e.g., private restaurants and shops. Western businessmen were encouraged to invest in China, particularly in joint ventures; at first the terms were too rigid but were modified later. Most of these joint ventures were initially located in special economic zones in the coastal cities, particularly along China's south-central coast. Here, managers of state enterprises and private entrepreneurs were allowed great freedom in dealing with Western business firms, and in developing private businesses. However, these special economic zones have been criticized for increasing the gap between the standard of living in these areas and inland China.

The CCP Congress of October 25 - November 1, 1987 endorsed further economic reforms, and also elected a new and younger leadership, but the government cracked down on corruption in 1988. Not only were private entrepreneurs buying party support and toleration, but as noted above, high party members themselves profited greatly from the resale of foreign goods. As we shall see, blatant corruption among high party members continued, and would be one of the evils protested by the students in spring 1989.

Unlike agriculture, *reform of existing industrial enterprises made very little headway*. It is all very well to preach accountability and profit, and therefore propose that industrial plants operating at a loss should be closed down. But what is the government to do with the workers? The same problem faces the new, non-communist, governments of the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe with their outdated Stalinist "rustbelt" industries.

In 1987-88, China stood at an economic crossroads. There was a huge budget deficit, the result of excessive investment and huge subsidies. The trade deficit was the largest in all of Chinese history. Inflation reached 12% in 1986, and went up another 7% in 1987. But these are official figures and Chinese economists estimated that inflation in 1985-86 would reach 30%. Finally, there was widespread corruption, which included party members, and a high crime rate. These trends continued into 1989 and must be seen as the background for popular support of the student democracy movement in Beijing in April-June 1989.

Even in agriculture there were serious problems, particularly stagnation, which was largely due to insufficient investment in the infrastructure, especially water resources. There was lack of capital, energy shortages, bottlenecks of all kinds, especially in transportation, and inflation. But on the positive side, there was a great increase in textile production, a developing electronics industry, especially computers, and a modern defense industry including aviation and missiles, e.g., the Silkworm missiles sold to Iran and used by it in the war with Iraq. (12)

In the early 1990s, economists asked: where is China to get the capital for large scale modernization, and how is she going to square profit and wealth with socialism? As it turned out, in 1994-96, foreign investment in China amounted to about \$100 billion. This constituted half of all foreign investment in the developing world and was second only to investment in the United States. However, the second half of the question still requires an answer.

4. The Background to the Student Democracy Movement of Spring 1989.

At first, Deng seemed to espouse the idea - first expressed in the Prague Spring of 1968, and taken up by Gorbachev in the USSR almost twenty years later - that economic reform cannot succeed without free discussion of problems and their possible solutions. This view was most strongly expressed by Hu Yaobang. In fact, this veteran soldier and bureaucrat of the Chinese Communist Party (b. 1913) came to express humane and democratic ideas. Toward the end of his life, and particularly after his death, he became, for Chinese students and other liberal intellectuals, the symbol of democracy and decency in public life.

Hu Yaobang seems to have been more of an idealist than a politician. Although he had had Deng's support for a while -- he had, after all, done the most to achieve Deng's political rehabilitation -- this could not last. Deng believed that the party must keep total control of every sphere of life, and, most of all, political life. Indeed, on March 30, 1979, at the time of the arrest and trial of Wei Jingsheng, Deng proclaimed that China must modernize, but within the framework of the Four Cardinal Principles of: socialism; the dictatorship of

the proletariat; party leadership; and Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong thought. There was certainly no room for democracy in this framework.

At the same time, however, Deng did speak of the need to abolish "feudalism" within the Party. He meant the feudal control exercised by provincial First Secretaries and other high bureaucrats. But these statements were likely aimed at the conservative faction in the party led by Chen Yun. It is interesting to note that in late 1980, Chen pointed out the dangerous implications for socialism posed by the Solidarity movement in Poland (1980-81, see ch. 8). He warned that changes in China might bring about similar developments there. On this basis, Chen opposed "bourgeois liberalization," i.e., free speech and democracy, as well as radical economic reforms. In 1983, he and his supporters also began a campaign against "spiritual contamination," i.e., Western ideas - especially democracy.

In the meanwhile, Hu Yaobang continued to give open support to political and ideological reform. This, of course, aroused the opposition of conservative hardliners. But the real reason for Hu's dismissal seems to have been a bold move against corruption in high places. Thus, Hu Yaobang obtained the necessary papers for the arrest of the son of Hu Qiaomu, the head of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, whose son had embezzled a huge sum of money. Hu Qiaomu appealed to Deng for help.

At this point, Premier Zhao Ziyang, who was in overall charge of economic reform, allegedly told Deng that he could no longer cooperate with Hu

Yaobang. In this way, Zhao, who stood for significant economic reform, made use of the support of the Old Guard, led by the conservative Chen Yun, to strengthen his own position. Then, the members of the ad hoc Standing Committee of the Politburo indicated they did not want Deng to resign, i.e., they did not want Hu Yaobang to succeed him. This decision was made before student demonstrations in favor of democracy took place at the turn of 1986-87, although Hu Yaobang was later accused of fomenting them.

Large student demonstrations began in early December 1986 at the University of Science and Technology in Hefei, Anhui Province. The students demanded *better living conditions and freedom of the press*. On December 23rd, students at Beijing University demonstrated calling for *freedom and democracy*. On December 31st, the media proclaimed there was a "plot" to overthrow the government and the Beijing Municipal Council imposed limits on all demonstrations. However, on January 1, 1988, over 2,000 students demonstrated in the capital.

On January 16, 1988, Hu Yaobang, who had opposed the party decision to suppress student demonstrations, was removed as General Secretary of the Party, and replaced by Zhao Ziyang. Also in the course of the month, three leading "liberals" were expelled from the Communist Party; they were the physicist, Fang Lizhi (b. 1936), who had been Vice-President of the University of Science and Technology and had supported student demands; the dissident writer, Wang Ruowang, and the daring journalist Liu Binyan, who had -- with

Deng's blessing -- publicized widespread corruption among high party members in northern China.

Although student demonstrations died down in 1988, this did not mean the end of the movement. Indeed, at many universities discussion groups, known as "salons" sprang up, in which students discussed the country's problems. The authorities kept an eye on them, but did not harass them unduly.

Fang Lizhi, who was barred from visiting the United States in 1988, expressed biting criticism of communism and gave information about these student groups to the Western press. In an article published in the New York Review of Books, in early February 1989, he stated that communism had failed in China, and also criticized the "Four Basic Principles" proclaimed by Deng in March 1979. Fang noted the establishment of *many informal dissident groups and listed the topics most commonly discussed as: (1) the need to guarantee human rights and the release of all political prisoners; (2) the establishment of a free economic system; (3) support for education; (4) the supervision of public officeholders and the use of "glasnost" to root out corruption; (5) an end to China's state of civil war and promotion of peace in the Taiwan straits; (6) establishment of rule by law; and (7) revision of the constitution, so as to provide for democracy and freedom.*

In the same month, February 1989, Fang Lizhi wrote an open letter to Deng Xiaoping, urging him to respect human rights and release Wei Jingsheng, who had, by then, languished in prison for almost ten years. The poet Bei Dao also sent a letter to Deng, urging a more flexible policy. Then, 33 intellectuals sent an open letter to the Central Committee and the State Council, urging the release of Wei Jingsheng on humanitarian grounds. Despite party leaders' attempts to get the writers to retract, 42 more scientists and social scientists signed it, while a third open letter was signed by young writers and scholars who demanded democracy.

As we know, 1989 was a year of great anniversaries -- the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution, the 70th anniversary of the May 4th Movement, and the 40th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. At the same time, it was the year which saw the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. However, it was the death of one man which sparked the explosion of public dissent in China. (13)

5. The Student Democracy Movement, April-June 1989.

On April 15, 1989, Chinese TV announced the death of Hu Yaobang, who had been hospitalized after a heart attack and died from a second one. The students of Beijing immediately saw demonstrations of mourning as a tool for pressing their political demands. After all, there was a recent precedent in the demonstrations at the funeral of Zhou Enlai in January 1976, which Deng had used to criticize Jiang Qing and her "Gang of Four." Although Deng had been

punished, he "rehabilitated" the demonstrations after returning to power. The difference was that in spring 1989 the demonstrations were not headed by party leaders.

On April 16, several universities in Beijing spontaneously changed mourning sessions for Hu into meetings criticizing corruption and bureaucratization in the Party. Students from Qinghua University even demanded the resignation of Li Peng, who had been in charge of higher education and became Premier on April 15.

On April 17, Wang Dan, a graduate student in history at Beijing University, emerged as the leader there and led a demonstration. When the crowd swelled to some 5,000, they decided to march to Tiananmen Square. As they went, they shouted "Down with Bureaucracy. Long Live Democracy. Hu Yaobang will never die!" Posters went up, praising Hu for his support of democracy and economic reforms.

At dawn on April 18, over 100,000 students gathered in Tiananmen Square. They demanded a re-evaluation of Hu's achievements; the rehabilitation of Fang Lizhi, Wang Ruowang and Liu Binyan; the publication of the finances of party and state leaders and their children; freedom of the press; increased funds for higher education; improved treatment of intellectuals; the cancellation of limits on demonstrations; and that the public be informed about the goals of the student movement.

The people of Beijing were delighted to see that the students were demanding reform and the end of corruption. They gave the students food and drink. They shouted "Long live the students," and the students replied "Long live the People!" The people also helped the students by forming human barriers to block them off from the police.

On April 19, some 10,000 students gathered in Tiananmen Square and called for Premier Li Peng to speak to them, but he refused. The next morning, 5,000 students asked government officials to enter into a dialogue with them. The students then broke into small groups and talked to the people, explaining why they were demonstrating. People collected money and food for them.

On the evening of April 21, the government announced that Tiananmen Square would be closed for Hu's funeral on April 22. Fundraising and speeches were forbidden.

However, on the afternoon of April 21, Wuer Kaixi, a freshman at Beijing Normal University (Teachers' College), announced the creation of a provisional student association. This was the beginning of an umbrella organization for students from the 16 universities and colleges in Beijing. That evening, over 40,000 students and teachers set off from Beijing University for Tiananmen Square; by midnight about 200,000 had gathered there. The leaders were Wang

Dang, Wuer Kaixi, Zhou Yongjun and Zhang Boli. They all settled down for the night, and were supplied with food and drink by the people.

At the same time, while a Party memorial service was held for Hu Yaobang inside the Great Hall of the People, student representatives were kneeling in front of the hall, asking Li Peng to come out and talk to them. He refused.

The party leadership was divided on what to do. Also, Party Chairman Zhao Ziyang was away on a visit to North Korea. Finally, on April 24, hardliners on the Beijing Municipal Council apparently forced through the decision to adopt a hard line, and a report was made to Deng Xiaoping on April 25. He is reported to have said:

It is a planned conspiracy, a political rebellion. We will not have a moment's rest if we do not stop it. We should try to avoid bloodshed. It is hard to shed no blood at all. Don't be afraid of international public opinion.

On April 26, the People's Daily accused the students of violating the constitution; of encouraging opposition to the Communist Party and socialist system; and of a planned conspiracy and rebellion. This editorial was broadcast on the radio.

It is very interesting to note that on April 24, Deng Xiao-ping was also alleged to have told Party members that:

These people have come under the influence and encouragement of Yugoslavian, Polish, Hungarian and Russian elements who [agitate for] liberalization, who urge them to rise up and create turmoil. They will cause the country and the Chinese people to have no future. We must take measures and act quickly, without losing any time. (14)

Indeed, we know that some of the student leaders -- for example, Wang Dan -- spoke of the changes in Eastern Europe. They most likely heard of them from Chinese language broadcasts of Voice of America, or by way of friends in Hongkong. Whatever the students may have known, Deng Xiaoping certainly must have been following the progress of "glasnost" in the Soviet Union, the Round Table talks in Poland, and the liberalization of the Hungarian Communist Party (see ch. 8).

On the morning of April 27, the students of Beijing University defied the Party and started to march again to Tiananmen Square. The citizens of the city used their bodies to break the police lines and so let the students pass. Hundreds of people recorded the events with their cameras.

Some units of the 38th Army were already in Beijing. However, they did not shoot, probably because thousands of people had turned out in support of the students. The latter were also shouting slogans praising the party. Some people blocked a troop transport at one of the overpasses - but 25 trucks full of troops were parked only a few blocks from the square.

Now students also came out into the streets in Shanghai, Wuhan and Changsha.

On April 29, Yuan Mu, spokesman for the State Council, was allowed by Premier Li Peng to talk with 45 students from the 16 college and universities in Beijing. However, the government would not recognize the students as representatives of the new, freely elected, student associations, but only as individuals. Wuer Kaixi, therefore, refused to enter into talks. Indeed, the government spokesmen openly hinted that people "with long beards," i.e., intellectuals like Fang Lizhi, were behind the demonstrations. Still, the meeting with the students was shown on Chinese TV and the government stated that the People's Daily editorial of April 26th was not aimed at them.

The authorities' backtracking and apparent hesitation to use force were due to a split within the leadership. While the hardliners, led by Deng and the Old Guard favored a crackdown, this was opposed by Zhao Ziyang, who returned

from North Korea on April 29. At this time, Li Peng told him that his (Zhao Ziyang's) eldest son, Zhao Dajun, was reported to have engaged in illegal trade. Zhao's reply was that the Central Committee should open an investigation and publicize it throughout the country. This was no doubt seen by Deng and the hardliners as a gesture of support for the students, who were demanding the punishment of corruption among high party members and their children. Indeed, Deng's invalid son, who headed a "charitable foundation," was widely suspected of using its tax free status to fill his own pockets.

As for Zhao Ziyang, he declared at several party meetings that he did not believe the student movement was manipulated by conspirators. He said the students acted from love of country and desire to speed up reform. He also wanted the government to admit that the People's Daily editorial was mistaken. The newspaper's partial retraction noted above must have been the result of Zhao's stand.

Zhao then went further by making his views public. He had stressed the need for "stability" on the evening of May 3rd - but next day, at a meeting of the board of the Asian Development Bank, he said publicly that the basic slogan of the student movement supported the Communist Party, the constitution, the speeding up of reform and democracy, and opposition to corruption. He said he believed the Party should acknowledge its mistakes and recognize student

demands as reasonable, but that reforms should be implemented in a peaceful and orderly way. He wanted all problems solved by democratic and legal means. (15)

Meanwhile, on May 2, a delegation from the Beijing universities and colleges, led by Wang Dan, appealed again for dialogue. On the following day, the government spokesman said that students could not talk with the government on an equal basis.

On May 4, the 70th anniversary of the May 4th Movement, some 200,000 students were in Tiananmen Square. They read the May 4 Manifesto and demanded a dialogue with the government. They also said they would resume classes on May 5. As noted above, it was also on May 4th that Zhao Ziyang had publicly acknowledged the demands of the students were reasonable, and that all problems should be resolved peacefully.

Whether Zhao's public statement was decisive in this or not, Chinese journalists now joined the students. Some 500 reporters and editors marched carrying banners proclaiming that the media must speak the truth. Also, a group of People's Daily reporters received great applause for carrying a banner that read: "We reject the editorial of April 24th" - i.e. the editorial that had condemned the student demonstration as a subversive attack on the Party. The

reporters and editors had demonstrated in this way for the first time in 40 years of communism in China. The press and TV informed the people of what was really going on. Many scholars now gave their support to the students and, for the first time, workers began to appear in numbers in the square.

However, despite Zhao Ziyang's speech of May 4th, the government still refused to talk with the students. Therefore, on the morning of May 13, some 200 students gathered at Beijing University and pledged to fast in order to speed up the process of democratization. They were joined by 600 more students from Beijing Normal University. Wuer Kaixi led the group to Tiananmen Square. There was also a young female student leader, Chai Ling. By 4 p.m. that day, 4,000 students were fasting. They wore headbands reading *Fasting, and Give Me Liberty, or Give me Death*.

An important factor in the dramatic events in Beijing and the struggle within the party leadership was the *visit of Mikhail Gorbachev on May 16-17*. This was the first visit by a Soviet chief of state since Khrushchev came to talk with Mao in September 1959. Gorbachev's car was cheered by the students, who obviously knew something about his "glasnost" policies in the USSR, but he was not allowed to speak to them.

What was more important, however, was the fact that Zhao Ziyang informed the Soviet leader of what had been hitherto kept strictly secret, i.e., the 1987

decision of the Central Committee of the CCP that though Deng had resigned from his party posts (except for the Chairmanship of the Central Military Commission), the Politburo would let him make the final decisions on all major issues. Thus, Deng's charade of giving up power was revealed. (16). This must have infuriated Deng and the Old Guard.

Especially important was the arrival of a whole army of foreign media to record the Gorbachev visit. People gambled that the party leadership would not risk a crackdown with the whole world watching what was going in Beijing. In an astonishing mass protest, one million city residents marched to Tiananmen Square on May 19th, and a second million - many of them workers - was to follow the next day.

On May 19, at about 5 a.m. Zhao Ziyang and Li Peng came out to the students fasting in Tiananmen Square. Zhao begged them to stop. He was in tears, but Li Peng showed no emotion and said nothing. In a statement that was puzzling at the time, but gained meaning from subsequent events, Zhao apologized to the students saying he had "come too late" to assist them.

At 9 p.m. that day, the student radio announced that the fast had ended and a sit-in had begun. It was high time, for many of the 3,000 fasters were at death's door. Ambulances rushed in to take them to hospitals around the city.

At 10 p.m. high ranking party members left their official residence, the Zhongnanhai for a decisive meeting in the General Logistics Department, located in the southwestern part of the city. Here, Premier Li Peng stated that Beijing was in the throes of a serious rebellion which must be put down. Yang Shangkun, one of the Old Guard (b. 1909) and Deputy Chairman of the Central Military Commission -- of which Deng was chairman -- said that troops were coming into the city to implement martial law. Then, official loudspeakers announced the speeches of Lin Peng and Yang Shangkun, and proclaimed that a state of martial law would exist in Beijing as of May 20. It was a signal of how irrelevant the Party had become that the announcement was ignored when carried by loudspeakers in Tiananmen Square.

On May 20, the people of Beijing formed human barriers to stop the trucks carrying soldiers; then they built barricades. This popular movement lasted for two weeks. On May 24, even the thieves declared they would not ply their trade, but would block military vehicles.

Perhaps encouraged by the popular support given the students, which was blocking the imposition of martial law, Zhao Ziyang *presented a six-point plan to the Standing Committee of the Politburo*; he argued that its adoption would reduce student discontent because student demands really agreed with the Party's goals. *The six points were:* (1) investigate all major companies run by

children of high ranking officials and publicize the results; (2) publicize the experience and accomplishments that qualified important officials for their positions; (3) abolish special supplies of goods for officials below the Vice-Premier and under the age of 75; (4) the People's Congress would establish a supervisory committee to investigate accusations of criminal activities by children of high-ranking officials; (5) the freedom of the press was to be expanded as soon as possible; (6) the judiciary should be made independent [of the party]; and all problems should be solved in accordance with legal procedures.

Zhao's plan was apparently distributed to the vice-chairmen and members of the congress. However, Li Peng was allegedly opposed, saying the plan was only Zhao's personal opinion. Indeed, Deng and the Old Guard furiously opposed Zhao. He was now accused of being the head of an "anti-Party clique" and, indeed, two of his supporters were high military officials with significant power. It seems that at least three of the eight military commanders opposed the use of force, as did many civilian officials. (17)

Here we should note that *from May 20 onward, student demonstrations spread beyond Beijing; they took place in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Chongqing, and nearly eighty cities throughout the country.* Chinese people in Hongkong and Macao also came out into the streets to express their support for the

students. Chinese students in the West, especially the large contingent in the United States, also expressed their enthusiastic support; they phoned or faxed Western press reports to their friends at home.

However, toward the end of May, the student sit-in in Tiananmen Square began to peter out. This was not surprising; after all, many had been there on and off since mid-April and they were tired. Many Western observers thought the government was wisely planning to "out-sit" the students, the last of whom were expected to leave shortly.

Furthermore, the National People's Congress opened on *May 22*, and many Chinese hoped it would support student demands. Indeed, the chairman, Wan Li, had expressed his sympathy with the students and returned from Canada two days later. However, he was detained in Shanghai for "health reasons" after landing there. This was ominous. Likewise, 38 members of the Standing Committee of the Congress were ready to call for an emergency meeting, but they lacked the requisite majority to do so.

On June 2 and 3, there were movements of armed troops in the city and some people were killed. However, on June 3, some 300,000 people blocked troops and police in Tiananmen Square.

That evening, radio and TV stations warned people to stay home, but they did not listen. Some 3,000 people were in the square when great numbers of troops marched toward it at 9 p.m. They shot people standing in their way and killed many. A bloody battle took place on Changan Avenue, east of the square. Some people angered by the killing, killed a few soldiers. The troops stopped ambulances from going to pick up the wounded.

After more fighting, the students in the Square decided to leave at 4:20 a.m. on June 4th. Just then, a flare lit up the scene and the soldiers attacked the students, beating and killing them. Accounts differ, but it seems that between 1,000 and 3,000 people were killed in Beijing, while many were also killed in other cities. The world watched in horror. At the same time, peaceful elections for a new legislature took place in Poland, where the communists suffered total defeat.

6. The Aftermath.

Thousands of people were arrested between June 4 and August 1989 for involvement in the student movement. We don't know how many were tortured to death and executed. Some student leaders escaped to the West. Western opinion was shocked, but after a while, the United States resumed business with China.

In spring 1990, the Chinese government finally allowed Fang Lizhi to leave the country on condition he would not criticize China. Fang had taken refuge in the U.S. Embassy in Beijing in June 1989.

On May 10, 1989, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security announced that 211 people detained for involvement in the 1989 democracy movement had been released. Only six names were given, including Dai Qing, an investigative journalist, and Li Honglin, a social scientist. The Ministry also said that 431 others were still being investigated.

Five days later, Amnesty International published the names of more than 650 prisoners still held in China. It submitted the list to Premier Li Peng and asked for information about them. It also asked for information on the fate of thousands of unnamed prisoners in jail since June 4, 1989. (18)

Although the student movement was brutally crushed, it is most unlikely that it will be forgotten. After all, it was the greatest protest movement against a government in the whole history of China. It showed that demands for human rights and democracy were supported by masses of Chinese students -- leaders of political protest movements in China since May 4, 1919. It is true that the party reimposed its control on the country. However, as was the case with martial law in Poland and the rebirth of Solidarity and its triumph in 1989, we

can also look forward to a resurgence of the movement for human rights and democracy in China.

China under Deng Xiaoping and After.

There were changes in the party executive at the Party Congress in October 1992 (see New York Times, October 20, 1992), and a military purge took place in February 1992. At that time, Deng Xiaoping -- now 89 years old -- stripped his old comrade-in-arms President Yang Shangkun, and the latter's half-brother, Gen. Yang Baibing, of their control of the military. He also sidelined over half of China's generals, i.e., those believed loyal to the Yangs. In March 1993, China increased its military spending by 15%, despite a budget deficit.

The Chinese economy was said to be overheating in 1993. The economic "czar" Deputy Prime Minister and head of the Economic and Trade Office, Zhu Rongji, imposed a 16 point austerity program in the summer, but this might have been directed more at curbing unwelcome private wealth than at real economic problems, for he paid great attention to curbing land speculation for building casinos, office towers and condominiums, and also to privately owned jetliner companies. (New York Times, October 3, 1993, sec. 1, p. 6; Wang Junjin, a 29 year old founder of a private airline was featured in the New York Times, of February 14, 1993, sec. 1, p. 1). In fact, it was the uncontrolled spending by

private entrepreneurs that was feeding inflation. A more serious problem, however, lies in the large, state-owned enterprises, about one-third of which failed to make any real money in 1992. Another third broke even, and one-third lost money, which forced the government to prop them up with about \$6 billion in subsidies (New York Times, May 2, 1993, sec. 1, p. 7).

In fact, China's economic miracle has its downside. She has an antiquated, bureaucratic, state banking system designed simply to do the state's bookkeeping. This banking system, however, makes loans at very low interest not only to state enterprises, but also to speculators, e.g., real estate developers, who drove up property prices in the affluent coastal regions. (Paul Blustein, "China's Hybrid Economy," Washington Post, National Weekly Edition, September 6-17, 1993). By 1996, however, China was taking steps toward the creation of a real central bank. Also, the austerity drive has worked. But there are still the 400,000 state enterprises with their 80 million workers; they swallow billions of dollars of state subsidies per year. This problem, of course, also exists in Russia, Ukraine, and on a smaller scale, in the new democracies of Eastern Europe.

In 1994, peasant unrest was noted in China, also increasing power held by regional party elites at the expense of Beijing. However, the Chinese economy continued growing at such a fast rate, that predictions were being made of

China becoming a great economic power by the year 2,000. We should balance this by reports of growing worker discontent with low wages, high prices, and corruption among the party elite. The impending death of Deng Xiao Ping adds to existing uncertainty about China's future.

As far as dissidents are concerned, China freed some to improve its image, with an eye to hosting the Olympic Games in the year 2000 (but Australia won that honor), also to forestall any trade restrictions by President Clinton. In early February 1993, the authorities released the most prominent student leader of 1989, Wang Dan. (New York Times, February 17, 1993, sec. 1, p. 1). Some 18-20 Catholic priests were reported as released in March 1993 (New York Times, March 21, 1993, sec. 1, p. 10), and at the end of the month there was an interview with Liu Qing, who served 11 years for advocating democracy. He told a harrowing tale of being forced to sit all day on a stool in his cell, and of the beatings he suffered. He can talk of these things now that he is in the U.S. (See: "Memories of Prison in China and Enduring for Democracy," New York Times, March 31, 1993, sec. 1, p. 14).

However, in 1995-96, the Chinese government has taken overt steps to show its contempt for western, especially U.S. opinion. Wang Dan was arrested again in spring 1995 and held without being allowed any family visits. On October 12, 1996, the world press reported that he was charged with conspiracy to overthrow the state. His "conspiracy" is defined as publishing anti-government

articles abroad; raising money to support needy dissidents, and accepting money from abroad, also a scholarship from the University of California. As of early October 1997, Wang was still in jail.

As for the veteran dissident, Wei Jingsheng, who spent fourteen and a half years in prison for demanding democracy in March 1979; he was released in September 1992, but rearrested for a short while and banished from Beijing. In 1995, he was sentenced to another fourteen years. Another veteran dissident, the literary critics Liu Xiaobo, was sentenced in mid-October 1996 to three years hard labor for co-signing a biting criticism of President Jiang. The co-author, also a veteran dissident, Wang Xixhe, has disappeared, and is presumed to be in prison as well. The U.S. government called on the Chinese government to release "all prisoners who are languishing and suffering in Chinese jails solely because of their political views." (19) Unfortunately, the old French saying may apply: "The more things change, the more they remain the same."

CHINA IN THE WORLD AFFAIRS TILL A.D. 2000

Since the start of the period of Reform and Opening Up in 1978, China's leaders have been regular travelers to all parts of the globe, and it has sought a higher profile in the UN through its permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and other multilateral organizations.

Closer to home, China has made efforts to reduce tensions in parts of Asia; its relations with its Asian neighbors have become stable during the last decades of the 20th century. It has contributed to stability on the Korean Peninsula, cultivated a more cooperative relationship with members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam), and participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum. In 1997, the ASEAN member nations and China, South Korea and Japan agreed to hold yearly talks to further strengthen regional cooperation, the ASEAN Plus Three meetings. In 2005, the "ASEAN Plus Three" countries together with India, Australia and New Zealand held the inaugural East Asia Summit (EAS). Relations have improved with Vietnam since a border war was fought with the one-time close ally in 1979. A territorial dispute with its Southeast Asian neighbors over islands in the South China Sea remains unresolved, as does another dispute in the East China Sea with Japan. These conflicts have had a negative impact on China's reputation in many parts of the world.^[17]

China has improved ties with Russia. Vladimir Putin and Jiang Zemin, in large part to serve as a counterbalance to the U.S., signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in July 2001. The two also joined with the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to found the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in June 2001. The SCO is designed to promote regional stability and cooperate to combat terrorism in the region.

Relations with India have fluctuated greatly over the years. After years of competition, general distrust between the two (mostly over China's close relationship with Pakistan and India's with the former Soviet Union) and several border conflicts, relations in the 21st century between the world's two most populous states stabilised, only for relations to suffer a massive hit in the late 2010s due to multiple border standoffs that resulted in deaths on both sides. While both countries have doubled their economic trade in the past few years, and China became India's largest trading partner in 2010, there is increasing unease in India regarding the perceived Chinese advantage in their trade relationship. The two countries are planning to host joint naval exercises. The dispute over Aksai Chin (formerly a part of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir) and South Tibet (China) or Arunachal Pradesh (India) is not settled and plagues Sino-Indian relations. While New Delhi has raised objections to Chinese military-aid to arch-rival Pakistan and neighbouring Bangladesh, Beijing similarly objects to India's growing military collaboration with Japan, Australia and the U.S.^{[18][19]}

China has border and maritime disputes, including with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin and with Japan. Beijing has resolved many of these disputes. Notably on 21 July 2008, Russia finally resolved the last remaining border dispute along the 4300 km border between the two countries by ceding a small amount of territory to China.^{[20][21]} China also reached a 2000 agreement with Vietnam to resolve some differences over their maritime borders, though disagreements remain over some islands in the South China Sea.

During the late 1990s and early 21st century, Chinese foreign policy appeared to be focused on improving relations with Russia and Europe to counterbalance the U.S. This strategy was based on the premise that the U.S. was a hyperpower whose influence could be checked through alliances with other powers, such as Russia or the European Union. This assessment of U.S. power was reconsidered after the U.S. intervention in Kosovo, and as the 20th century drew to a close, the discussion among think tanks in China involved how to reorient Chinese foreign policy in a unipolar world. This discussion also occurred in the context of China's new security concept, which argued that the post-Cold War era required nations to move away from thinking in terms of alliances and power blocs and toward thinking in terms of economic and diplomatic cooperation.

China had long been a close ally of North Korea but also found a valuable trading partner in South Korea and eventually took a role in the early 2000s as a proponent of "six-party talks" (North Korea, South Korea, Russia,

Japan, the U.S., and China) to resolve tensions on the Korean Peninsula. China was instrumental at brokering talks with North Korea over its nuclear program, and in 2003, there was a concerted effort by China to improve relations with the ASEAN countries and form a common East Asian market. These foreign policy efforts have been part of a general foreign policy initiative known as China's peaceful rise. On 15 November 2005, Hu Jintao visited Seoul and spoke of the importance of both countries' contributions for regional peace and cooperation in economic development.

However, China's opposition to the bid of two of its important neighbors—India and Japan—to become permanent members of the United Nations Security Council has proved to be an irritant in their respective relationships. Japan, with its large economic and cultural influences in Asia, is seen by China as its most formidable opponent and partner in regional diplomacy. The two sides established diplomatic relations in 1972, and Japanese investment in China was important in the early years of China's economic reforms and ever since.

In 2019, the Pew Research Center made a survey on international opinion of China among 34 surveyed countries. The survey indicated that a median of 41% surveyed countries have an unfavorable opinion of China, meanwhile a median of 40% have favorable. In 17 countries, including Indonesia, Canada, Sweden, Australian, U.S., U.K., Netherland and other countries, median who have a favorable opinion of China became fewer in 2019 than in 2018.^[22]

21st century

At a national meeting on diplomatic work in August 2004, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary Hu Jintao reiterated that China will continue its "independent foreign policy of peaceful development," stressing the need for a peaceful and stable international environment, especially among China's neighbors, that will foster "mutually beneficial cooperation" and "common development." This policy line has varied little in intent since the People's Republic was established in 1949, but the rhetoric has varied in its stridency to reflect periods of domestic political upheaval.

In 2007, Foreign ministry spokesman Qin Gang made a statement about the eight-point diplomatic philosophy of China:^[23]

1. China will not seek hegemony. China is still a developing country and has no resources to seek hegemony. Even if China becomes a developed country, it will not seek hegemony.
2. China will not play power politics and will not interfere with other countries' internal affairs. China will not impose its own ideology on other countries.
3. China maintains all countries, big or small, should be treated equally and respect each other. All affairs should be consulted and resolved by all countries on the basis of equal participation. No country should bully others on the basis of strength.

4. China will make judgment on each case in international affairs, each matter on the merit of the matter itself and it will not have double standards. China will not have two policies: one for itself and one for others. China believes that it cannot do unto others what they do not wish others do unto them.

5. China advocates that all countries handle their relations on the basis of the United Nations Charter and norms governing international relations. China advocates stepping up international cooperation and is against unilateral politics. China should not undermine the dignity and the authority of the U.N. China should not impose and set its own wishes above the U.N. Charter, international law and norms.

6. China advocates peaceful negotiation and consultation so as to resolve its international disputes. China does not resort to force, or threat of force, in resolving international disputes. China maintains a reasonable national military buildup to defend its own sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is not made to expand, nor does it seek invasion or aggression.

7. China is firmly opposed to terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. China is a responsible member of the international community, and as for international treaties, China abides by all them in a faithful way. China never plays by a double standard, selecting and discarding treaties it does not need.

8. China respects the diversity of the civilization and the whole world. China advocates different cultures make exchanges, learn from each other, and complement one another with their own strengths. China is opposed to clashes and confrontations between civilizations, and China does not link any particular ethnic group or religion with terrorism.

In 2011, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi outlined plans for an "integrated approach" that would serve China's economic development.^[24]

In 2016, during the 6th Plenum of 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Party General Secretary Xi Jinping has presented efforts for greater transparency in the decision-making process in local governance, which also represent his effort in establishing a positive image of China's Communist Party overseas.^[25]

Xi's foreign policy writ large, perceived anti-China hostility from the West amongst Chinese government officials, and shifts within the Chinese diplomatic bureaucracy have been cited as factors leading to its emergence. It is commonly known as "Wolf warrior diplomacy".

At their annual meeting on June 13, 2021, leaders from the Group of Seven (G7) democracies sharply criticized China for a series of abuses. The G7 nations--the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Canada and Japan--had been hesitant about acting separately. Pressured by US President Joe Biden, they unanimously agreed on a sharp criticism, followed

the next day by a similar strong unanimous attack by NATO members. The criticisms focused on the mistreatment of the Muslim Uyghur minority, the systematic destruction of democracy in Hong Kong, repeated military threats against Taiwan, unfair trade practices, and lack of transparency regarding the origins of COVID-19. China has rejected all criticism of what it considers to be strictly internal policy matters. On the other hand, the constellation of critics is essential to the Chinese economy in terms of jobs, investments and purchases of its huge quantity of exports.^{[26][27][28][29]}

Economic policy

China places a high priority on economic self-sufficiency, particularly in the energy sector and semiconductor industry. As of 2018, China imports hundreds of billions of dollars worth of oil annually, but spends three times as much on imports of integrated circuits. Therefore, energy security and self-reliance for semiconductors are made a priority.

China has invested in many infrastructure projects around Eurasia and Africa, including the Eurasian Land Bridge, Sino-Myanmar pipelines and railway and an economic corridor and a port in Pakistan. It also financed a very large port in Sri Lanka, which drew allegations of debt-trap diplomacy when Sri Lanka defaulted on its loans and China took control of the port for 99 years.^[30] *The New York Times* characterized this arrangement as China getting Sri Lanka to "cough up a port".^[31] *The Washington Post* ran an

op-ed stating that "China's debt traps around the world are a trademark of its imperialist ambitions".^[32]

Several projects of Chinese investment in Malaysia were canceled when the government of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad determined Malaysia "could not afford" them.^[33]

Western analysts have suggested China's debt-trap diplomacy may hide hegemonic intentions and challenges to states' sovereignty.^[34]

As a major oil importer, it is often assumed that a transition from fossil fuels to renewables is good for China. However, China is also a very major producer of fossil fuels in its own right, including oil, gas and coal. China is therefore not one of the major winners in full transition to renewables. The index of Geopolitical Gains and Losses after energy transition (GeGaLo) ranks China 104th out 156 countries.^[35]

Recent initiatives

As the Trump administration in the United States opened a trade and tariff war with China in 2017, China's response has been to set up its own multinational trading arrangements. In late March 2019 Paramount leader Xi Jinping moved forward with major trading deals with France and Italy. French President Emmanuel Macron and Paramount leader Xi Jinping signed a series of large-scale trade agreements that covers many sectors over a period of years. The centerpiece was a €30 billion purchase of airplanes from Airbus. It came at a time when the leading American firm, Boeing, saw its entire fleet of new 737

MAX passenger planes grounded worldwide. Going well beyond aviation, the new trade agreement covered French exports of chicken, a French-built offshore wind farm in China, and a Franco-Chinese cooperation fund, as well as billions of Euros of co-financing between BNP Paribas and the Bank of China. Other plans include billions of euros to be spent on modernizing Chinese factories, as well as new ship building.^[37] The same week Paramount leader Xi Jinping signed an infrastructure plan with Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte. Italy became the first European power to join the Belt and Road Initiative, which Western Europe sees as a push not just for more business but for greater geopolitical influence. Rome has reassured its allies that the agreement is not fully binding and does not undermine Italy's commitment to its Western political and security alliances.^[38]

China-United States trade war

The world's two largest economies have engaged in an escalating trade war through increasing tariffs and other measures since 2018.^[39] On January 15, 2020, the two sides reached a phase one agreement.

Lawrence J. Lau argues that a major cause is the growing battle China and the U.S. for global economic and technological dominance. He argues, "It is also a reflection of the rise of populism, isolationism, nationalism and protectionism almost everywhere in the world, including in the US."^[40]

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a free trade agreement between the Asia-Pacific nations of Australia, Brunei,

Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam. The 15 member countries account for about 30% of the world's population (2.2 billion people) and 30% of global GDP (\$26.2 trillion) as of 2020, making it the biggest trade bloc in history. Unifying the preexisting bilateral agreements between the 10-member ASEAN and five of its major trade partners, the RCEP was signed on 15 November 2020 at a virtual ASEAN Summit hosted by Vietnam, and will take effect 60 days after it has been ratified by at least six ASEAN and three non-ASEAN signatories. Mainland China expressed its expectation that India and Hong Kong would join.

Africa

With China's growing influence around the world, Beijing has now set its efforts on Africa. China's focus in Africa is not a recent occurrence. In the 1960s and 1970s, Beijing's interest centered on building ideological solidarity. Following the Cold War, Chinese interests evolved into more pragmatic pursuits such as trade, investment, and energy.^[42] Sino-African trade quadrupled between 2000 and 2006. China is Africa's largest commercial partner and the largest exporter to Africa. It is notably ahead of former colonial power Britain in both categories.^[43] Unlike many western nations that hesitate to forge ties with countries with poor human rights records, China ignores human rights for Africans in favour of exploiting economic opportunities.^[44]

The establishment of modern Sino-African relations dates back to the late 1950s when China signed the first official bilateral trade agreement with Algeria, Egypt, Guinea, Somalia, Morocco and Sudan. Zhou Enlai made a ten-country tour to Africa between December 1963 and January 1964. Zhou Enlai visited Ghana and established close relations with Kwame Nkrumah, was a leader who strived for a united Africa.^[45] Relations at that time were often reflective of Chinese foreign policy in general: China "began to cultivate ties and offer[...] economic, technical and military support to African countries and liberation movements in an effort to encourage wars of national liberation and revolution as part of an international united front against both superpower".^[46]

Diplomacy

Early modern bilateral relations were mainly affected by the Cold War and the ideology of communism. China originally had close ties with the anti-apartheid and liberation movement, African National Congress (ANC), in South Africa, but as China's relations with the Soviet Union worsened and the ANC moved closer to the Soviet Union, China shifted away from the ANC towards the Pan-Africanist Congress.^[47] China adopted several principles, among them supporting the independence of African countries while investing in infrastructure projects. The Somali Democratic Republic established good relations with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War era. When Somalia sought to create a Greater Somalia, it declared war on Ethiopia, with the aid of the Soviet Union, Somalia took Ogaden in three months, but the Soviet Union shifted its support from Somalia to Ethiopia, and Ethiopia retook the Ogaden

region. This angered Siad Barre, and expelled all Soviet advisors and citizens from Somalia, but Somalia maintained good relations with China, which segregated with the traditional Soviet Communism. China and Zaire shared a common goal in Central Africa, namely doing everything in their power to halt Soviet gains in the area. Accordingly, both Zaire and China covertly funneled aid to the FNLA (and later, UNITA) in order to prevent the MPLA, who were supported and augmented by Cuban, from coming to power. During the Cold War, a few smaller nations also entered in alliances with China, such as Burundi under Michel Micombero.

The political status of Taiwan has been a key political issue for the People's Republic of China (PRC). In 1971, the support of African nations was crucial in the PRC joining the United Nations (UN), taking over the seat of the ROC on Taiwan.^[48] However, while many African countries such as Algeria, Egypt and Zambia have stressed their support to the PRC's one-China policy, Swaziland maintains relations with Taipei.^[49] For the quest of a permanent UN Security Council seat for Africa, Nigeria, the most populous African country, relies on Chinese support while Egypt looks to U.S. backing.^[50]

Since 1997, around 40 African heads of state have visited China.^[51] The ministerial meeting, Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held in Beijing in October 2000 was the first collective dialogue between China and African nations.

Economic relations

In 1980, the total Sino-African trade volume was US\$1 billion. By 1999, it had reached US\$6.5 billion.^[52] By 2005, the total Sino-African trade had reached US\$39.7 billion before it jumped to US\$55 billion in 2006, making China the second largest trading partner of Africa after the U.S., which had trade worth US\$91 billion with African nations. China also passed the traditional African economic partner and former colonial power France, which had trade worth US\$47 billion.^[53] In 2010, trade between Africa and China was worth US\$114 billion and in 2011, US\$166.3 billion.^[54] In the first 10 months of 2012 it was US\$163.9 billion.^[54]

There are an estimated 800 Chinese corporations doing business in Africa, most of which are private companies investing in the infrastructure, energy and banking sectors.^[55] Unconditional and low-rate credit lines (rates at 1.5% over 15 years to 20 years)^[56] have taken the place of the more restricted and conditional Western loans.^[55] Since 2000, more than US\$10 billion in debt owed by African nations to China has been canceled.^[56]

Military relations

Military cooperation goes back to the Cold War period when China was keen to help African liberation movements. Apart from some traditional allies such as Somalia and Tanzania, China also had military ties with non-aligned countries such as Egypt. Military equipment worth \$142 million was sold to African countries between 1955 and 1977.^[56] Two decades after the collapse of

the Soviet Union, military relations are now^[needs update] based on business interests rather than ideology.^[citation needed]

In 2004, China deployed around 1,500 soldiers under the UN umbrella, dispatched between Liberia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.^[56] China is also present via its military attachés; as of 2007, it has 14 attachés in 14 different African countries while there are 18 African countries who maintain their attachés in Beijing.^[57] Apart from peacemaking, China provides military training and equipment to a few countries, though this does not require military forces to be deployed.^[citation needed]

Culture

Africa is a host of three Chinese cultural centres. The first overseas Chinese centre was opened in Mauritius in 1988.^[58] Two other followed in Egypt and Benin. The Confucius Institute, which focuses on the promotion of the Chinese language and culture, has 20 centers distributed around 13 African countries.^[59]

Historically, little is known about early African immigration to China, although there is no doubt and much consensus that the human species was originally from Africa. Due to recent developments in relations,^[ambiguous] many^[quantify] have been relocating for better opportunities. Places dubbed 'Little Africa' and 'Chocolate city' are increasingly receiving new immigrants, mostly Nigerians. Most of the African immigrants are concentrated in the area of Guangzhou with an estimated number of 20,000.^[60] It is

estimated that there are around 10,000 illegal African immigrants in China and police crackdowns have intensified since early 2009.^[61]

In contrast, early modern Chinese immigration to the African continent is slightly better documented. In 1724, a few Chinese convicts were brought as labourers to South Africa from the Dutch East Indies (modern-day Indonesia) by the Dutch Empire. In the early 19th century, another wave of immigrants came to South Africa as workers brought by the British to work in agriculture, infrastructure building and mining.^[62] In recent years, there has been an increasing presence of Chinese in Africa. Estimates vary by source though Xinhua, China's official news agency, states that there are no less than 750,000 Chinese nationals working or living in Africa.^[62] The number of Chinese illegal immigrants remains unknown.

Due to the low prices of Chinese-made weaponry and military equipment, an increasing number of African countries shifted their source of supply from traditional providers such as Russia to China.^[63] However, the selling of arms to some states accused by Western countries of war crimes, such as Sudan, have prompted criticism in the West (see Criticism section below).^[64]

Criticism

The Zimbabwean example is relevant. Relations between China and Robert Mugabe's regime in Zimbabwe have also been the focus of criticism by a few Western countries. China was accused of supplying Zimbabwe with jet

fighters, vehicles and other military equipment.^[65] China declared in 2007 that it was dropping all kinds of assistance and limiting assistance to humanitarian aid.^[66] In July 2008, the Chinese diplomacy asked Mugabe "to behave" though critics see that as a way for China to protect its own interests in this country should a regime change.^[67]

Chinese role in Africa has sparked much criticism, including accusations of neocolonialism and racial discrimination.^{[68][69][70]} As a response to such criticism, China issued the *Nine Principles to Encourage and Standardise Enterprises' Overseas Investment*, a charter and guide of conduct to Chinese companies operating abroad.^[71] Other criticism include the flooding of the African markets with low-cost Chinese-made products, thus harming the growth and the survival of local industries and businesses.^[72]

UNIT –IV

RISE OF IMPERIALISM

Japan was the only Asian country to have escaped imperialist control. For centuries, military generals, called shoguns, exercised real power in Japan while the Japanese emperor was a mere figurehead.

For over two hundred years, Japan had been almost totally secluded from the rest of the world. In many respects, the Japanese social system was comparable to the social system of feudal Europe. Around the middle of the nineteenth century, Japan was rudely awakened to the modern world when her independence was threatened.

Within a few decades she not only succeeded in warding off the danger of foreign domination but also underwent a process of modernising certain aspects of her society that enabled her to emerge as a world power.

In 1853, Commodore Perry went with a US fleet and delivered an ultimatum to Japan. It was stated that “positive necessity requires that we should protect our commercial interests in this remote part of the world and in doing so, to resort to measures, however strong, to counteract the schemes of powers less scrupulous than ourselves”.

Eight months later, when he returned with a bigger fleet, the Japanese government signed a treaty with the US under which two ports were opened to US ships and some amount of trade was permitted. Similar treaties were then signed by several European countries. In 1863 and

1864, the US and European fleets displayed their military superiority by firing on two Japanese cities. In 1868, the rule of the shogun was ended and a new set of rulers and advisers came to the fore. They ruled in the name of the emperor, whose authority, in theory, was restored. This event is known as the Meiji Restoration, after the title 'Meiji' which the new emperor took.

Within less than four decades of the Meiji Restoration, Japan's economy and political institutions underwent speedy transformation. The Japanese government made heavy investments in industries, the money for which was raised through heavy taxation and by exploiting the peasantry. Subsequently, the industries were sold to capitalists.

Afterwards, government support for starting industries was no longer required as the Japanese capitalists were able to start industries on their own. The process of industrialisation was accompanied by impoverishment of the peasants, who often rebelled.

An increasing number of them migrated to the cities where they provided cheap labour for the industries. By the early years of the twentieth century, Japanese goods, particularly textiles, could successfully compete in

the international market with European goods. The demand for Japanese manufactures within Japan was limited due to the extreme poverty of the common people.

In 1889, Japan was given a new constitution. The emperor enjoyed a special position as head of the executive and ministers were appointed by him and were responsible to him. He was believed to be “heaven- descended, divine and sacred; he is pre-eminent above his subjects. He must be revered and is inviolable”.

The constitution provided for a parliament called the Diet. Less than three per cent of the population had the right to vote. The Diet enjoyed little power: the ministers were not responsible to it, and even in financial matters, its powers were limited.

The military enjoyed vast powers in the new political system and, in course of time, came to dominate it completely. The army and the navy appointed army and naval officers, ministers of the army and the navy, and the Diet had absolutely no control over them.

The educational system which was built up made the mass of the population literate within a very short time. It enabled the Japanese to master the technical skills necessary for industrialisation. The educational system was used to promote emperor worship and an attitude of extreme nationalism and chauvinism. Civil liberties and open political struggles were lacking in Japan.

The state was controlled by an oligarchy and the repressive apparatus of the state, notably the police, enjoyed wide powers to control the press and even prevent the holding of public meetings and demonstrations. Political dissent was not tolerated. In spite of severe restriction, however, the first socialist group in Asia was formed in Japan.

Japan as an Imperialist Power:

By the 1890s, Japan had started pursuing her colonial ambitions. These ambitions were primarily directed at China and aimed at establishing Japanese supremacy in East Asia. Later, the object of the Japanese ambition encompassed the entire Asian continent and the Pacific region.

Having built up her armed strength, she went to war with China and defeated her in 1895. She annexed Formosa (Taiwan), which was a part of China, and forced China to recognise Korea, over which she claimed suzerainty, as an independent state.

The Japanese objective in all this was not to secure the independence of Korea but to end the Chinese influence there and to gain a free hand for the subjugation of Korea. In 1905, Korea was made a protectorate of Japan and in 1910 was annexed by her.

In 1899, Japan's status as a great power was recognised by the US and European countries when they gave up the rights and concessions that they had obtained as a result of the treaties which Japan had been forced to sign with them after 1854.

In 1902, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty or Alliance was signed, and Japan became the first Asian country to enjoy the status of full equality with other colonial powers. The British objective in signing the treaty was to deter Russian designs in China.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) that followed ended in the defeat of Russia. Southern Manchuria was recognised as a Japanese "sphere of influence". Japan also obtained half of the Sakhalin Island and acquired control of the Liaotung Peninsula. During the First World War, Japan sought to establish her protectorate over China. Though she did not succeed in achieving this aim, she was able to extend her influence there.

The rise of Japan as a great power, even though she was following imperialist policies in Asia, provided an impetus to the growth of nationalism in many Asian countries. Her war with Russia proved that an Asian non-White country could defeat a major European power.

It should, however, be remembered that the main victims of Japanese imperialism were not Europeans but people of other Asian countries. The emergence of USA and Japan as great powers was an indication that the

supremacy of Europe would not last long. The First World War hastened the end of European hegemony.

FIRST SINO- JAPANESE WAR

China is gearing up for the 120th anniversary of the First Sino-Japanese War, which began in 1894 and ended with China's defeat in 1895. The war was a devastating blow to China's then-rulers, the Qing dynasty, as China had always considered Japan a 'little brother' rather than a serious competitor. The war is often seen as the defining point when power in East Asia shifted from China to Japan, as Tokyo claimed control of the Chinese territories of Taiwan and the Liaodong Peninsula (site of the port city of Dalian) as well as Korea (which changed from being a Chinese vassal to an officially independent state under Japanese influence).

To commemorate the 120th anniversary of the war, Xinhua published a special supplement to its Reference News newspaper. The supplement consisted of 30 articles by members of the People's Liberation Army "analyzing what China can learn from its defeat" in the Sino-Japanese war. Summing up the articles, Xinhua said that "the roots of China's defeat lay not on military reasons, but the outdated and corrupt state system, as well as the ignorance of maritime strategy." This conclusion has obvious modern-day applications, as China's leadership is currently emphasizing both reform and a new focus on China's navy.

The PLA authors laid the bulk of the blame for China's defeat on the Qing dynasty's failure to effectively modernize. "Japan's victory proved that its westernization drive, the Meiji Restoration, was the right path, despite its militarist tendency," Xinhua summarized. Political commissar of China's National Defense University Liu Yazhou compared Japan's reforms to China's: "One made reforms from its mind, while another only made changes on the surface."

Though these comments are referencing a conflict from 120 years ago, it's easy to see the relevance for today. Xi Jinping is trying to spearhead China's most ambitious reform package since the days of Deng Xiaoping, including not only difficult economic rebalancing but also an overhaul of the way China's bureaucracy (both civilian and military) is organized. In other words, China still needs to finish the modernization project that the Qing halfheartedly began in the 19th century. Westernization (what today China would call modernization) remains "the right path."

Other PLA officers argued that corruption was a major contributing factor to China's defeat by the Japanese in 1895. Vice Admiral Ding Yiping, a deputy commander in the PLAN, blamed the defeat on "corruption and fatuity in politics." Major-General Jin Yinan, a strategist at NDU, said that China's Beiyang Fleet at the time had all the necessary equipment, but that the period of peace before the war led to "the general mood of the fleet becoming depraved."

As part of these reforms, Xi has repeatedly warned about the danger of corruption, particularly in the military. In one of his first major policy pronouncement after being named Secretary General of the Communist Party, Xi urged China's military to be ready for battle. "It is the top priority for the military to be able to fight and win battles and it is fundamental that the military consolidates itself through governing the troops lawfully and austere," Xi said in a speech in Guangzhou. One could say that Xi saw a "depraved" mood in China's own military, where personal profit concerns outweighed national security. It's no coincidence that a PLA general now highlights that same factor as a major cause in one of China's most stinging military defeats.

PLA officers also emphasized the importance of maritime strategy in Japan's victory in the Sino-Japanese war. Under this argument, China was defeated because it had neglected naval warfare in its preparations. Up until recently, this remained largely true. China's naval forces were historically subordinate to the ground forces, as evidenced by the very name: People's Liberation Army Navy.

However, Xi Jinping has been pushing for more attention to go to China's navy, as well as its coast guard. In support of this position, Vice Admiral Ding wrote that maritime strategy was a key to China's defeat 120 years ago, and that the ocean remains central to national interests today. "State security cannot be ensured if maritime rights cannot be safeguarded," Ding said.

Xi Jinping apparently shares this view, as he has called for China to become a maritime power. “The oceans and seas have an increasingly important strategic status concerning global competition in the spheres of politics, economic development, military, and technology,” Xi said at a July 2013 study session with Politburo members. China’s new focus on naval assets has also brought renewed attempts to demonstrate sovereignty in disputed maritime areas from the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to the Spratlys. The Xinhua articles use the Sino-Japanese War as a lesson to back Xi’s increased focus on maritime security and strategy.

Last, but certainly not least, the PLA experts ended with the most obvious argument: that the First Sino-Japanese War proves the dangers of militarism in Japan. Chinese officials generally use Japan’s World War II conduct to criticize modern-day Tokyo, probably because this gives their criticisms a global application. But to China, the First Sino-Japanese War actually marked the beginning of Japan’s militaristic, imperialistic tendencies. Chinese scholars see this trend as continuing unabated until Japan’s defeat in World War II—which is also known as the Second Sino-Japanese War in Chinese (or, more colloquially, as the War of Resistance Against Japan).

Several of the PLA authors drew explicit parallels between the lead-up to the Sino-Japanese War and today. One national security policy expert, Peng Guangqian, said that the rise of militarism in Japan today echoes the situation in Japan in 1894. He warned China to “guard against the sneak attacks that Japan has a history of making.”

However, unwilling to end on a sour note, Xinhua ended by citing General Liu’s argument that, despite losing the war, China ‘won’ in the long-term. Liu said that China’s memory of the “humiliation” of its defeat helped spark its current rise to power, whereas Japan is still suffering the consequences of its overreach in World War II.

Foreign scholars are more interested in looking back at World War I and its implication for Asia, but in China they have their sights set even farther in the past. Chinese military officers are using the memory of one of China’s most humiliating defeats to argue for the importance of modern-day issues like reform, a naval build-up, and the need to be wary of Japan. The implication is clear: follow Xi’s prescriptions, or risk another national humiliation.

ANGLO- JAPANESE ALLIANCE

Anglo-Japanese Alliance, (1902–23), alliance that bound Britain and Japan to assist one another in safeguarding their respective interests in China and Korea. Directed against Russian expansionism in the Far East, it was a cornerstone of British and Japanese policy in Asia until after World War I.

The alliance served Japan in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05) by discouraging France, Russia's European ally, from entering the war on the Russian side. It was renewed in 1905 and again in 1911 after Japan's annexation of Korea. On the basis of its tie with Britain, Japan participated in World War I on the side of the Allies.

After the war the British no longer feared Russian encroachment in China and wished to maintain close ties with the United States, which tended to view Japan as its rival in the Pacific. Following an unsuccessful attempt to bring the U.S. into the alliance at the Washington Conference of 1921–22, Britain allowed it to lapse. It was specifically terminated by the Four-Power Pacific Treaty (1921), a vaguely worded agreement that left the Japanese without allies until the conclusion of their Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in September 1940.

RUSO-JAPANESE WAR

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, caused by Russian and Japanese expansionism in the Far East, inflicted humiliating defeats on Russia at land and sea. The war contributed to domestic unrest in both countries, catalysing the revolution of 1905 in Russia. The rise of Japan also sent reverberations across the world.

Causes

The war between Russia and Japan was provoked by strategic issues, the international context and personal factors. Russian expansionism and rapid Japanese military growth and modernisation generated clashes over military, political and commercial interests in East Asia. In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Japan eliminated Chinese power in Korea and won control over the Liaotung Peninsula in Manchuria. An alliance of Russia, France and Germany, however, pressured Japan to give back the peninsula in return for increased reparations. Tensions increased as Russia founded the Russo-Korean Bank, demanded a twenty-five-year lease from China of the Liaotung Peninsula for itself and moved troops into Manchuria in response to the Boxer Uprising.

Furthermore, in 1897 Russia had embarked on railway building on Chinese territory to open it up to commercial exploitation. The potential of the railway as an instrument of economic control, colonisation and military policy caused alarm among Japanese leaders. In 1902, Japan signed a treaty with

Britain that secured British intervention should any country join Russia in a war against Japan, effectively removing the threat of other European powers' involvement if hostilities erupted. Influential individuals disrupted attempts at conciliation. The Russian viceroy for the Far East, Yevgeni Ivanovich Alekseyev (1843-1917), for example, encouraged the Tsar to strengthen his Far East forces when they were supposed to be withdrawing from Manchuria. As negotiations stalled, on the night of 8-9 February 1904 Japanese destroyers launched a surprise attack on Russian warships at Port Arthur in Manchuria and Chemulpo (Inchon) in Korea. On 10 February 1904, after the initial assaults had taken place, Japan declared war.

Military Conflict

The War at Sea

Japanese naval manoeuvres at Port Arthur beginning in February 1904 failed to block the harbour, but largely confined the Russian squadron to the port. On 13 April 1904, a mine sunk the Russian flagship Petropavlovsk in the harbour, taking with it Vice-Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov (1848-1904) and 662 crew members. Japanese forces pursued the remaining Russian ships, under the command of Admiral Vil'gel'm Karlovich Vitgeft (1847-1904), when they broke out to join with cruisers at Vladivostok. The ensuing Battle of the Yellow Sea was a significant defeat for Russia. Admiral Vitgeft was killed and no Russian ships succeeded in reaching Vladivostok. Some were interned in foreign ports, one destroyer was sunk and another captured. The rest of the

squadron was forced back to Port Arthur. In December 1904 all but one of the Russian battleships still anchored there were sunk by Japanese shelling. The final large-scale encounter of the war was the Battle of Tsushima between the fleet of Admiral Heihachiro Togo (1848-1934) and the 2nd Pacific Squadron led by Rear-Admiral Zinovii Petrovich Rozhdestvenskii (1848-1909). The newly formed 2nd Pacific Squadron had left the Baltic in October 1904. On the way it caused a diplomatic incident at Dogger Bank by firing on English trawlers mistaken for Japanese torpedo boats. By the time the fleet approached Japan in May 1905 it was weakened by problems with fuelling, mutiny and tropical disease. The Japanese fleet routed the squadron and captured the badly injured Rozhdestvenskii. Thousands of Russians were killed, taken prisoner to Japan or interned in neutral countries, while Japan lost just three torpedo boats and 700 men killed or wounded.

The War on Land

At the end of April 1904, the first major land battle, the Battle of the Yalu River, took place on the boundary between Korea and Manchuria. It resulted in Russian retreat, their exclusion from Korea and the surrender of part of the Russian army. A few days later, the Japanese 2nd Army was able to land unopposed on the Liaotung Peninsula, north of Port Arthur. At the Battle of Nanshan, the 2nd Army drove the Russians to abandon the commercial port of Dalny and the outer defences of Port Arthur despite heavy casualties. From the end of July 1904, Japanese forces besieged Port Arthur's fortress town,

accepting the surrender of the garrison on 2 January 1905. In the meantime, in 1904 Japanese divisions had advanced into Manchuria, driving back the much larger Russian army of General Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin (1848-1925) at Liaoyang, albeit with greater losses, and inflicting heavy casualties on the Russians at the Battle of Sha-Ho. The Russian offensive at San-de-pu in January 1905 ended in failure. Reinforcements arrived on both sides and in February and March 1905, in the town of Mukden, the armies fought the longest land battle of modern history to that point. The battle cost both sides almost a third of their forces as Japanese troops outflanked those of Kuropatkin and took the town.

Peace Settlement

Japan had won clear victories at Mukden and Tsushima; however, Japanese forces were exhausted, low on ammunition and the country's economy was strained. Russia could draw on more substantial reinforcements than Japan, but the Tsar was preoccupied with domestic unrest. In August 1905, peace negotiations began in the United States. The Treaty of Portsmouth signed in September 1905 recognised Japanese rights in Korea and ceded Port Arthur, Dalny and the adjacent territory to Japan, along with control over the South Manchurian Railway. It provided for Russian evacuation from Manchuria. The Japanese government's demands for financial reparations were not granted, however, and the island of Sakhalin, seized by Japan at the end of the war, was divided between the two powers.

Consequences and Significance

The war took a bitter toll on each side, contributing to domestic unrest in both countries. In Japan, many felt the peace settlement cheated them of the fruits of victory. Riots lasted for days and the authorities instituted martial law. In Russia, news of defeat seemed to justify the political opposition's criticism of the autocratic regime's incompetency. Discontent at military humiliation and economic disruption, compounded by the domestic absence of the troops, relied upon by the regime to quell domestic protest, heightened social unrest. Waves of oppositional activity culminated in the Revolution of 1905, in which protests by liberals, socialists, workers, peasants, ethnic minorities and even some soldiers and sailors, for example on the Black Sea fleet's battleship Potemkin, forced the Tsar to grant Russia's first parliament.

The shame of defeat also prompted long-delayed military reform to bring Russia's capability in line with her Great Power status, a programme interrupted by the outbreak of the First World War. In addition, military humiliation contributed to currents of nationalism and pan-Slavism that found release in the eruption of war in 1914. There was also a significant international dimension to the Russo-Japanese war. Its global reverberations have led some scholars to term it "World War Zero."^[1] It changed the balance of power in East Asia, elevated Japan to potential inclusion in the ranks of the Great Powers and inspired anti-imperialists across Asia. The victory of an

Asiatic country over a European power shattered illusions in the west and the general staffs of European and American militaries pored over reports sent back by their observers. Unfortunately, erroneous inferences were often drawn, for example that future warfare would be short, mobile and won by spirited offensives, lessons which had to be quickly unlearned as the First World War unfolded.

JAPAN AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

Japanese entry into WW1 began with the Anglo Japanese Alliance of 1902. Although the cornerstone of this agreement, and its primary purpose, was mutual recognition of interests of the parties in China, an obscure provision was the promise of support if either signatory became involved in war with more than one Power. This clause was triggered when the British declared war on Austria-Hungary on August 12th, 1914, having previously declared war on Germany on August 4th. Accordingly, Japan declared war on both on August 23rd.

German front line at Tsingtao

Why did Japan want to become involved in WW1? They had little interest in the events unfolding in Europe, except that a prolonged conflict would certainly distract the European powers from their interests in China and weaken their position there by requiring the transfer of ships and soldiers.

However, the Japanese saw an opportunity to enhance their standing in the region by supplanting Germany and to take another step towards recognition of Japan as a world power.

What were the Japanese contributions to the Allied effort in WW1?

The capture of the German concession at Tsingtao (Qingdao) in northern China. The Japanese led the attacking force which consisted of 23,000 Japanese and 1,500 British and Indian troops taken from the Hong Kong garrison. After an eight day battle, the mostly German garrison ran short of ammunition and surrendered. Japanese losses were 733 killed and 1,282 wounded, plus the cruiser Takachiho and the destroyer Shirotaye were sunk. The capture of the German Pacific colonies north of the equator, the Mariana (except Guam), Marshall and Caroline Islands, which wasn't a dangerous task as none of the islands had a military garrison.

The Japanese Navy secured the sea lanes in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans, not much of a challenge after the Germans withdrew their East Asiatic Squadron in September 1914 and the Indian Ocean raider SMS Emden was destroyed by the Australians in November 1914.

The British allowed the Japanese to base ships at Singapore, which proved of great value to the British in late January 1915 when Muslim soldiers from the Indian Army, responding to the Ottoman Jihad declaration, mutinied and rampaged freely in the city for two days until an ad hoc force headed by 158 Japanese Marines restored order.

At the end of 1916 the British asked for Japanese naval assistance in the Mediterranean. A squadron of 3 cruisers and 14 destroyers was dispatched and took over all anti-submarine escort and search duty in the sea lane between Suez and Malta. One destroyer, the Sakaki, was torpedoed by the Austro-

Hungarian U-27. Fifty nine sailors died and the ship was never returned to service.

In July 1918 Japan agreed to contribute 12,000 soldiers as part of the Siberian Expeditionary Force, which included nearly 8,000 Americans, to secure, protect and operate the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The Japanese occupied Vladivostok and their soldiers ventured as far into Russia as Lake Baikal. The Japanese stayed until the fall of 1920, losing about 5,000 men, mostly to disease and bad conditions.

Japanese Seaplane carrier Wakamiya

A footnote for the aviation history buffs: two 'firsts' happened at Tsingtao. The Japanese seaplane carrier Wakamiya launched the first naval air raids in history, and second, one of these Farman MF-7 seaplanes was the first aircraft in history to be shot down by another aircraft, hit by a Mauser C-96 automatic pistol fired by the pilot of a Taube reconnaissance plane.

Japanese Farman MF-7's

For their participation, Japan was accorded full recognition as a combatant by the Allies, with voting power at the peace conference equal to each of the Western Front powers. Japan also got four years of freedom to pursue aggression against China without European objection.

What did Japan want to gain from the peace? Permanent recognition of their annexation of German territories already occupied and a declaration of racial equality. At the conference, the Japanese delegation proposed an amendment after Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, Part I of the Versailles Treaty, by adding this provision.

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord as soon as possible to all alien nationals of states, members of the League, equal and just treatment in every respect making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.

On April 11th, 1919 this amendment was carried by a vote of 11 to 8. However, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, who was the chairman, ruled that, due to the strongly-voiced objections by British Commonwealth, Belgian, Portuguese and even American interests, approval required unanimity. All compromise negotiations failed; the amendment was defeated.

Japan didn't get permanent sovereignty over the captured territories, either. Instead, the League of Nations granted Japan a Class C Mandate, which recognized that the lands would be "best administered under the laws of Japan as an integral part of Japanese territory", and so they were until Japan's defeat in WW2.

THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1930

Introduction

The London Naval Conference of 1930 was the third in a series of five meetings, formed with the purpose of placing limits on the naval capacity of the world's largest naval powers. The purpose of the meetings was to promote disarmament in the wake of the devastation of the First World War; they began with the Washington Conference of 1921–22 and concluded with the London Conference of 1935. After an unsuccessful meeting in Geneva in 1927, Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy gathered in London in 1930 to make a new attempt at revising and extending the terms of the Five Power Treaty of 1922.

In 1927, Great Britain and the United States could not agree on naval cruiser limits; however, representatives of the two governments continued to work on a compromise measure. By 1930 both sides were anxious to reach a deal to avoid an all out arms race and, importantly, forced their naval officers to take a back seat to their diplomats in the negotiations.

Tonnage Restrictions

The restrictions on tonnage on Great Britain, the United States, and Japan relative to one another were an important issue for discussion. The Washington conference established a ratio of 5:5:3 for capital ships—for every five capital ships the Americans and British had, the Japanese were allowed to

have three. As in 1927, Japan insisted that the ratio for auxiliary vessels be increased to 10:10:7, rather than maintaining the 5:5:3 ratio. If the United States was to have 18 heavy cruisers, the latter ratio placed the Japanese limit at 10 cruisers; however, at the time of the conference, Japan had built or was building 12 new ships. The United States was the power most opposed to granting the higher ratio, although it ultimately conceded the point; the official terms of the treaty granted the 10:7 ratio on light cruisers and destroyers and maintained the 10:6 ratio on heavy cruisers, but with a compromise under which the United States delayed its shipbuilding program to give Japan a grace period with a 10:7 ratio in heavy cruisers as well.

The other key issue of the 1930 conference was the maximum tonnage for light cruisers. The United States was adamantly opposed to any maximum lower than 10,000 tons, because given the nature of its international commitments—in particular, its involvement in the Philippines and East Asia and the limited number of refueling stations available in the Pacific—lighter cruisers would not be of much use. Although it compromised on the Japanese ratio and the heavy cruisers, the United States refused to yield on this issue, in spite of the fact that the other powers were far more willing to accept the British maximum of 7,000 tons. In the end, the U.S. position prevailed.

The final treaty limited tonnage of auxiliary ships, as well as the size and gun power of submarines and destroyers. In all but “offensive” ship categories, it granted the Japanese their long-sought 10:10:7 ratio. The treaty also set

maximum tonnage for cruisers at 339,000 tons for Great Britain, 323,500 tons for the United States, and 208,850 tons for Japan. The maximum numbers of heavy cruisers were set at 18 for America, 15 for Great Britain, and 12 for Japan. The Treaty upheld and extended the provision in the 1922 treaty that prohibited the powers from building new capital ships for 5 years. The provisions in both the Five-Power Treaty of 1922 and the 1930 treaty were set to expire in 1936.

U.S. Shipbuilding After the Conference

Although it was described as an “arms limitation conference,” in actuality, the London Naval Treaty set limits above the current capacity of some of the powers involved. The U.S. Senate approved the treaty in July of 1930 over the objections of key naval officers concerned that the naval limitations would inhibit the American ability to defend its control of the Philippine islands. Then the United States actually embarked on a shipbuilding program to make up the difference between its existing cruiser tonnage and what it was allotted under the treaty. That building ultimately helped to alleviate some unemployment caused by the Great Depression.

In 1935, the powers met for a second London Naval Conference to renegotiate the Washington and London treaties before their expiration the following year. The Japanese walked out of that conference, but Great Britain, France, and the United States signed an agreement declaring a six-year holiday

on building large light cruisers in the 8,000 to 10,000 ton range. That final decision marked the end to the decade-long controversy over cruisers.

UNIT – V

RISE OF MILITARISM

The notion that expansion through military conquest would solve Japan's economic problems gained currency during the Great Depression of the 1930s. It was argued that the rapid growth of Japan's population—which stood at close to 65 million in 1930—necessitated large food imports. To sustain such imports, Japan had to be able to export. Western tariffs limited exports, while discriminatory legislation in many countries and anti-Japanese racism served as barriers to emigration. Chinese and Japanese efforts to secure racial equality in the League of Nations covenant had been rejected by Western statesmen. Thus, it was argued, Japan had no recourse but to use force.

The weakening of party government

To these economic and racial arguments was added the military's distrust of party government. The Washington Conference had allowed a smaller ratio of naval strength than the navy desired, while the government of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi in 1930 had accepted the London Naval Conference's limits on heavy cruisers over military objections. In 1925 Katō Takaaki had cut the army by four divisions. Many military men objected to the restraint shown by Japan toward the Chinese Nationalists' northern expedition of 1926 and 1927 and wanted Japan to take a harder line in China. Under Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi the Seiyūkai cabinet reversed earlier policy by intervening in Shantung in 1927 and 1928. But Tanaka was replaced by

Hamaguchi in 1929, and under his cabinet the policy of moderation was restored. The army and its supporters felt that such vacillation earned Japan ill will and boycotts in China without gaining any advantages.

While many military leaders chafed under the restrictions that civilian governments placed upon them, they still retained considerable power. It would be wrong to attribute such resentment to all, or even most, of the high command, but enough army officers held such views to become a locus for dissatisfaction among other groups in Japanese society. The idea of the frugal and selfless samurai served as a useful contrast to the stock portrait of the selfish party politician.

Economic pressures and political misgivings were further exploited by civilian ultranationalists who portrayed parliamentary government as being “un-Japanese.” A number of rightist organizations existed that were dedicated to the theme of internal purity and external expansion. These sought to preserve what they thought was unique in the Japanese spirit and fought against excessive Western influence. Some originated in the Meiji period, when nationalists had felt obliged to work for a “fundamental settlement” of differences with Russia. Most, like the Black Dragon Society (Kokuryūkai), combined continental adventurism and a strong nationalist stance with opposition to party government, big business, acculturation, and Westernization. By allying with other rightists, they alternately terrorized and intimidated their presumed opponents. A number of business leaders and

political figures were killed, and the assassins' success in publicizing and dramatizing the virtues they claimed to embody had a considerable impact on the troubled 1930s. It is clear, however, that the terrorists never had as much influence as they claimed or as the West believed.

The principal force against parliamentary government was provided by junior military officers, who were largely from rural backgrounds. Distrustful of their senior leaders, ignorant of political economy, and contemptuous of the urban luxuries of politicians, such officers were ready marks for rightist theorists. Many of them had goals that were national-socialist in character. Kita Ikki, a former socialist and one-time member of the Black Dragon Society, contended that the Meiji constitution should be suspended in favour of a revolutionary regime advised by "national patriots" and headed by a military government, which should nationalize large properties, limit wealth, end party government and the peerage, and prepare to take the leadership of a revolutionary Asia. Kita helped persuade a number of young officers to take part in the violence of the 1930s with the hope of achieving these ends.

Aggression in Manchuria

The Kwantung Army, which occupied the Kwantung (Liaotung) Peninsula and patrolled the South Manchurian Railway zone, included officers who were keenly aware of Japan's continental interests and were prepared to take steps to further them. They hoped to place the civilian government in an untenable position and to force its hand. The Tokyo terrorists similarly

sought to change foreign as well as domestic policies. The pattern of direct action in Manchuria began with the murder in 1928 of Chang Tso-lin, the warlord ruler of Manchuria. The action, though not authorized by the Tanaka government, helped bring about its fall. Neither the cabinet nor the Diet dared to investigate and punish those responsible. This convinced extremist officers that their lofty motives would make retribution impossible. The succeeding government of Prime Minister Hamaguchi sought to curtail military activists and their powers. The next plots, therefore, were aimed at replacing civilian rule, and Hamaguchi was mortally wounded by an assassin in 1930. In March 1931 a coup involving highly placed army generals was planned but abandoned.

On September 18, 1931, came the Mukden (or Manchurian) Incident, which launched Japanese aggression in East Asia. A Kwantung Army charge that Chinese soldiers had tried to bomb a South Manchurian Railway train (which arrived at its destination safely) resulted in a speedy and unauthorized capture of Mukden (now Shen-yang), followed by the occupation of all Manchuria. The civilian government in Tokyo could not stop the army, and even army headquarters was not always in full control of the field commanders. Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō gave way in December 1931 to Inukai Tsuyoshi. Inukai's plans to stop the army by imperial intervention were frustrated. On May 15, 1932, naval officers took the lead in a terrorist attack in Tokyo that cost Inukai his life but failed to secure a proclamation of martial law. The army now announced that it would accept no party cabinet. To

forestall its desire for power, the last *genrō*, Saionji, suggested retired Admiral Saitō Makoto as prime minister. Plotting continued, culminating in a revolt of a regiment about to leave for Manchuria. On February 26, 1936, several outstanding statesmen (including Saitō) were murdered; Prime Minister Okada Keisuke escaped when the assassins mistakenly shot his brother-in-law. For more than three days the rebel units held much of downtown Tokyo. When the revolt was put down on February 29, the ringleaders were quickly arrested and executed. Within the army, the influence of the young extremists now gave way to more conservative officers and generals who were less concerned with domestic reform, while sharing many of the foreign-policy goals of the young fanatics.

The only possible source of prestige sufficient to thwart the military lay with the throne. But the senior statesmen were cautious lest they imperil the imperial institution itself. The young emperor Hirohito had been enthroned in 1926, taking as his reign name Shōwa (“Enlightened Peace”). His outlook was more progressive than that of his predecessors; he had traveled in the West, and his interests lay in marine biology. Those close to the throne feared that a strong stand by the emperor would only widen the search for victims and could lead to his dethronement. As international criticism of Japan’s aggression grew, many Japanese rallied to support the army.

The road to World War II

Each advance by the military extremists gained them new concessions from the moderate elements in the government and brought greater foreign hostility and distrust. Rather than oppose the military, the government agreed to reconstitute Manchuria as an “independent” state, Manchukuo. The last Manchu emperor of China, P'u-i, was declared regent and later enthroned as emperor in 1934. Actual control lay with the Kwantung Army, however; all key positions were held by Japanese, with surface authority vested in cooperative Chinese and Manchu. A League of Nations committee recommended in October 1932 that Japanese troops be withdrawn, Chinese sovereignty restored, and a large measure of autonomy granted to Manchuria. The League called upon member states to withhold recognition from the new puppet state. Japan's response was to formally withdraw from the world body in 1933. Thereafter, Japan poured technicians and capital into Manchukuo, exploiting its rich resources to establish the base for the heavy-industry complex that was to undergird its “new order” in East Asia.

Events in China

In northern China, boundary areas were consolidated in order to enlarge Japan's economic sphere. In early 1932 the Japanese navy precipitated an incident at Shanghai in order to end a boycott of Japanese goods; but Japan was not yet prepared to challenge other powers for control of central China,

and a League of Nations commission arranged terms for a withdrawal. By 1934, however, Japan had made it clear that it would brook no interference in its China policy and that Chinese attempts to procure technical or military assistance elsewhere would bring Japanese opposition.

Further external ambitions had to wait, however, for the resolution of domestic crises. The military revolt in Tokyo in February 1936 marked the high point of extremist action. In its wake power shifted to the military conservatives. Moreover, the finance minister Takahashi Korekiyo, whose policies had brought Japan out of its economic depression, was killed, and his opposition to further inflationary spending was thus stilled. In politics, the confrontation between the parties and the army continued. Efforts to find a leader who could represent both military and civilian interests led to the appointment to the premiership of the popular but ineffective Konoe Fumimaro, scion of an ancient court family, in 1937. Meanwhile, in China the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek had been kidnapped in the Sian Incident in December 1936, and this led to an anti-Japanese united front by Nationalists and Communists. Domestic politics revealed, moreover, that the Japanese people were not yet prepared to renounce their parliamentary system. In the spring of 1937, general elections showed startling gains for the new Social Mass (or Social Masses) Party (Shakai Taishūtō), which received 36 out of 466 seats, and a heavy majority of the remainder went to the Seiyūkai and Minseitō, which had combined forces against the government and its

policies. The time seemed ready for new efforts by civilian leaders, but in the field the armies preempted them.

On July 7, 1937, Japanese troops engaged Chinese units at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing, leading to warfare between China and Japan. Japanese armies took Nanking, Han-k'ou (Hankow), and Canton despite vigorous Chinese resistance; Nanking was brutally pillaged by Japanese troops. To the north, Inner Mongolia and China's northern provinces were invaded. On discovering that the Nationalist government, which had retreated up the Yangtze to Chungking, refused to compromise, the Japanese installed a more cooperative regime at Nanking in 1940.

Foreign relations

In November 1936 Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany and later with Italy. This was replaced by the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, which recognized Japan as the leader of a new order in Asia; Japan, Germany, and Italy agreed to assist each other if they were attacked by any additional power not yet at war with them. The intended target was the United States, since the Soviets and Nazis had already signed a nonaggression pact in 1939, and the Soviets were invited to join the new agreement later in 1940.

Japanese relations with the Soviet Union were considerably less cordial than those with Germany. The Soviets consented, however, to sell the Chinese

Eastern Railway to the South Manchurian Railway in 1935, thereby strengthening Manchukuo. In 1937 the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with China, and in 1938 and 1939 Soviet and Japanese armies tested each other in two full-scale battles along the border of Manchukuo. But in April 1941 a neutrality pact was signed with the Soviet Union, with Germany acting as intermediary.

Japanese-German ties were never close or effective. Both parties were limited in their cooperation by distance, distrust, and claims of racial superiority. The Japanese were uninformed about Nazi plans for attacking the Soviet Union, and the Germans were not told of Japan's plans to attack Pearl Harbor in Hawaii. Nor, despite formal statements of rapport, did Japan's state structure approach the totalitarianism of the Nazis. A national-mobilization law (1938) gave the Konoe government sweeping economic and political powers, and in 1940, under the second Konoe cabinet, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was established to merge the political parties into one central organization; yet, the institutional structure of the Meiji constitution was never altered, and the wartime governments never achieved full control over interservice competition. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association failed to mobilize all segments of national life around a leader. The emperor remained a symbol, albeit an increasingly military one, and no führer could compete without endangering the national polity. Wartime social and economic thought retained important vestiges of an agrarianism and familism that were in essence premodern rather than totalitarian.

Japan's relations with the democratic powers deteriorated steadily. The United States and Great Britain did what they could to assist the Chinese Nationalist cause. The Burma Road into southern China permitted the transport of minimal supplies to Nationalist forces. Constant Japanese efforts to close this route led to further tensions between Great Britain and Japan. Anti-Japanese feeling strengthened in the United States, especially after the sinking of a U.S. gunboat in the Yangtze River in 1937. In 1939 U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull renounced the 1911 treaty of commerce with Japan, and thus embargoes became possible in 1940. President Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to rally public opinion against aggressors included efforts to stop Japan, but, even after war broke out in Europe in 1939, American public opinion rejected involvement abroad.

World War II and defeat

Prologue to war

The European war presented the Japanese with tempting opportunities. After the Nazi attack on Russia in 1941, the Japanese were torn between German urgings to join the war against the Soviets and their natural inclination to seek richer prizes from the European colonial territories to the south. In 1940 Japan occupied northern Indochina in an attempt to block access to supplies for the Chinese Nationalists, and in July 1941 it announced a joint protectorate with Vichy France over the whole colony. This opened the way for further moves into Southeast Asia.

The United States reacted to the occupation of Indochina by freezing Japanese assets and embargoing oil. The Japanese now faced the choices of either withdrawing from Indochina, and possibly China, or seizing the sources of oil production in the Dutch East Indies. Negotiations with Washington were initiated by the second Konoe cabinet. Konoe was willing to withdraw from Indochina, and he sought a personal meeting with Roosevelt, hoping that any U.S. concessions or favours would strengthen his hand against the military. But the State Department refused to agree to such a meeting without prior Japanese concessions. Having failed in his negotiations, Konoe resigned in October 1941 and was immediately succeeded by his war minister, General Tōjō Hideki. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Hull rejected Japan's "final offer": Japan would withdraw from Indochina after China had come to terms in return for U.S. promises to resume oil shipments, cease aid to China, and unfreeze Japanese assets. With Japan's decision for war made, the negotiators received instructions to continue to negotiate, but preparations for the opening strike against the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor were already in motion. Japan's war aims were to establish a "new order in East Asia," built on a "coprosperity" concept that placed Japan at the centre of an economic bloc consisting of Manchuria, Korea, and North China that would draw on the raw materials of the rich colonies of Southeast Asia, while inspiring these to friendship and alliance by destroying their previous masters. In practice, "East Asia for the Asiatics," the slogan that headed the campaign, came to mean "East Asia for Japan."

Early successes

The attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7 [December 8 in Japan], 1941) achieved complete surprise and success. It also unified American opinion and determination to see the war through to a successful conclusion. The Japanese had expected that, once they fortified their new holdings, a reconquest would be so expensive in lives and treasure that it would discourage the “soft” democracies. Instead, the U.S. fleet was rebuilt with astonishing speed, and the chain of defenses was breached before the riches of the newly conquered territories could be effectively tapped by Japan.

The first years of the war brought Japan great success. In the Philippines, Japanese troops occupied Manila in January 1942, although Corregidor held out until May; Singapore fell in February, and the Dutch East Indies and Rangoon (Burma) in early March. The Allies had difficulty maintaining communications with Australia, and British naval losses promised the Japanese navy further freedom of action. Tōjō grew in confidence and popularity and began to style himself somewhat in the manner of a fascist leader. But the U.S. Navy had not been permanently driven from the South Pacific. The Battle of Midway in June 1942 cost the Japanese fleet four aircraft carriers and many seasoned pilots, and the battle for Guadalcanal Island in the Solomons ended with Japanese withdrawal in February 1943.

Japan on the defensive

After Midway, Japanese naval leaders secretly concluded that Japan's outlook for victory was poor. When the fall of Saipan in July 1944 brought U.S. bombers within range of Tokyo, the Tōjō cabinet was replaced by that of Koiso Kuniaki. Koiso formed a supreme war-direction council designed to link the cabinet and the high command. Many in government realized that the war was lost, but none had a program for ending the war that was acceptable to the military. There were also grave problems in breaking the news to the Japanese people, who had been told only of victories. Great firebombing raids in 1945 brought destruction to every major city except the old capital of Kyōto; but the generals were bent on continuing the war, confident that a major victory or protracted battle would help gain honourable terms. The Allied talk of unconditional surrender provided a good excuse to continue the fight.

In February 1945 the emperor met with a group of senior statesmen to discuss steps that might be taken. When U.S. landings were made on Okinawa in April, the Koiso government fell. The problem of the new premier, Admiral Suzuki Kantarō, was not whether to end the war but how best to do it. The first plan advanced was to ask the Soviet Union, which was still at peace with Japan, to intercede with the Allies. The Soviet government had agreed, however, to enter the war; consequently, its reply was delayed while Soviet leaders participated in the Potsdam Conference in July. The Potsdam Declaration issued on July 26 offered the first ray of hope with its

statement that Japan would not be “enslaved as a race, nor destroyed as a nation.”

The end of the war

Atomic bombs largely destroyed the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, respectively. On August 8 the Soviet Union declared war and the next day marched into Manchuria, where the Kwantung Army could offer only token resistance. The Japanese government attempted to gain as its sole condition for surrender a qualification for the preservation of the imperial institution; after the Allies agreed to respect the will of the Japanese people, the emperor insisted on surrender. The Pacific war came to an end on August 14 (August 15 in Japan). The formal surrender was signed on September 2 in Tokyo Bay aboard the battleship USS *Missouri*.

Military extremists attempted unsuccessfully to prevent the radio broadcast of the emperor’s announcement to the nation. There were a number of suicides among the military officers and nationalists who felt themselves dishonoured, but the emperor’s prestige and personal will, once expressed, sufficed to bring an orderly transition. To increase the appearance of direct rule, the Suzuki cabinet was replaced by that of Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko.

Postwar investigators concluded that neither the atomic bombs nor the Soviet entry into the war was central to the decision to surrender, although

they probably helped to advance the date. It was determined that submarine blockade of the Japanese islands had brought economic defeat by preventing exploitation of Japan's new colonies, sinking merchant tonnage, and convincing Japanese leaders of the hopelessness of the war. Bombing brought the consciousness of defeat to the people. The destruction of the Japanese navy and air force jeopardized the home islands. By the end of the war, Japan's cities were destroyed, its stockpiles exhausted, and its industrial capacity gutted. The government stood without prestige or respect. An alarming shortage of food and rising inflation threatened what remained of national strength.

SOCIAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHANGES IN JAPAN FROM 1919 TO 1950

The development of industry drove many social and intellectual changes. After the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the government utilized the Chinese indemnity to subsidize the development of the Yawata Iron and Steel Works, which were established in 1897 and began production in 1901. Yawata significantly expanded Japan's heavy industry sector, but it depended on China for its ores. The growing textile and other consumer goods industries expanded both to meet Japanese needs and to earn the capital required for the import of raw materials. Heavy industry was encouraged by government-controlled banks, and strategic industries such as steel and railways were in government hands. Most new growth was in the private sector, however, although it remained somewhat concentrated in the hands of the *zaibatsu* financial and industrial giants.

The industrial labour force numbered about 400,000 workers in 1895. Police action restricted the growth of labour unions, and socialist movements were quickly repressed. In 1903 the *Heimin Shimbun* ("Commoner's Newspaper") published *The Communist Manifesto* and opposed the Russo-Japanese War in the name of the workers of Russia and Japan before it was forced to cease publication. The Christian pacifist Uchimura Kanzo joined in these antiwar protests but later parted company with the socialists. The labour and socialist movements gained in strength after World War I, but they had many handicaps. Leadership usually had little real contact with the workers

because of police repression. The challenge of organizing across the vast industrial empires of Mitsui and Mitsubishi also kept the labour movement from making headway. The increasing confidence and power of management, which came to influence and at times control the political parties, were in marked contrast to the slow progress of the labour movement. The Katō government of 1924–26 was sometimes referred to as a “Mitsubishi cabinet” because of its close relations to that company’s interests and families. In 1928 a revision of the law passed under Katō made it a capital crime to agitate against private property or Japanese “national essence” (*kokutai*).

In the countryside, farm villages provided the bulk of the labourers for the new industries, and rural women were to be found in many of the textile plants. The early decades of the 20th century were not years of agricultural prosperity, however. Increased tenancy resulted in the growth of tenant organizations, and government efforts to encourage voluntary reform measures brought only a 1924 law for mediation of disputes between tenants and landlords. This made little real impact. The financial panic of 1927 aggravated rural conditions and indebtedness, and the collapse of the U.S. silk market in 1929 spelled disaster for the farmers and workers alike.

The most-lasting social changes were those found in the great metropolitan centres where the growing labour force and the new middle class “salary” groups were concentrated. The Tokyo-Yokohama area was devastated by a great earthquake in September 1923, and its reconstruction as a modern

metropolis symbolized the growth and orientation of the urban society. Japanese popular culture during and after World War I drew from international sources, most conspicuously the United States. Western music and sports achieved inroads, and the rising standards of living produced the need for better access to higher education. Women shared in the changes, and the participation of women in the workforce gave rise to a feminist movement. While the gains achieved were halting at best, the Japanese family system was undergoing dramatic changes.

The educated class grew in size, embracing beliefs ranging from Western-style democracy to the new radicalism of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the foundation for these new currents of liberalism was unstable. Universal manhood suffrage was achieved, but political expression was checked by the Tokubetsu Kōtō Keisatsu (“Special Higher Police”), or Tokkō, a police force which was established to prevent the spread of “dangerous thoughts.” Economically, the urban classes were dependent upon the continuance of the favourable trade patterns of the 1920s. When the Great Depression at the end of the decade wrecked Japan’s foreign markets, many were prepared to listen to charges that party politicians had imperiled Japan while enriching themselves.

The rise of the militarists

The idea that military conquest could solve Japan’s economic problems was not new, but the hardships of the Great Depression gave it increased

prominence. One of the key arguments advanced to support aggressive militarism was that it posed a solution to the problem of surplus population. Japan's population had grown from 30 million at the time of the Meiji Restoration to almost 65 million in 1930. Each year the problem grew worse; the imports of needed foodstuffs increased, while Western tariffs limited exports. It was also argued that discrimination was a barrier to Japanese emigration to many areas. The so-called Gentlemen's Agreement with U.S. Pres. Theodore Roosevelt succeeded in removing legal barriers in California, but bias and prejudice continued. Japanese were barred from Australia altogether. Efforts made by Japan and China to secure a racial equality clause in the League of Nations covenant were frustrated by Western statesmen who feared the anger of their constituents. With economic avenues closed, militarists argued that force was Japan's only option.

The armed services distrusted the political parties and opposed several international agreements which the civilian governments accepted. The Washington Conference limited Japan's naval strength, and in 1930 the government of Prime Minister Hamaguchi Osachi accepted the London Naval Conference limitations on cruiser strength. The Katō government reduced the size of the army by four divisions. Many service leaders also bridled under the moderation that Foreign Minister Shidehara showed during the Nationalist Party's Northern Expedition in 1926–27, and they would have preferred that Japan be much more militarily assertive in China. Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi reversed Shidehara's policy by intervening in Shandong in 1927 and

1928, but Tanaka was forced out in 1929 and replaced by Hamaguchi, under whom Shidehara resumed control of the foreign office. It seemed to many in the military that such inconsistency had earned Japan the enmity of China without gaining any obvious advantage.

Many military leaders resented the restrictions that the civilian governments placed upon them, and, because they had direct access to the throne and possessed the ability to break a cabinet by refusing their cooperation, their power was considerable. Such views were not held by all or even most of the high command; many politically savvy senior officers approved of party government, and navy leaders tended to be more discreet. However, enough army officers embraced this position that it became a possible focus for dissatisfaction among other groups in Japanese society. The image of the frugal, selfless samurai was peculiarly useful as a contrast to the stock characterization of the selfish party politician.

These internal clashes were exploited by groups of civilian ultranationalists who opposed parliamentary government on principle. Since Meiji times, there had been a number of rightist organizations dedicated to Japanese cultural purity and external military expansion. They sought to preserve what they believed to be unique in the Japanese spirit and therefore fought against excessive Westernization. There were many such organizations, the most important of which drew inspiration from the ultranationalist Tōyama Mitsuru. Most of the organizations were opposed to political parties and big

business as well as Westernization, and, by allying with rightist forces, civilian and military, they alternately terrorized and intimidated their presumed opponents.

Junior officers in the armed services were a receptive audience for the far right theorists, and they would prove to be the strongest force against parliamentary government. Many of them were animated by goals that were national socialist in character. Kita Ikki, a former socialist who had embraced nationalism and militarism, wrote in *An Outline Plan for the Reorganization of Japan* that the Meiji Constitution should be set aside in favour of a revolutionary regime. Ikki's military government would nationalize many forms of property, place limits on wealth, end party rule, and assume the leadership role in a revolution that would sweep Asia. Kita helped persuade a number of young officers to take part in the violence of the 1930s, and in large measure their plots were designed to create a disorder so great that military government would follow. Once this had been achieved, they thought, the army would know what to do next.

The Manchurian Incident

The Japanese Kwantung Army occupied the Liaodong Peninsula and patrolled the South Manchurian Railway zone. Many of the officers of this force were keenly aware of Japan's continental interests and prepared to take steps to further them. Their actions were designed to place the civilian government in an untenable position and to force its hand.

Direct action in Manchuria began with the murder of Marshal Zhang Zuolin, the warlord ruler of Manchuria, whose train was bombed by Japanese extremists in June 1928. The bombing was not authorized by the Tanaka government and helped to bring about its fall. Because of resistance from the army, Tanaka's cabinet dared not investigate and punish those responsible, and this contributed to the feeling of extremist officers that they were exempt from civilian oversight. The succeeding Hamaguchi government showed intentions of restraining the power of the military. Unsurprisingly, subsequent plots centred around plans for replacing civilian government altogether, and in November 1930 Hamaguchi was mortally wounded by an assassin's bullet. In March 1931 a group of highly placed army generals planned to carry out a coup by terrorizing civilian politicians into a grant of martial law, but the scheme was abandoned because of lack of agreement among the principals.

On September 18, 1931, the Manchurian (Mukden) Incident marked the dawn of Japanese military aggression in East Asia. The Kwantung Army alleged that Chinese soldiers had tried to bomb a South Manchurian Railway train. Damage to the railway was minimal and the train arrived at its destination safely. Nevertheless, the incident resulted in the speedy and unauthorized capture of Mukden (now Shenyang) followed by the occupation of all of Manchuria. The civilian government in Tokyo had no control of the Kwantung Army, and even direction from army headquarters was not always heeded by field commanders.

In December 1931 Prime Minister Wakatsuki Reijirō was succeeded by Inukai Tsuyoshi, who immediately moved to check the political power of the military. Inukai's efforts to stop the armies by enlisting the aid of the emperor were frustrated when the army discovered his plans before he could act. In May 1932 naval officers took the lead in extremism: they launched an attack in Tokyo that left Inukai dead. The terrorists failed to kill their other targets—among them the film star Charlie Chaplin, who had been visiting Japan on a promotional junket—and they failed to secure a proclamation of martial law. With the military proving unsuccessful in its attempt to secure power by force, the army simply declared that no party cabinet would be acceptable to it.

In an effort to placate the army, the last genro, Saionji, recommended retired admiral Saitō Makoto as prime minister. Plotting continued furiously, culminating in the revolt of a regiment about to leave for Manchuria. On February 26, 1936, a large number of prominent statesmen (including Saitō and Takahashi Korekiyo, the finance minister who had guided Japan out of the Depression) were murdered; Prime Minister Okada Keisuke escaped when the assassins mistakenly shot his brother-in-law. For several days the rebel units held much of downtown Tokyo, and it required great effort to convince the troops that their junior officers had acted without warrant and in violation of their proper loyalty. When the uprising was finally suppressed on February 29, the ringleaders were quickly arrested and executed, and with them fell their mentor Kita Ikki. From that point, the influence of the young extremists, often referred to as the Imperial Way faction (*Kōdō ha*), gave way before that of the

more cautious Control faction (*Tôsei ha*), which had less-sweeping plans for internal reform but shared many of the foreign policy goals of the young fanatics.

The only possible source of authority and prestige sufficient to thwart the military lay with the emperor. Senior statesmen, however, were reluctant to jeopardize the very institution of the throne. The young emperor Hirohito had succeeded to rule in 1926, taking as his reign title Shōwa ("Bright Peace"). He had traveled in the West, and his interests lay in marine biology, a scientific attachment the ultranationalists felt unfortunate in one whose role it was to embody the Japanese mystique. Saionji and other palace advisers feared the radicalism of the young extremists and thought a strong stand by the emperor would only widen the search for victims. Saionji himself was on almost every assassination list, and he feared that the extremism might lead to overthrow of the monarch. Therefore, he chose to bide his time, hopeful that national or international currents would shift in such a way as to change or thwart the extremists' plans. Unfortunately, this was not to be. As international criticism of Japan's aggression grew, many Japanese rallied to the support of their soldiers.

The road to World War II

Each gain achieved by the militarists resulted in new compromises by more moderate elements in the government, and each of these in turn brought greater foreign hostility and distrust. Manchuria was fully occupied early in

1932, and, rather than attempt to thwart the military, the government agreed to reconstitute it as the puppet state of Manchukuo. The last Manchu emperor of China, Puyi, was first declared regent and then enthroned as emperor in 1934. Actual control lay with the Kwantung Army, however; all key positions were held by Japanese with surface authority granted to cooperative Chinese.

Manchukuo and the Second Sino-Japanese War

Aggression in Manchuria was supported by moves in North China, where boundary areas were consolidated in order to enlarge the economic basis of the emerging “Co-prosperity Sphere.” In the winter and spring of 1932, the Japanese navy precipitated an incident at Shanghai in order to put an end to a boycott of Japanese goods there. Japan was not yet prepared to challenge other powers for control of central China, however. The League of Nations appointed a committee headed by Lord Lytton which recommended in October 1932 that Japanese troops be withdrawn, Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria recognized, and a large measure of autonomy granted to Manchuria. The league accepted these recommendations and called upon member states to withhold recognition from the new puppet state. When this measure was passed, the Japanese delegation, led by Matsuoka Yosuke, walked out of the league’s chamber.

In January 1933 the Japanese army moved south from Manchuria into Jehol (Chengde). Shortly afterward, in March 1933, Japan formally withdrew from the League of Nations. In May 1933, as the Japanese consolidated their

gains in China, they concluded a truce with the Nationalist government in Beijing, whereby a demilitarized zone was set up between Beijing and the Great Wall. This brought the fighting to a temporary close. In 1934 a statement by the Tokyo foreign office made it clear that Japan would brook no interference in its China policy and that Chinese attempts to procure military assistance elsewhere would bring Japanese opposition. Japan poured workers and capital into Manchukuo, exploiting its resources to establish the heavy industry complex that was to undergird the new order in East Asia. The military planners avoided contacts with the old *zaibatsu* firms whose ties with the political party governments they had deplored. Instead, they worked through new firms of their own selection.

In the short term, domestic crises would limit further Japanese military expansion in China. The February 1936 military revolt in Tokyo marked the high point of the extremists and the consolidation of power by the Control faction within the army. With the death of Korekiyo, whose monetary policies had spared Japan the worst effects of the Depression, opposition to additional inflationary spending by the government was silenced. Further efforts by palace advisers to defer full power for the military brought short periods of rule under Hirota Kōki and Hayashi Senjūrō. When these efforts failed, the leadership went to the popular but largely ineffective Konoe Fumimaro, scion of an ancient court family, in June 1937.

Meanwhile, in December 1936 Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by Chinese border armies at Sian (Xi'an) and was released when he agreed to the consolidation of Nationalist and communist efforts in an anti-Japanese United Front. To this development was added evidence that the Japanese people were not yet prepared to renounce the parliamentary system. General elections in spring 1937 showed a surprisingly strong performance by the new Social Mass Party, which received 36 seats out of 466 and a heavy majority for Seiyūkai and Minseitō, which had combined forces against the government and its policies. The time seemed ready for civilian leaders to assert their primacy, but the field armies anticipated them.

On July 7, 1937, Japanese troops opened fire on Chinese units at the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing. Thus began the Second Sino-Japanese War. Japanese armies took Nanking (Nanjing), Hankow (Hankou), and Canton (Guangzhou) despite a spirited Chinese defense; to the north, Inner Mongolia and the provinces of Shansi (Shanxi) and Shensi (Shaanxi) were invaded but not fully subjugated. After the brutal massacre of civilians and surrendered soldiers in Nanking, the Konoe government began peace feelers. The Nationalist government, which had retired to Chungking (Chongqing) in Szechwan (Sichuan), refused to negotiate. The Japanese responded in March 1940 by installing its own regime at Nanking under the former Nationalist leader Wang Ching-wei.

The rise of the Axis and the breakdown of relations with the U.S.

On November 25, 1936, the Anti-Comintern Pact was signed with Germany, and in 1937 it was expanded to include Italy. In September 1940, one year after the start of World War II, this was replaced by the Tripartite Pact. The Axis powers recognized Japan as the dominant power in Asia, and the three signatories agreed to assist each other if any one was attacked by a power not then at war. This was directed against the United States, as the Soviets and the Third Reich were then allied under the terms of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. Indeed, the Soviet Union was invited to join in the Tripartite Pact later in 1940.

Japanese relations with Moscow were not as close as those with Berlin. The Soviets did, however, sell their Chinese Eastern Railway holdings to the South Manchurian Railway in 1935, greatly strengthening the transportation infrastructure of Manchukuo. In 1937 the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression pact with China, and in 1938 and 1939 Russian and Japanese armies tested each other in two full-scale battles along the border of Manchukuo. The Soviet-Nazi pact of August 1939, however, was followed by a neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan in April 1941. Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke was taken aback by the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. in June 1941 and lost his position after an unsuccessful attempt to persuade his government to join in the German attack.

The German-Japanese alliance was never a close or effective one. Both parties were limited in their cooperation by distance, mutual distrust, and competing claims of racial superiority. Just as the Japanese were uninformed about Nazi plans for invading the Soviet Union, the Germans were not notified of Japan's intention to attack Pearl Harbor. Japan's state structure also did not approach the totalitarianism of the Third Reich. The Konoe government gained sweeping economic and political powers after the passage of a national mobilization law of 1938, and in 1940, under the second Konoe cabinet, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was established to merge the political parties into a single central organization. However, the institutional structure of the Meiji Constitution was never altered, and even the wartime governments never achieved total control. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association and its fronts never succeeded in mobilizing all segments of national life around a leader. The emperor remained but a symbol, albeit one increasingly tied to the military, and no Führer could compete without endangering *kokutai*, the national polity. Moreover, wartime social and economic thought retained important vestiges of agrarianism and familism which were in essence premodern rather than totalitarian.

Throughout the late 1930s, Japan's relations with the democratic powers deteriorated steadily. Both the United States and Great Britain assisted the Chinese Nationalist cause. The Burma Road, constructed with great difficulty, permitted the transport of a trickle of supplies to Nationalist forces. Japanese efforts to close this route were constant, and they briefly succeeded in 1940

when the British, facing desperate odds in Europe, felt they could not risk a second war. Animosity between the U.S. and Japan increased in the wake of the sinking of the gunboat USS *Panay* on the Yangtze River in 1937. In 1939 U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull denounced the 1911 commerce treaty with Japan, making possible the enacting of embargoes the following year. U.S. Pres. Franklin D. Roosevelt's efforts to rally public opinion against the world's aggressors included efforts to check Japan's expansion in Asia, but, even after the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, public opinion in the United States was averse to overseas intervention.

The war in Europe provided Japan with several avenues to profit. In 1941 the Japanese were torn between German invitations to join their war against the Soviets and the possibility of richer prizes from the warring powers' colonial holdings to the south. In 1940 Japan had occupied northern Indochina in an attempt to block access to supplies of the Chinese Nationalists, and in July 1941 it announced a joint protectorate with Vichy France over the whole colony. With this new base for action in Southeast Asia the way was prepared for further moves.

The United States reacted to the occupation of Indochina by freezing Japanese assets and declaring an embargo on oil to Japan. Japan's stockpiling had been inadequate, and the cutoff of U.S. petroleum presented the government with the alternatives of conciliating the U.S. by withdrawing from at least Indochina and possibly China or seizing the sources of oil production

in the Dutch East Indies. Negotiations with Washington were carried on under the second Konoe cabinet, which had come to power in 1940. Willing to agree to a withdrawal from Indochina, Konoe sought a personal meeting with Roosevelt. He had hoped that some concessions or favour would allow him to convince military leaders of the necessity of mending relations with the United States, but the U.S. State Department refused to agree to a meeting without prior Japanese concessions. Pressed by his war minister, Gen. Tōjō Hideki, Konoe resigned in October 1941 and was succeeded by Tōjō.

A deadline laid down by the military for agreement with the U.S., first set for October, was now pushed to November 29. Hull refused to recognize Japan's "final offer"—under which Japan would withdraw from Indochina only after China had come to terms, in return for U.S. promises to resume oil shipments, cease aid to China, and unfreeze Japanese assets. Hull also decided against proposing a previously formulated counteroffer lest the U.S. position seem to be weakening. In the meantime, Japan's decision for war had been made, but its negotiators in the United States, Nomura Kichisaburō and Kurusu Saburō, received instructions to continue dialogue with Washington. Preparations for the opening strike against the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, were already in motion.

The Japanese militarists had been presented with great opportunities for solving problems of material and strategic needs but had found their options limited by their previous aggression and the alienation of Western opinion.

They elected to try to establish a sphere in which Japan would sit at the centre of an industrial bloc that included Manchuria, Korea, and North China. This “new order” would draw the raw materials it needed from the rich colonies of Southeast Asia while inspiring these colonies to friendship and alliance through the destruction of their previous masters. In reality, “East Asia for the Asiatics,” Japan’s Monroe Doctrine for Asia, turned out to mean “East Asia for Japan.”

The demise of imperial Japan

World War II and early successes

The Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, achieved complete surprise, and the U.S. naval presence in the Pacific was significantly weakened as a result. Although some critics accused Roosevelt of creating a “back door to war” by precipitating the conflict, the Pearl Harbor attack galvanized the American people and awakened in them a determination to see the war through to a successful finish. This invalidated a major premise upon which the Japanese had based their decision. They had expected that once they fortified their new holdings, the “soft” democracies would balk at a reconquest that would be undoubtedly expensive in blood and treasure. Instead, U.S. naval strength in the Pacific was expanded dramatically, and Japan’s chain of defenses was breached before these riches could be effectively tapped by Japan.

The first years of the Pacific War brought Japan astounding victories. Japanese troops occupied Manila on January 2, 1942, although the American and Filipino defenders of Corregidor held out until May 6. Singapore fell on February 15, the Dutch East Indies were taken early in March, and Rangoon (Yangon) on March 8. The Allies struggled to maintain lines of communication with Australia, and the sinking of the British battleships *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales*, combined with the U.S. losses at Pearl Harbor, seemed to promise the Japanese navy complete freedom of action. In Japan the military situation bolstered Tōjō's confidence and popularity, and he began to adopt the mannerisms of a fascist leader. In the months that followed, however, it developed that the U.S. Navy had not been permanently driven from the South Pacific.

From Midway to Hiroshima

The Battle of Midway (June 3–6, 1942) cost the Japanese fleet aircraft carrier strength it could ill afford to lose. The battle for Guadalcanal in the Solomons ended with a Japanese withdrawal in February 1943. After Midway, Japanese naval strategists began to analyze shipping and battle losses and concluded that Japan's outlook for victory was poor. Their conclusions were carefully kept to themselves.

The Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 19–20, 1944) devastated what remained of Japanese carrier-based aircraft strength, and it led to the fall of Saipan in July 1944. This placed U.S. bombers within range of Tokyo and

doomed the Tōjō cabinet. It was replaced by that of Koiso Kuniaki. Koiso formed a supreme war council which was designed as a connection between the government and the high command. By this time it was becoming evident that Japan was losing the war, but no group was ready with an exit strategy that was acceptable to military leaders. Told only of victories, the Japanese people remained largely ignorant of the direction that the war had taken. The Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 23–26, 1944) effectively ended the ability of the Japanese Combined Fleet to carry out offensive operations and ushered in the widespread use of kamikaze attacks on Allied ships. The U.S. firebombing raids of 1945 devastated Tokyo and brought destruction to every major city except the old capital of Kyōto. Even then the generals were committed to continuing the war, confident that a major victory or even a protracted battle would be the best way of gaining honourable terms. Allied talk of unconditional surrender provided an additional rationale for continuing the fight.

In February 1945 the emperor met with senior statesmen, including Konoe, Okada, and other former premiers, to discuss Japan's options. After U.S. troops landed on Okinawa in April 1945, the Koiso government fell. The new premier, Adm. Suzuki Kantarō, was a veteran of the First Sino-Japanese War and an advocate of reaching a settlement with the Americans as soon as possible; the question was not whether to end the war but how best to do so. The first proposal involved soliciting the intervention of the Soviets, with whom Japan was still at peace. Konoe planned to travel to Moscow, but the Soviets had pledged to enter the Pacific War themselves. They delayed a reply while

Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin took part in the Potsdam Conference in July. While the Potsdam Declaration of July 26 restated the American ultimatum for an unconditional surrender, it pledged that Japan would not be “enslaved as a race nor destroyed as a nation.” The path to an honourable surrender seemed open, but Suzuki’s response to the Potsdam Declaration was noncommittal, and the Japanese government made no additional statements.

On August 6 a U.S. Army Air Forces B-29 dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, destroying the city. The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8. The following day the Red Army marched into Manchuria, where the Kwantung Army, whose best units had long since been withdrawn, could offer only slight resistance. A second atomic bomb was dropped, on Nagasaki on August 9.

The Suzuki government now attempted to gain as its sole condition for surrender a qualification concerning the preservation of the imperial institution. After the Allies replied that the will of the Japanese people would be respected, the emperor insisted on surrender. The Pacific War came to an end on August 14, 1945. Extremists within the military made a final attempt to prolong the war by preventing the August 15 radio broadcast of the emperor’s surrender announcement, but they were unsuccessful. The surrender was accompanied by a wave of suicides by military officers and nationalists who felt themselves dishonoured, but the emperor’s personal prestige was sufficient to carry the surrender process to its conclusion. To facilitate the transition, on

August 16 the Suzuki cabinet was replaced by that of Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko; Higashikuni would be the only member of the royal family to serve as prime minister. On September 2, 1945, U.S. and Japanese representatives met aboard the USS *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay to conclude the formal surrender agreement.

Investigators who studied the political and economic factors preceding the surrender concluded that neither the atomic bomb nor the Soviet declaration of war were the central factors in Japan's capitulation, although they probably hastened its arrival. It was concluded that the Allied naval blockade had brought economic victory by annihilating Japan's merchant marine capacity and preventing the effective exploitation of Japan's new colonies. American submarines sank nearly 5 million tons of Japanese merchant ships, while army and navy aircraft accounted for an additional 2.5 million tons. The devastating American strategic bombing campaign brought the consciousness of defeat to the Japanese public, killing hundreds of thousands and rendering nearly one-third of Japan's urban population homeless. The sanguinary battles in the Pacific had so depleted the strength of the Japanese navy and air force that the home islands could be threatened with invasion. The American occupation force found Japan's cities in ruins, its supplies exhausted, and its factories gutted. The government, whose boasts and guarantees of victory had proven hollow, stood without prestige or respect. Shortages of food and spiraling inflation threatened what remained of the *kokutai*. The time was ripe for changes.

Japan under U.S. occupation

During the war, the policies that would govern the occupation of Japan had been the subject of sharp debate in Washington. Although some advocated doing away with the influence of prewar Japanese moderates altogether, in the end a great deal was left to the initiative of the supreme commander. The Potsdam Declaration had pledged that postwar Japan would guarantee freedom of speech, religion, and thought and respect fundamental human rights. The Japanese government was to remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.

On August 29, 1945, a document outlining the initial U.S. post-surrender policy for Japan was worked out by the Departments of State, War, and the Navy; this became the basic statement of principles. As its ultimate objective, it envisaged Japan as no longer a threat to the peace and security of the world, ruled by a responsible government which would respect the rights of other states and support the objectives of the charter of the United Nations. The U.S. did not wish to impose any form of rule that ran contrary to the freely expressed will of the Japanese people, but it was hoped that Japan would conform as closely as possible to principles of democratic self-government. Japan would be limited to the four main islands and such minor islands as

were to be specified at a later date. The Soviets had laid claim to the Kuril Islands as a condition of their declaration of war; that transfer was formalized in 1951, and the entire Japanese population of the archipelago was forcibly repatriated. Japan was to be disarmed and demilitarized, with the influence of the militarists “totally eliminated” from political, economic, and social life. The Japanese people would be encouraged to develop a respect for individual liberties and human rights, and they would be given the opportunity to develop an economy adequate to meet the peacetime requirements of the population.

Power to carry out these objectives was given to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). By agreement of the U.S., British, and Soviet foreign ministers, a Far Eastern Commission representing all the Pacific allies was established for the formulation of policies and review of MacArthur’s actions, but whatever recommendations and directives ensued would reach him through normal military channels. An Allied council for Japan, representing the Soviet Union, China, the British Commonwealth, and the supreme commander, sat in Tokyo to furnish on-the-spot advice and consultation. The supreme commander was to consult this council before issuing orders, the exigencies of the situation permitting, but the final decision was his. In practice, SCAP paid the Allied council little heed and acted swiftly to forestall Far Eastern Commission directives. As a result, he was little hampered by outside interference, and the occupation was thus largely a U.S. affair. SCAP became a large organization of several thousand persons, including both the headquarters staff of the Pacific campaigns and personnel

who provided the technical, administrative, and bureaucratic staffs. MacArthur worked through the Japanese government and made his wishes known by directives or more discreet suggestions. He had to be consulted on all major decisions of policy or politics and thus functioned somewhat in the manner of the genro of an earlier day.

The efforts at democratizing Japanese society seemed successively radical and cautious, and they were criticized as doctrinaire and half-hearted by turn. The spirit of reform gave way to an emphasis on rebuilding and resuming production, as external factors sparked concern about excessive social and political change. It is evident that the victory of the Communists in the Chinese Civil War altered the U.S. view of Japan's role in international affairs and increased the desirability of speeding Japan's economic recovery. The SCAP attitude toward communism, labour, and deconcentration underwent decided changes. However, historians largely agreed that the measures taken by SCAP created an open political environment in which new forces could and did rise. Such trends proved successful and lasting in areas where occupation measures had coincided with trends toward change long present, though suppressed, within Japanese society.

The early months of the occupation saw SCAP move swiftly to remove the principal supports of the militarist state under which Japan had gone to war. The armed forces were demobilized, State Shintō was disestablished, and nationalist organizations were abolished and their members barred from

holding important posts. Other purges removed from active roles all individuals prominent in wartime organizations and politics, including commissioned officers of the armed services; this was later extended to include all high executives of the principal industrial firms. In Tokyo the International Military Tribunal for the Far East tried Tōjō and other leaders for war crimes, sentencing 7 to death, 16 to life imprisonment, and 2 to shorter terms. Millions of Japanese were repatriated from the former colonies and from Southeast Asia.

The Home Ministry, which had controlled wartime Japan through its appointive governors and national police, was abolished, and the Education Ministry was deprived of its sweeping powers to control compulsory education. Since central control and military influence were being dismantled by a military government which needed centralized powers in order to be effective, the occupation's role was often a contradictory one. In the course of issuing instructions to the Japanese government to make certain that changes were being carried out, SCAP ensured the survival of that government as one intimately concerned with the pattern of local events in all parts of the country. In many cases, factors of geography and economic rationality reinforced the logic of centralization, and some of the moves toward decentralization were soon modified or reversed.

Political reform and the 1947 “peace” constitution

The new political structure of Japan centred on a new democratic constitution. The indirect rule, unseen cliques, and shadowy nature of the real power behind the facade of imperial rule made the Meiji Constitution clearly inadequate, and SCAP informed Japanese leaders that constitutional reform should receive first attention. The veterans of earlier decades of parliamentary government proved unable to grasp or accept the kind of reform that was intended. Between October 1945 and February 1946 a cabinet committee headed by Matsumoto Jōji prepared revisions to the Meiji Constitution. However, when the resulting draft was submitted to SCAP, it proved to contain few and superficial changes. MacArthur’s government section rushed a new draft to completion in six days. This document was then submitted to the Japanese government as the basis for further Japanese deliberations. Despite the misgivings of conservative statesmen, it was approved by the emperor and submitted for amendment to the first postwar Diet, which had been elected in April 1946—the first Japanese elections in which women voted. The constitution, slightly modified, went into effect on May 3, 1947.

Its preface stated in ringing tones the intention of the Japanese people to ensure peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty for themselves and their descendants. The constitution included a 31-article bill of rights. Perhaps most notable of these was Article 9, which renounced war as a

“sovereign right of the nation” and pledged that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” The emperor, who had renounced his claim to divinity on January 1, 1946, was described as the “symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.” The prewar Meiji Constitution had described him as “sacred and inviolable.” The constitution provided for a bicameral Diet, with the greatest power vested in a House of Representatives whose members served for four-year terms. The old peerage was dissolved, and the House of Peers was replaced by a House of Councilors whose members served six-year terms. The prime minister was to be chosen by the Diet from among its members, and an independent judiciary, as in the U.S., had the right of judicial review.

The new constitution thus reversed the Meiji pattern that had placed all sovereignty in the imperial institution, from which power could be drawn by imperial household officials, military officers, and the privy council as well as by the prime minister. With the removal of the military service heads, the privy council, and the peers and with a clearly nonpolitical role specified for the emperor, authority lay solely with the elected Diet, which selected the executive from its ranks. For the first time in modern Japan, the nature and role of the executive were clearly defined. Parallel changes made prefectural governors and other local officials elective so that the government could be responsive to the popular will.

The 1947 constitution was drawn up hastily, and subsequent research by Japanese scholars led to the suspicion that SCAP had rushed to head off the recommendations of the Far Eastern Commission. Despite this, the constitution worked well, and it gained widespread support in Japan. Because its implementation coincided with the purge of most of the leaders of prewar and wartime Japan, conditions were favourable for the development of new ideas and methods.

By the time the Treaty of Peace with Japan went into effect in 1952, elements of the political pattern had already changed, and subsequent governments showed their ability to modify by administrative actions a constitution that remained unchanged. Decentralization in some fields had proven expensive and inefficient. The police, for instance, while less centralized than in Home Ministry days, had returned to a substantially national organization. Despite the announced goals of local decentralization, changing patterns of communications and administration had shown the logic of incorporating many small units of administration into larger units, a trend particularly marked in the countryside where villages and towns merged to form a more rational tax structure. Article 9 of the constitution was compromised by the decision taken by SCAP to form a “police reserve” of 75,000 men during the Korean War. This body, renamed the Self-Defense Force in 1954, came to number roughly 250,000 in the 21st century.

Nevertheless, the basic principles of the 1947 constitution enjoyed support among all factions in Japanese politics. Executive leadership was a chief asset of the new institutions. With the abolition of competing forces that had beset the premiers of the 1930s, the postwar prime ministers found themselves in charge of the administration and, with rearmament, the armed forces as well. Thus, responsible leadership gradually replaced the ambiguous claims of imperial rule of earlier days.

FOREIGN POLICY OF JAPAN FROM 1950 TO 2000

The Japan that returned to the international community in 1952 was considerably reduced in territory and influence. The Republic of China (Taiwan), the People's Republic of China on the mainland, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) all possessed military establishments far larger than what became Japan's Self-Defense Forces. Given the rise of the Cold War, international relations were not destined to be conducted on the pacifist lines envisioned by Article 9 of the constitution. The United States maintained its occupancy of Okinawa and the Ryukyus, while the Soviet Union occupied the entire Kuril chain and claimed southern Sakhalin. The Korean War increased the urgency for a peace treaty. Details for such a treaty were worked out by the United States and its noncommunist allies during the command of General Matthew B. Ridgway, who succeeded MacArthur as supreme commander in April 1951.

The San Francisco peace conference that convened in September 1951 thus ratified arrangements that had been worked out earlier. In the peace treaty that ensued, Japan recognized the independence of Korea and renounced all rights to Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Kurils, and southern Sakhalin and gave up the rights to the Pacific islands earlier mandated to it by the League of Nations. The Soviet Union attended the conference but refused to sign the treaty. This enabled Japan to retain hope for regaining four islands of the Kurils closest to Hokkaido—territory that Japan had gained through negotiations, not war. The

peace treaty recognized Japan's "right to individual and collective self-defense," which it exercised through the United States–Japan Security Treaty (1951) by which U.S. forces remained in Japan until the Japanese secured their own defense. Japan agreed not to grant similar rights to a third power without U.S. approval. Americans promised to assist Japan's Self-Defense Forces while U.S. military units (except air detachments and naval forces) were withdrawn to Okinawa.

The treaty made no arrangements for reparations to the victims of Japan's Pacific war but provided that Japan should negotiate with the countries concerned. Consequently, effective resumption of relations with the countries of Asia came only after treaties covering reparations had been worked out with them. These were signed with Burma (now Myanmar) in 1954, the Philippines in 1956, and Indonesia in 1958. In 1956 Japan restored diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union but without a formal peace treaty. With the Soviet Union no longer blocking the way, Japan was admitted to the United Nations in late 1956 and subsequently became active in United Nations meetings and specialized agencies. It also became a contributing member of the Colombo Plan group of countries for economic development in South and Southeast Asia, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Japan spearheaded the creation of the Asian Development Bank in 1965–66.

At the time of the peace treaty, Prime Minister Yoshida wanted to delay committing Japan to either of the two Chinas, but the U.S. negotiator John Foster Dulles convinced him that the treaty would be opposed in the U.S. Senate unless assurances were given that Japan would recognize the Republic of China. Thus, Tokyo soon negotiated a peace treaty with that regime, but one that would not prejudice subsequent negotiations with Beijing. A lively trade developed with Taiwan, where Japan made considerable contributions to the economy.

Trade relationships with mainland China developed slowly in the absence of diplomatic ties. In 1953 an unofficial trade pact was signed between private Japanese groups and Chinese authorities. In addition, a semiofficial “memorandum” trade became increasingly important in the 1960s. The Chinese government made skillful use of trade for political purposes, in the hope of embarrassing or weakening Japan’s conservative governments, and intervals of ideological tension on the mainland—e.g., the Great Leap Forward (1958–60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–76)—usually were reflected in a decline or cessation of trade with Japan. Nevertheless, Japan gradually became China’s most important trading partner.

U.S. overtures toward mainland China in 1971 led to a rapid reorientation of Japan’s China policy. Japanese government leaders indicated a willingness to compromise ties with Taiwan in favour of a closer relationship with Beijing. Beijing also revealed a new interest in formal relations with Japan, subject to

Japan's revocation of its treaty with Taiwan. In 1972, a year after mainland China was admitted to the UN, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei reached an agreement with Beijing on steps to normalize relations. Japan simultaneously severed its ties with Taiwan, replacing its embassy with a nonofficial office.

Japan's post-occupation relationship with the United States was founded on the 1951 security treaty. Part of the understanding that lay behind this treaty was that Japan would have access to the U.S. market in exchange for the maintenance of American bases on Japanese soil. While the LDP saw advantages to maintaining such a quid pro quo relationship, which allowed Japan to dramatically expand its foreign trade while avoiding undue security costs, Japan's opposition parties were less sanguine about a relationship that tied Japan directly into the increasingly hostile Cold War. Tensions therefore mounted as the renewal date of the treaty (scheduled for 1960) approached; both governments hoped to extend it for 10 years as the revised Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. The situation was complicated by domestic dislike of Kishi Nobusuke, who had become prime minister in 1957 after having earlier served in the Tōjō cabinet. Kishi had been named, though not tried, as a war criminal by the occupation. His staunch anticommunist stand, his open support of constitutional revision, and his undemocratic tactics made him suspect among many Japanese who felt they had been only marginally involved in the making of the original treaty and were anxious about the nation's future. Added to this was the proposed visit to Japan by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower that was scheduled amid new tensions caused

by the downing of a U.S. reconnaissance plane by the Soviet Union in May 1960. When the Kishi cabinet used its majority in the Diet to force through treaty revisions, opposition increased steadily. Gigantic public demonstrations, largely composed of students, shook Tokyo for days. In the end the treaty survived, but Eisenhower's visit was canceled and Kishi resigned in July 1960.

The administration of U.S. President John F. Kennedy caught the imagination of many Japanese, and Kennedy's designation of the popular scholar Edwin O. Reischauer as ambassador further improved Japanese-American relations. But by the late 1960s the unpopularity of the Vietnam War threatened to disturb the relationship once more. Prime ministers Ikeda and Satō worked hard to remove the final reminders of war. In 1967, under Satō, the Bonin (Ogasawara) Islands were restored to Japan; and in 1969, on the eve of renewed negotiations over treaty revisions, the United States agreed to return the Ryukyus in 1972, although bases were to be maintained on Okinawa under the terms of the security treaty. The treaty was renewed without incident in 1970, now changed to allow termination by either side with a year's advanced notification. Thus, by 1972 the U.S.-Japan relationship had stabilized. While signs of change on the part of both countries could be found in their China policies, there was as yet little to indicate the mounting conflict over trade that subsequently emerged.

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The late 20th and early 21st centuries

Economic change

By the early 1970s a series of forces had combined to bring to an end the era of high growth that Japan had experienced in the 1950s and '60s. These included significant advances in technology, the disappearance of ample rural labour for industry, and the decline in international competitiveness of heavy manufacturing industries such as shipbuilding, aluminum, fertilizers, and, later, steel. Outcries over urban congestion, pollution, and environmental degradation and dissatisfaction with ever-escalating land prices caused many middle-class Japanese to question the economic and political logic that linked growth with national success. The foreign trading environment also was changing. In 1971 the United States devalued the U.S. dollar by 17 percent against the Japanese yen. The OPEC oil embargo of 1973–74 created a further disruption of the Japanese economy, which depended heavily on Middle Eastern oil. Outbreaks of panic buying by consumers brought reminders of the essential fragility of Japan's economic position; the rapid rise in the price of oil ended an era of relatively cheap and abundant energy resources. Thus, by the mid-1970s many Japanese felt increasingly insecure about their place in the global economy. Japanese dependency on fuel and food—as demonstrated by the consternation caused in 1972 when the United States temporarily embargoed soybean exports to Japan—had become increasingly clear.

During the 1970s and '80s, consequently, Japan tried to integrate its economy more effectively into the global system and sought to diversify its markets and sources of raw materials. Japan became a firm advocate of international free trade and tried to create at least a measure of energy self-sufficiency through the increased use of nuclear power. The economic uncertainties of the 1970s produced a reemergence of a defensive, nationalistic sentiment that pictured Japan in a struggle with outside forces aimed at depriving the Japanese of their hard-won postwar gains. Until the early 1990s, international economic tensions were effectively used by the ruling LDP and the bureaucracy to contain and defuse important domestic economic and political issues.

The domestic rhetoric about the hostile international environment in which Japan operated cloaked the fact that by the 1980s the Japanese economy had become one of the world's largest and most sophisticated. Per capita income had surpassed that of the United States, and total gross national product stood at roughly one-tenth of world output. By the mid-1980s Japan had become the world's leading net creditor nation and the largest donor of development aid. Prosperity, however, was increasingly linked to trade. Slow domestic growth was offset by booming exports. In the 1970s exports were seen as vital to balance the deficits anticipated from rapidly rising oil prices. But, as the Japanese economy successfully weathered the recessions induced by escalating oil prices in 1972-74 and 1979-81, the volume of exports accelerated. Headed by automobiles, colour television sets, high-quality steel, precision optical equipment, and electronic products, Japan's merchandise

trade balance with western Europe and the United States steadily mounted in its favour.

By contrast, domestic consumption, which had played such an important role in the first phase of Japan's postwar recovery, began to stagnate. By the early 1990s the Japanese were consuming considerably less than their American, British, or German counterparts. At the same time, consumer prices in Japan were considerably higher than the world average. Studies showed that consumption patterns were influenced by lagging wage increases, congested housing, traditional savings habits, and long working and commuting schedules that provided little time for leisure.

Mounting Japanese trade surpluses increased friction between Japan and its trading partners in Europe and the United States. Japan's critics charged that the country advocated free trade abroad but maintained a closed market at home, engaged in "adversarial trade" designed to benefit only Japan, and pushed trade to export domestic unemployment during economic hard times, and there were complaints that Japan sold goods abroad at lower than domestic prices—a charge denied by Japanese business and government leaders. The government and bureaucracy responded by making efforts to "open" Japan. In the early 1970s Japan had the world's second highest tariffs on manufactured goods, but two decades later such tariffs were the lowest among the economically advanced countries. Restrictions on many agricultural products—including, in the early 1990s, rice—were lifted. Japan's financial

markets were deregulated and liberalized, and a study commissioned under Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro in 1986 proposed the restructuring of the Japanese economy to make it rely almost entirely on domestic demand for growth. Plans for such changes were further taken up in the so-called Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) in the late 1980s. By the end of the decade it was generally acknowledged that formal barriers to trade had been largely dismantled, though areas such as construction bidding were still closed, and many cultural barriers remained.

At the same time, what came to be called Japan's "bubble economy" of the 1980s, which typified an era that combined easy credit with unbridled speculation and eventually drove Japanese equity and real estate markets to astronomical price levels, burst. In 1992–93 this ushered in a deep recession, the severity of which postponed many of the earlier reform plans, further undercut Japanese consumer confidence, and inevitably exacerbated trade tensions. Japan's merchandise trade surplus with the world, however, continued to spiral up. Those export surpluses finally produced a rapid appreciation of the yen against the dollar in the mid-1990s. Contrary to American expectations, however, this had only marginal effects on the trade balance. At the same time, the stronger Japanese currency allowed Japanese firms and individuals to invest heavily abroad by buying foreign assets (notably real estate) at bargain prices.

The Japanese economy continued to stagnate, teetering between economic recession and anemic growth as the country entered the 21st century. Unemployment, still relatively low by Western standards, rose considerably and in 2000 surpassed 5 percent for the first time in the postwar era. A series of prime ministers in the 1990s and early 21st century called for major economic reforms, particularly deregulation. Notable were the sweeping reforms (dubbed the “Big Bang”) proposed by Hashimoto Ryūtarō (who served as prime minister 1996–98) in administration, finance, social security, the economy, the monetary system, and education. The measures were endorsed by Hashimoto’s successors, but they met resistance in many sectors. Several leaders, including Koizumi Junichiro, who became prime minister in 2001, felt stymied by the inability of the policy changes to produce economic growth. The economy also faced other challenges, particularly from a rapidly aging population and rising income disparities. Although the bond with the United States remained the linchpin of Japan’s external relations, Japan reoriented its economy to integrate it more effectively into that of the Asian economic bloc.

Political developments

The LDP continued its dominance of Japanese politics until 1993. Its success in steering Japan through the difficult years of the OPEC oil crisis and the economic transition that substituted high-technology enterprises for smokestack industries in the 1970s and ’80s, thereby restoring Japan’s international economic confidence, was not lost on the Japanese public. The

emerging prosperity that accompanied this transition and the declining influence of the opposition parties, particularly the socialists and communists, served as further popular endorsements of the government-business alliance that the LDP represented. By the late 1980s and early '90s, however, as economic growth slowed and income disparities heightened public sensitivity to political corruption, this bargain between the people and their government changed.

Yet, there were also earlier signs of a political transition. While LDP rule appeared to be strengthening, the party's share of the popular vote was declining—from three-fifths in 1969 to barely half in 1983 and to less than a third in the House of Councillors election of 1989. And, while the premiership remained firmly under LDP control, all governments but that of Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982–87) were short-lived. In 1989 the LDP lost control of the House of Councillors to a coalition of opposition parties headed by the socialists, who proposed Doi Takako, the first woman to head a major party in Japan, to be prime minister—a nomination rejected by the lower house.

The era had begun in 1972 with considerable hope for political change, as Tanaka Kakuei, a self-made politician who defied the usual LDP bureaucratic model, sought to address the problems of pollution and urban crowding by calling for a redistribution of industry throughout the Japanese islands. Tanaka's grand plans soon encountered the reality of the OPEC oil crisis. His era ended in 1974 with little change and with him mired in

a major influence-peddling scandal. Indeed, Tanaka came to symbolize the rise of “money politics,” as election campaigns became increasingly expensive and faction leaders—expected to provide campaign funds to their followers—became heavily entangled in questionable financial relationships. At the same time, aggressive businesses needed the cooperation of politicians and bureaucrats to expand within Japan’s highly regulated economic system. As the bubble economy inflated in the 1980s, money flowed freely into political coffers. Although there were early calls for reform, few in the LDP were prepared to make changes. To some degree Tanaka, who was arrested in 1976 and convicted of bribery charges in 1983, underscored this reluctance on the part of the LDP to undertake serious reforms. Despite the guilty verdict, he served no jail time and remained a political force into the late 1980s. By that time, political corruption had become almost endemic, and the LDP was racked by a succession of scandals.

Political turmoil was muted for some months during Emperor Hirohito’s illness in 1988. His death, in January 1989, ended the Shōwa era, the longest recorded reign in Japanese history—some 62 years. He was succeeded by his son, Akihito, who took the reign name Heisei (“Achieving Peace”).

But “peace” was difficult to preserve on both the domestic and foreign fronts. Later in 1989 Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru was forced out of office for involvement in a scandal involving manipulation of the stock market. Takeshita’s successor Uno Sōsuke almost instantly found himself embroiled in a sex scandal, and he resigned after only 68 days in office. Uno was replaced by the “clean” Kaifu Toshiki, who lacked firm support in the party. This became apparent in the lead-up to the Persian Gulf War (1990–91), when Kaifu found himself labeled “reluctant” and “indecisive” in handling Japan’s response to U.S. requests for assistance. Kaifu was forced from office in late 1991 when his efforts to secure legislation for Japanese noncombat participation in UN peacekeeping efforts—which was passed in 1992—and anticorruption measures failed to gain Diet support.

Miyazawa Kiichi, who succeeded Kaifu in 1991, had been a powerful figure within the LDP for several decades. Another damaging political scandal emerged, and Miyazawa, sensing the public outcry, tried to introduce reform legislation in the Diet. This cost him the support of key LDP members, and a no-confidence motion in June 1993, supported by many LDP members, toppled his government. In elections held the following month, the LDP lost its Diet majority to a coalition of opposition parties, ending its 38-year rule.

The July 1993 election ushered in a period of political transition. Several new parties emerged that were essentially splinter groups off the LDP, including the Japan New Party (JNP) and the Japan Renewal Party. These joined several

former opposition parties to form a coalition government with Hosokawa Morihiro, leader of the JNP, as prime minister.

Hosokawa initiated political reform, including limitations on campaign contributions and a change in the Japanese electoral system. He achieved some success in limiting contributions and managed to pass a modified elections package that included the creation of 300 single-member constituencies (the remainder of the House of Representatives was to be elected by proportional representation in 11 regional blocs). Opposition within his coalition to tax reform and accusations of his own involvement in the Miyazawa-era scandal forced his resignation in April 1994. Hosokawa's successor, Hata Tsutomu, lasted a mere two months. In the ensuing power vacuum, socialists and remaining LDP members formed an unlikely coalition, and Murayama Tomiichi became Japan's first socialist premier since 1948.

During Murayama's short tenure (1994–96), Japan experienced a devastating earthquake in Kōbe that killed more than 5,000 people and a terrorist attack on the Tokyo subway system by AUM Shinrikyo, a small religious sect, that killed 12 people and injured thousands of others. In 1995 the House of Representatives passed a resolution expressing "deep remorse" for past "acts of aggression," particularly in Asia, and pledging adherence to the no-war clause in the postwar constitution. Murayama followed the resolution by becoming the first Japanese prime minister to use the word *owabi* (unambiguously, "apology"). That year, however, Murayama's Social Democratic Party of

Japan (the former Japan Socialist Party) suffered a string of election defeats, and in early 1996 Murayama resigned as prime minister.

Murayama was succeeded by LDP president Hashimoto Ryūtarō, who retained the support of the socialists and the smaller New Harbinger Party (Sakigake). In October the LDP won 239 of 500 seats in the House of Representatives, but with no party willing to join a coalition with the LDP, Hashimoto oversaw a minority administration. By the following year, however, the LDP was able to recruit enough independents to command a majority in the House. Nevertheless, the economic recession reduced the government's popularity and led in 1998 to legislative losses for the LDP and Hashimoto's resignation. Obuchi Keizo, who led the largest of the LDP's factions, was elected LDP president and prime minister. In April 2000 Obuchi suffered a stroke that left him comatose (he died six weeks later), and the LDP secretary-general, Mori Yoshiro, was quickly confirmed as prime minister. In elections that June, the LDP lost its majority and was forced into an awkward alliance with two smaller parties. Mori's many missteps—for example, he referred to Japan as a “divine country,” a phrase that evoked Japan's militaristic past—reduced his approval rating to an all-time low for a Japanese prime minister. In April 2001 Mori announced his intention to resign.

Koizumi Jun'ichirō, who urged economic reform and fiscal restraint and criticized the party's factions, defeated several rivals to win the presidency of the LDP and was confirmed as prime minister. Koizumi enjoyed widespread

popularity, but some of his reforms were resisted by the LDP's conservative factions. In addition, his support for allowing Japan's military forces to exercise a full-fledged (rather than only defensive) security policy and his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine elicited outrage from some segments of the Japanese population and protests from Japan's neighbours in Asia, particularly South Korea and China. Despite the controversies, the LDP's resurgence continued, and in 2003 the party won a clear majority in the House of Representatives, securing Koizumi a second term as prime minister.

Koizumi, after serving his full term, stepped down in September 2006 and was succeeded over the next two years by a string of three prime ministers—all from politically well-connected families. Abe Shinzo, the grandson of Kishi Nobusuke and great nephew of Satō Eisaku (both former prime ministers), served in 2006–07 but resigned amid party scandals and concerns about his health and after the LDP had lost its majority in the upper house of the Diet. His replacement, Fukuda Yasuo—whose father, Fukuda Takeo, was prime minister in 1976–78—also stepped down after a year in office (2007–08), following a nonbinding censure vote by the upper house (the first under the 1947 constitution) and continued frustration over his political agenda. Succeeding Fukuda in September 2008 was Asō Tarō, grandson of Yoshida Shigeru and son-in-law of Suzuki Zenkō, both also former prime ministers. However, Asō could not stem the downward spiral of the LDP's popularity with voters, who were increasingly dissatisfied with what they saw as the party's ineffectiveness, mismanagement, and corruption. A particular focus of voter

anger was the apparent bureaucratic mishandling of some 50 million pension records that was revealed in 2007. Voters were also unhappy that the LDP had changed prime ministers three times in three years without an electoral mandate. In the August 2009 lower-house elections, scores of LDP candidates were soundly defeated, and the party was swept out of office.

Replacing the LDP was the centrist Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which had been founded in 1996 to challenge the LDP. Soon after its formation, the DPJ emerged as the main opposition party. However, it endured several years of mixed electoral results before its first major success in the 2007 House of Councillors elections, when with its allies it became the dominant force in that chamber. The DPJ's victory was a landslide in the August 2009 elections, winning 308 seats in the lower house. The party subsequently formed a ruling coalition with the Social Democratic Party of Japan and the People's New Party, and on September 16 DPJ leader Hatoyama Yukio was elected prime minister. However, Hatoyama's tenure was ineffectual and brief, cut short after he reneged on a campaign promise to close an unpopular U.S. military base on Okinawa (it was to be moved to a different part of the island instead). He stepped down as prime minister and as head of the party on June 4, 2010, and was succeeded in both offices by Kan Naoto, another high-ranking member of the DPJ.

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